# Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk

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## 1AC

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#### Queer life is prestructured by chrononormativity – temporal linearity organizes life into staged sequences of maximum productivity in service of capital and statecraft. To have a life, to embody one’s flesh, is to belong to the state’s timeline of linear movement that brackets out the “excessive” and “unproductive” past unless it contributes to national futurity. Debate itself is structured by this temporal linearity – the resolutional demand for action is the generative point for zones of excess violence. Out of the narratives of chronobiopolitics emerges the sexual dissident of queerness, the anachronism, the flicker of history and pastness, that interrupts the sequence of cisheteronormativity and must immediately be effaced.

Freeman ’10 -- Professor of English at UC Davis, began her teaching career at Sarah Lawrence College, coming to UC Davis in 2000. She specializes in American literature and gender/sexuality/queer studies, and her articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals (Elizabeth Freeman, "Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories," Perverse Modernities: A Series Edited by Jack Halberstam and Lisa Lowe, Duke University Press, 2010, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1198v7z>, accessed 4-16-2021) -- nikki

By portraying the reciprocal derangement of bodies and sequences, K.I. P. offers a through-the-looking-glass view of how time binds a socius. By ‘‘binds,’’ I mean to invoke the way that human energy is collated so that it can sustain itself. By ‘‘time binds,’’ I mean something beyond the obvious point that people find themselves with less time than they need. Instead, I mean that naked flesh is bound into socially meaningful em- bodiment through temporal regulation: binding is what turns mere exis- tence into a form of mastery in a process I’ll refer to as chrononormativity, or the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity. And I mean that people are bound to one another, en- grouped, made to feel coherently collective, through particular orchestra- tions of time: Dana Luciano has termed this chronobiopolitics, or ‘‘the sexual arrangement of the time of life’’ of entire populations. Chrononormativity is a mode of implantation, a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts. Schedules, calendars, time zones, and even wristwatches inculcate what the sociologist Evitar Zerubavel calls ‘‘hidden rhythms,’’ forms of temporal experience that seem natural to those whom they privilege. Manipulations of time con- vert historically specific regimes of asymmetrical power into seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines, which in turn organize the value and meaning of time. The advent of wage work, for example, entailed a violent retemporalization of bodies once tuned to the seasonal rhythms of agricultural labor. An even broader description of chrononormativity appears in Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of habitus—a social group’s culti-vated set of gestural and attitudinal dispositions. Bourdieu argues that ‘‘the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations’’ structuring the norms of embodiment, personhood, and activity in a culture takes shape within the rhythms of gift exchange. For Bourdieu, cultural competence and thus belonging itself are matters of timing, of coming to inhabit a culture’s expectations about the temporal lapses be- tween getting and giving such that they seem inborn. More recently, Judith Butler has shown how the rhythms of gendered performance— specifically, repetitions—accrete to “freeze” masculinity and femininity into timeless truths of being. Zerubavel’s “hidden rhythms,” Bourdieu’s “habitus,” and Butler’s “gender performativity” all describe how repe- tition engenders identity, situating the body’s supposed truth in what Nietzsche calls ‘‘monumental time,’’ or static existence outside of histori- cal movement. But Bourdieu alone allows us to see that subjectivity emerges in part through mastering the cultural norms of withholding, delay, surprise, pause, and knowing when to stop—through mastery over certain forms of time. In temporal manipulations that go beyond pure repetition, his work suggests, institutionally and culturally enforced rhythms, or timings, shape flesh into legible, acceptable embodiment. In chronobiopolitics, this process extends beyond individual anato- mies to encompass the management of entire populations: people whose individual bodies are synchronized not only with one another but also with larger temporal schemae experience belonging itself as natural. In a chronobiological society, the state and other institutions, including repre- sentational apparatuses, link properly temporalized bodies to narratives of movement and change. These are teleological schemes of events or strate- gies for living such as marriage, accumulation of health and wealth for the future, reproduction, childrearing, and death and its attendant rituals. Indeed, as the anthropologist John Borneman’s work clarifies, so-called personal histories become legible only within a state-sponsored time- line. his timeline tends to serve a nation’s economic interests, too. In the United States, for instance, states now license, register, or certify birth (and thus citizenship, eventually encrypted in a Social Security id for taxpaying purposes), marriage or domestic partnership (which privatizes caretaking and regulates the distribution of privatized property), and death (which terminates the identities linked to state benefits, redistribut- ing these benefits through familial channels), along with sundry privileges like driving (to jobs and commercial venues) and serving in the military (thus incurring state expenditures that often serve corporate interests). In the eyes of the state, this sequence of socioeconomically ‘‘productive’’ moments is what it means to have a life at all. And in zones not fully reducible to the state—in, say, psychiatry, medicine, and law—having a life entails the ability to narrate it not only in these state-sanctioned terms but also in a novelistic framework: as event-centered, goal-oriented, in- tentional, and culminating in epiphanies or major transformation. The logic of time-as-productive thereby becomes one of serial cause-and- effect: the past seems useless unless it predicts and becomes material for a future. These teleologies of living, in turn, structure the logic of a “peo- ple’s” inheritance: rather than just the transfer of private property along heteroreproductive lines, inheritance becomes the familial and collective legacy from which a group will draw a properly political future—be it national, ethnic, or something else. Chronobiopolitics harnesses not only sequence but also cycle, the dia- lectical companion to sequence, for the idea of time as cyclical stabilizes its forward movement, promising renewal rather than rupture. And as Julia Kristeva argues, the gender binary organizes the meaning of this and other times conceived as outside of—but symbiotic with—linear time. Kristeva claims that Woman, as a cultural symbol, comes to be correlated with the endless returns of cyclical time, as well as the stasis of monu- mental time: the figure of Woman supplements the historically specific nation-state with appeals to nature and eternity. Luciano dates a par- ticularly Anglo-American version of this arrangement to the early nine- teenth century, when ‘‘separate spheres’’ were above all temporal: the repetitions and routines of domestic life supposedly restored working men to their status as human beings responding to a ‘‘natural’’ environ- ment, renewing their bodies for reentry into the time of mechanized production and collective national destiny. In the wake of industrializa- tion in the United States, she writes, mourning was newly reconcep- tualized as an experience outside of ordinary time, as eternal, recurrent, even sacred—and so, I would argue, were any number of other affective modes. Mid-nineteenth-century writers figured maternal love, domestic bliss, romantic attachments, and eventually even bachelorhood as havens from a heartless world and, more importantly, as sensations that moved according to their own beat. The emerging discourse of domesticity, especially, inculcated and validated a set of feelings—love, security, har- mony, peace, romance, sexual satisfaction, motherly instincts—in part by figuring them as timeless, as primal, as a human condition located in and emanating from the psyche’s interior. In this sense, the nineteenth cen-tury’s celebrated ‘‘heart,’’ experienced by its owner as the bearer of archaic or recalcitrant sensations, was the laboring body’s double, the flip side of the same coin of industrialization. The fact that the wage system privat- ized domestic activities also meant that they could be experienced as taking place in a different time zone. In the home, time bound persons “back” to “nature,” a state of innocence that could be understood as restorative only if women’s domestic labor were fully effaced. If time becomes history through its organization into a series of discrete units linked by cause and effect, this organization in turn retrospectively con- structs an imagined plenitude of “timeless” time to which history can return and regroup. Thus the monumental or sacred time that Kristeva also describes as ‘‘Women’s Time’’ does not escape chronobiopolitical regulation either. Luciano’s crucial extension of and intervention into Kristeva’s work dem- onstrates that nations and other public forms of engroupment depend not only on progressive, linear time and the cyclical time that buttresses it but also on the illusion that time can be suspended. Pauses or interrup- tions in the routinized rhythms of everyday life, in the sequences expected to unfold naturally from one another, become the material for a people- hood experienced as pre- or a-political, as merely human. In describing the narrative texture of modern nationality, Homi Bhabha too refines the distinction between linear-historical time and the more static times of cyclic and monumental time: he describes the dialectic between a ‘‘peda- gogical’’ time in which historical events seem to accrete toward a given destiny, and a ‘‘performative’’ time in which a people recreates itself as such through taking up a given activity simultaneously. Soliciting the masses to stop and feel together, activities done in tandem with strangers seen and unseen, like singing the national anthem or watching the Olym- pics, revivify national belonging as a matter of shared emotion rather than civic action. Bhabha claims that within performative strategies of national belonging, fissures can open up to suggest other historical moments or ways of living. And indeed, as Luciano points out, in counterpoint to the time of factory life in the antebellum United States, a set of ‘‘performa- tive’’ sensations and corporeal forms was imagined, or even felt, not just as a contribution to national destiny but also as an impediment to or bulwark against the pedagogical time of history proper. Mourning and romance, empathy and affection were not segmented into clock-time, even if highly ritualized public performances like courtship and grieving did follow timelines; the sentiments and their perceived rhythms coun-tered ‘‘work time’’ even as they were also a product of it. So did the time of specific bodily needs. As Eli Zaretsky writes, ‘‘The family, attuned to the natural rhythms of eating, sleeping, and child care, can never be wholly synchronized with the mechanized tempo of industrial capital- ism.” Emotional, domestic, and biological tempos are, though cultur- ally constructed, somewhat less amenable to the speeding up and micro- management that increasingly characterized U.S. industrialization. Time’s Wounds As Luciano puts it, in the dialectic between linear-national history and cyclical-domestic time, history appears as damaged time; time appears as the plentitude that heals the historical subject. Time, then, not only “binds” flesh into bodies and bodies into social but also appears to ‘‘bind’’ history’s wounds. But the figure of damaged time also became the signa- ture of late-nineteenth-century decadence and modernism. Of course, the appearance of sexual identity as a field of knowledge and self-description was part of a more general movement toward the abstraction and tax- onomizing of human qualities, the reification of both space and time, that began with industrial capitalism. In this sense, homosexual identity was simply the product of a historical moment in time. But sexual dissi- dents have also in many ways been produced by, or at least emerged in tandem with, a sense of “modern” temporality. The double-time of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was somewhat different from the highly gendered, sacred time of antebellum domesticity: rather than evoking timelessness, it trafficked in signs of fractured time. Its signature was interruptive archaisms: flickering signs of other histori- cal moments and possibilities that materialized time as always already wounded. Thus gay men, lesbians, and other ‘‘perverts’’ have also served as figures for history, for either civilization’s decline or a sublimely fu- turistic release from nature, or both. Here we might cite, for instance, the poet Renée Vivien’s Sapphic vampires, the novelist Djuna Barnes’s hybrid animal/child/lesbian Robin Vote, or T. S. Eliot’s sexually alien- ated J. Alfred Prufrock declaring himself to be ‘‘Lazarus, come from the dead!’’ Sexual dissidents became figures for and bearers of new cor- poreal sensations, including those of a certain counterpoint between now and then, and of occasional disruptions to the sped-up and hyperregu- lated time of industry. Freud’s concept of the unconscious acknowledged exactly this doubled time: it relocated modernity’s temporal splittings into the psyche’s in- terior (and thus from their moorings in historically specific changes). Freud theorized the ‘‘normal’’ self as a temporal phenomenon, the ego as a manifestation of displaced and disavowed past experiences. The Freud- ian unconscious refused to make an experience obsolete or to relegate it to the past; within the Freudian paradigm that Laplanche and Pontalis term Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, the mind recorded the signs of an event when the subject could not consciously process its meaning, and preserved these signs for future uses.≤≥ So even as an emerging consumer market and what Foucault calls the ‘‘incitement to discourse’’ about sexual types put an ever greater premium on novelty, the interlaced models of the unconscious and Nachträglichkeit insisted on a certain semiotic re- calcitrance. And in Freud, what we might now claim as a queer intem- pestivity evidenced itself in and with the body as well as the emotions. The repetitions and returns that disturb the Freudian subject appear not as pictorial or narrative memories per se but in forms that are at once metaphorical and visceral: a ‘‘slip of the tongue,’’ repetitive bodily acts, lingering symptoms with no apparent physical etiology. In this sense, the ‘‘perverse’’ Freudian body itself became the scene of and catalyst for en- countering and redistributing the past. This was particularly true of the body erotic. As early as the eighteenth century, Henry Abelove and Paul Morrison have argued, erotic life began to assume the contours of mechanized productivity, and specific sexual practices came to be seen as ‘‘foreplay,’’ acceptable en route to intercourse but not as a substitute for it.≤∂ In Freud’s update, these practices were remnants of childhood itself, not merely adult means to an orgasmic end. Psychologizing what had once been biological paradigms, Freud identi- fied taboo sexual practices as normal childhood behavior in which the pathological adult subject was simply stuck or frozen due to an inability to remember, conceptualize, or narrate past events. Orality, anality, fe- tishism, and so onthat lie became, in the Freudian itinerary, places that chil- dren visited on their way to reproductive, genital heterosexuality, but not places to stay for long. This stubborn lingering of pastness (whether it appears as anachronis- tic style, as the reappearance of bygone events in the symptom, or as arrested development) is a hallmark of queer affect: a “revolution” in the old sense of the word, as a turning back. Heather Love’s Feeling Backward, for instance, astutely diagnoses the ‘‘backwards’’ emotions elaborated by artists for whom the birth of the modern homosexual identity-form was constraining rather than liberating: shame, passivity, melancholy, and recoil, to name but a few, were ways of refusing the progressive logic by which becoming ever more visible was correlated with achieving ever more freedom.≤∑ Late-nineteenth-century perverts, melancholically at- tached to obsolete erotic objects or fetishes they ought to have outgrown, or repeating unproductive bodily behaviors over and over, also used pas- tess to resist the commodity-time of speedy manufacture and planned obsolescence.

#### In the contemporary digital era emerging technologies are no longer material but rather are subjective and ideological constructions grounded in the erasure of queered difference – normative technological computation and the system of laws that proceed from it form an infrastructure of control structured to maximize the functionality of technology while effacing its inextricable relationship to queer life – only a queer digital aesthesis can solve.

Ruberg et al ’18 -- (Bonnie Ruberg, Jason Boyd, James Howe,2018, "Toward a Queer Digital Humanities," University of Minnesota Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5749/j.ctv9hj9r9.11.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ab631047a0664f3e40ceb61daa13f4225&ab\_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=search-results, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

Queer DH Methodologies: Inspiration from Existing Work While queer studies can usefully employ DH tools and practices to produce scholarship focused on queer subjects, it is also important to examine how queer theory can inform current and future digital humanities methodologies. One of the key areas of debate in DH is the role that computing plays in differentiating DH from other modes of humanities scholarship. Some have argued that the digital humanities’ narrow focus on computation has led the field to imagine itself, supposedly like computation itself, as free from concerns of economics, race, gender, and sexuality. As Alan Liu observes, “While digital humanists develop tools, data, and metadata critically . . . rarely do they extend their critique to the full register of society, economics, politics, or culture. How the digital humanities advances, channels, or resists today’s great postindustrial, neoliberal, corporate, and global flows of information-cum-capital is thus a question rarely heard in the digital humanities” (Liu, web). Liu goes on to argue that DH must develop a “methodological infrastructure” that unites computational and cultural criticism. Similarly, Roopika Risam, in her essay on intersectionality in DH, suggests four areas in which the digital humanities need to develop in order to create a more inclusive and socially engaged standard of practice: “cultivating a diverse community,” “acknowledging inclusions and exclusions in data,” applying “theoretical models that position intersectionality as an already existing but oft-overlooked part of computation,” and developing systems “for understanding the ways difference [or lack thereof] shapes digital practices” (Risam). Liu’s and Risam’s critiques make it clear that currently dominant DH methodologies are not sufficient for the development of a queerly inflected digital humanities. The last two areas of development mentioned by Risam (theoretical models in which to identify existing intersectionalities and systems for understanding how difference shapes computation) are of particular interest to the present project. They suggest a queer DH praxis that is distinguished from mainstream DH through its conceptual models—models that can usefully be informed by queer theory. To draw from key questions that queer theory has asked in literary and historical studies, how can we discover, uncover, and recover the queerness (in its various intersectional manifestations) in computation, as well the effects that queerness has had on computing and the potential effects it could have in the future? To date, this praxis has taken the form of speculating on the interconnected histories of queerness and computing, imagining the queering of the fundamental structures of computing technologies, conceptualizing queerness itself as a technology, exploring the queerness of code, and utilizing concepts of “speculative computing” to enact queer work. A number of these existing works can help us think about queer methodologies for DH. A generative starting point is Kara Keeling’s “Queer OS,” which outlines the properties of an imagined queer operating system that itself offers new frameworks for making sense of society and identity. In Keeling’s formulation, inspired by Tara McPherson, Queer OS is “a project at the interfaces of queer theory, new media studies, and technology studies” that structures itself around the logics of queerness (153). Keeling’s Queer OS, should it exist, would understand cultural phenomena like “race, gender, class, citizenship, and ability . . . to be mutually constitutive with sexuality and with media and information technologies.” Keeling continues: “Queer OS names a way of thinking and acting with, about, through, among, and at times even in spite of new media technologies and other phenomena of mediation. It insists upon forging and facilitating uncommon, irrational, imaginative, and/or unpredictable relationships” between human subjects and digital media (154). As a launching point for imagining queer DH methodologies, Keeling’s Queer OS can be read as an imperative for queer DH scholars to embrace the complex and often contradictory tangle of intersectional investigation. It also directs DH researchers more generally to understand computing not as outside of social issues but rather as shaping and indeed being shaped by cultural determinants. In addition to informing our vision of a queer digital humanities, Keeling’s essay has inspired others to interrogate the intersection of queerness and DH. In their 2016 piece, “Queer OS: A User’s Manual,” Barnett and colleagues take up Keeling’s call to conceptualize a Queer OS, which, the authors point out, “remains a largely speculative project” (50). However, as the authors themselves point out, the speculative operations of the queer system shouldn’t necessarily conform to conventional notions of functionality. To the contrary, they state, [Our goal] is to engage with the challenge of understanding queerness today as operating on and through digital media and the digital humanities. Our intervention therefore seeks to address what we perceive as a lack of queer, trans, and racial analysis in the digital humanities, as well as the challenges of imbricating queer/trans/racialized lives and building digital/technical architectures that do not replicate existing systems of oppression. As such this is a speculative proposition for a technical project that does not yet exist and may never come to exist, a project that does not yet function and may never function. (51) The “user’s manual” the essay provides is a provocative queer reimagining of what form and role various key components in digital computing (such as interfaces, applications, and memory) might take, with “each component given a poetical and theoretical description of its features and limitations” (50). While these descriptions inspire the reader to imagine a potential future in which computing is more in line with the ethos of queerness, some readers may ask where, in the present, we might identify the beginning points that might lead us toward a concrete instantiation of a Queer OS and, along with it, a queer DH. DH practitioners who are themselves queer and therefore potentially marginalized subjects working within the reward and accreditation structures of contemporary academia may feel that they need to produce work of a more tangible sort than “theoretical vapourware, speculative potentialware, ephemeral praxis” (51). These individuals may wish to (or feel the need to) develop computing technology that shares meaningful connections with this theoretical work but that does not itself embody “an unreliable system full of precarity” with an “inherent instability,” given the already precarious position of many queer subjects within the digital humanities (54). In order to further explore the trajectories along which queer DH might unfold, we turn next to three of the scholarly works from which Keeling draws. The first is Jacob Gaboury’s series of articles titled “A Queer History of Computing.” One question that vexes the development of a queer DH is how to theorize the relationship between queerness and the ways in which computing itself can enact queer erasure. In his piece, Gaboury addresses this tension through a discussion of Alan Turing and other figures from the history of computing whom Turing influenced. Though Turing is considered to be a central figure in the development of modern computing, rarely have conceptualizations of his work overlapped with discussions of his queerness or the injustices he suffered at the hands of the British government. Gaboury recognizes that any claims about a direct correlation between Turing’s sexuality and his theories of computation would be problematic. To posit that the former “inspired” the latter would be simplistic, says Gaboury, yet to conclude that no relationship exists between the two “parses what is technologically significant in such a way so as to exclude the personal, the emotional, and the sexual” (Gaboury). Faced with the problem of articulating how the sexual signifies within the technological, Gaboury traces historical connections between a community of queer figures who played key roles in the early history of computing. Though it remains unclear what direct effects sexuality may have had on their work, Gaboury finds value in refiguring their production through a “speculative history” that foregrounds the oft-elided place of queerness. This type of fabrication (i.e., speculation) resonates in unexpected ways with the digital humanities practices of critical making. Gaboury’s history of computing both extends and problematizes DH methodologies by recasting making as “making up.” Additionally, Gaboury’s focus on historical absence—the suppressed, missing, unrecorded, and always partial nature of queerness in the history of computing—points toward the restorative work that could be done by a queer digital humanities. Turing’s place within the history of artificial intelligence connects Gaboury’s work to Jack Halberstam’s earlier essay “Automating Gender: Postmodern Feminism in the Age of the Intelligent Machine.” Halberstam’s essay too provides useful models for conceptualizing a queer digital humanities. “Automating Gender” offers, among other things, a critique of feminist theories that rely on reductive ideas of phallotechnocracy and essentialist conceptions of gender. Like Gaboury, Halberstam looks to Turing to counter these narratives. What is now commonly referred to as the “Turing Test,” Halberstam points out, began as a “sexual guessing game” in which an interrogator attempted to determine the genders of players as they answer questions via technological mediation. “Turing does not stress the obvious connection between gender and computer intelligence,” writes Halberstam. However, “both are in fact imitative systems, and the boundaries between female and male . . . are as unclear and as unstable as the boundary between human and machine intelligence. . . . Gender, like intelligence, has a technology” (443).2 To illuminate this unstable binary between the human and the machine, Halberstam takes up Donna Haraway’s delineation of the female cyborg as a representation of technology’s ability to transcend binary structures. Given that queerness, unlike essentialized gender or sexuality, has been closely aligned with artificiality, unnaturalness, imitation, and the subversion of binaries, one might describe Haraway’s cyborg as queer—and, by extension, Halberstam’s vision of cyborg technology as queer technology. In addition to envisioning technology as queer, Halberstam implicitly posits queerness itself as a technology. Such a formulation suggests a symbiotic, dialectic relationship between technology and queerness. It also suggests that the interface between human and computing technology might be understood as a space of queer intimacy and relation. Placed within our discussion of digital humanities methodologies, “Automating Gender” challenges us to account for the ways in which gender and sexuality are in fact inextricable from computational systems. Another valuable touchstone for interrogating the relationship between queerness and the digital is Blas’s Queer Technologies project, mentioned above, which similarly turns to Turing in theorizing the relationship between queerness and computation. “For us,” write Blas with his collaborator cárdenas in an article outlining the work of Queer Technologies, “Turing is a crucial historical figure for thinking the politics of digital technologies from queer and feminist perspectives” (2). Yet, perhaps more than a historical figure, Turing appears here as a founder of queer computational thinking. Did Turing’s homosexuality affect his research? Blas and cárdenas answer this question with a resounding yes. “The drives and assumptions of a heterosexual sexuality produce certain ways of producing and knowing that can be embodied in objects created by heterosexual scientists,” they assert. “Similarly, homosexual desires can inform and help to materially construct the technicity of objects.” That is, for Blas and cárdenas, the very logics around which contemporary computation has been founded are shaped by Turing’s queerness. Fittingly, it seems that the impulse behind the many artistic works that make up the Queer Technologies project is to reimbue or perhaps rediscover the queerness in computational technology. Of these works, the one of most interest here is Blas’s transCoder, which Blas describes as “a queer programming anti-language.” Works written using transCoder are not executable. Instead, transCoder functions primarily as a critical tool—in Mark C. Marino’s words, “a theoretical software development kit, made not of functional functions but of encoded plays on the methods and discourse of critical theory” (“Of Sex,” 187). As an unexecutable coding language, transCoder suggests a suite of approaches to queer digital humanities methodologies that play with failure and loss. We will return to reflect on the critical concerns that surround failure below. Still, our vision of a queer DH must account for an investigation of the times when technologies, like heteronormative modes of meaning, break down. Queer Technologies models how practice-based work might speak to potential queer DH methodologies. It also directs us to consider the queer potential of other forms of digital praxis. transCoder can be seen as a queer application of what has been called codework. Codework subverts the tenets of “well-written” code: simplicity, functionality, transparency, and legibility. Examples of codework range from the nonexecutable net.art creations of “Mez” (Mary-Ann Breeze), written in a hybrid language called “m[ez]ang.elle,” to obfuscated code and esoteric programming languages (“esolangs”). In “Interferences: [Net.Writing] and the Practice of Codework,” Rita Raley notes that codework allows programming languages to break the surface, rather than simply leveraging them to perform the invisible labors of technology. This refiguration of code—as elusive, hidden, and ultimately uncontrollable—resonates with queer theory’s notion of queer meaning as similarly submerged and anxiogenic. Referring to Jessica Loseby’s net.art work Code Scares Me, Raley notes how it thematizes “anxieties about [the] intrusion, contamination, and uncontrollability” of code (Raley). Like queerness as interpreted by many queer literary scholars, code in Raley’s formulation becomes monstrous, invisible, unknowable, and alien: “It lurks beneath the surface of the text. . . . The fear, further, is that code is autopoietic and capable of eluding . . . attempts to domesticate it and bring it into order.” Practitioners of codework, Raley observes, see their production as expressly political; it resists assumptions about the neutrality of programming, reclaims code from corporate functionalism, and repurposes the pragmatic as the aesthetic. Such sentiments stand in contrast to the seemingly apolitical sensibilities of programmer communities dedicated to composing obfuscated code and esolangs. These practices tend to fall into the domain of professional programmers for whom testing the boundaries of coding represents an opportunity to demonstrate mastery. Yet obfuscated code and esolangs too represent potentially generative modes of queer DH methodologies. They refuse established expectations for readability and intentionally walk an anxious line between the domestication of code and code’s refusal to “be brought into order.”3 This discussion of esolangs brings us to the last work from which we draw inspiration for our vision of queer DH methodologies. This is what Johanna Drucker has termed “speculative computing.” As Drucker recounts in her book SpecLab, speculative computing emerges from a “productive tension” within the digital humanities. Specifically, speculative computing aims to invert DH’s focus on the use of digital tools in humanities scholarship by focusing instead on the development of “humanities tools in digital environments” (Drucker, xi). Extending the conceptual stakes of speculative computing, Drucker advances a theory called “aesthesis,” which foregrounds “partial, situated, and subjective knowledge” and proposes imaginative play with digital objects as an antidote to the totalizing authority of meaning. “Aesthesis,” writes Drucker, “allows us to insist on the value of subjectivity that is central to aesthetic artifacts . . . and to place that subjectivity at the core of knowledge production” (Drucker, xiii). In Drucker’s characterization, speculative computing takes seriously the destabilization of categories, including taxonomies of entity, identity, object, subject, interactivity, process, and instrument. In short, speculative computing rejects mechanistic and instrumental approaches, replacing them with indeterminacy and potentiality, intersubjectivity, and deformance. Speculative computing operates as a critique of the computational logics that structure much digital humanities scholarship. While Drucker does not mention queerness in SpecLab, her work gives voice to an ethos that could serve as a powerful directive for the queer digital humanities. A queer DH would extend the “otherness” that speculative computing enacts by focusing deliberately on issues concerning gender and sexuality in computing. Like queerness itself, the methodologies of a queer digital humanities must not be monolithic. Indeed, with its resistance to totalizing knowledge, speculative computing demonstrates the importance of methodological diversity. Accordingly, we believe that modes of queer DH scholarship must themselves be multivalent, multiplicative, and self-critical: a set of practices in flux. Taken together, the works considered in this section challenge us to think about queerness in digital humanities methodologies as a matter of fundamental computational structures, as well as (if not more than) a matter of content. These works also encourage us to reflect on the foundational role that intersectional issues related to gender and sexuality play in the formation of new media and digital tools. They insist upon the importance of queer thinking within the history of computation; they delineate the queerness of technology as well as the technology of queerness. Some of the research we have discussed employs traditional scholarly methods. Equally compelling, other works make their arguments through fabrication and artistic interpretation. In our vision, a queer digital humanities too stands poised at the intersection of critique and creation. Drawing from these conceptual frameworks, queer DH itself emerges cyborg-like: a playful methodological hybrid of perspectives, tools, and meaning.

#### This resolution calls us to know the world through technology which is to engage in an intimate encounter with queerness – technologies are not static or rigid but rather are malleable, unstable, and deconstructible – the ontological indeterminacy of queerness is the generative point for digital possibilities.

Haber ’16 -- (Benjamin Haber, 2016, "The Queer Ontology of Digital Method,” Women's Studies Quarterly , FALL/WINTER 2016, Vol. 44, No. 3/4, QUEER METHODS (FALL/WINTER 2016), pp. 150-169, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44474067.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A16ac84823d870932dfbc4dad72c01232&ab\_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

Ontology after the Normal Responding in part to the limitations of a discursive politics built upon the implicit corporal malleability of social constructionism, queer and fem- inist theorists have been articulating a weirder and less determined un- derstanding of embodiment for some time. As heralded through a variety of turns and critical réévaluations (see, for example, Clough and Halley 2007; Coole and Frost 2010; Mortimer- Sandilands and Erickson 2010), these more complicated ontologies understand a body as more distribut- ed, less human, and dynamically undone through strange temporalities encompassing food, plastic, and distant relatives (Landecker 201 1). Both drawing from and intervening in the natural sciences, this new attention to matter and embodiment has produced exciting new interventions in fields like physics (Barad 2007), biology (Wilson 2010; 2015), and neu- roscience (Pitts-Taylor 2016). While fruitful, moving queerness from its discursive and deconstructive roots to a more generative and ecological ontology has provided the politics of queer indeterminacy with some un- comfortable mirrors. The scientific uptake of a postnormal biological ontology has led to a productive réévaluation in feminist and queer social theory of the in- herent political value of indeterminacy. The increasing body of research highlighting the strong, temporally strange "epi" (i.e., socioenvironmen- tal) influence on genetics (Landecker 201 1) has both usefully complicated deterministic ideas about genetic inheritance (Lock 2005) and lead to troubling suggestions of state management of pregnant bodies (Bateson 2001, 932-33). While the notion of the body as an autopoietic system guarding against the harmful outside world is increasingly superseded by a queerer, more flexible looping process of body formation in action, the politics of this move are unsettled as well (Maturana and Varela 1980). Victoria Pitts-Taylor, for example, has explored how plastic notions of the brain can be smoothly resonant with a "neoliberal logic of self-care and responsibility" (2010, 639), while Catherine Malabou looks at the trauma of war and the ways that brain plasticity and an ontological openness can be radically destructive to subjects (2012). While scientists are just begin- ning to recognize the vital role of nonhuman cells in regulating the body, once speculative moves to queer the notion of the subject beyond the human, bounded body, or even the organism (Clough 2012) are becom- ing increasingly widespread. This opens up possibilities for new alliances and deeper connections as well as new ground for military and biomedical intervention and modulation (Cooper 2008). The interest in indeterminacy in the life sciences finds increasing paral- lels in the computer sciences. More precisely, the biodigital is converging in ways that render the distinction less meaningful as the body s capacity is leveraged, for example, by creating rewritable digital data storage in live cells (Bonnet, Subsoontorn, and Endy 2012). There is also the growing field of machine learning; notable in particular are "neural" systems of par- allel algorithms, inspired by the stochastic and plastic human brain, which learn how to perform tasks like scanning "800 million people to find a sin- gle face in 5 seconds" (Hemsoth 2015). More speculative are the moves to harness indeterminacy at the small- est scales of matter. Nanotechnologies involve computational bioengi- neering of materials "before they become qualified in a specific form or function" (Parisi 2012, 38). For Parisi, this is the extension of affect, that realm of precognitive capacity, away from life and the organism in order to see an indeterminate potential at the heart of all matter. Parisi writes of the futurai potential of "programmable matter" designed to operate in a specu- lative environment of emergent relations and unknown equations (40). This is an indeterminacy with vast potential for instrumentalized capital- ization - a paradoxical indeterminacy where "nano-ergonomic control indeed leaves nothing to approximation and yet its precise design remains infinitely open," such that nanotech is "almost designed to remain exact but uncertain" (46). This vision is of capitalism well beyond the normal, a new kind of postprobabilistic modulation where "if control is investing in chaos, it is because it is working to grasp the randomness" (37). While the technoscientific uptake of ontological indeterminacy re- quires an ongoing interrogation of the queer political project, it also sug- gests a unique opportunity for both biopolitical critique and, essentially, queer experimentation. As the tracking and sensing technologies of the everyday rearticulate embodiment and environment, queerness can more forcefully articulate a vision of indeterminacy that whisks away from capi- talization and is bent toward thoughtful interconnection and the perverse proliferation of pleasures and expressions.

#### How does the system of states that characterizes our contemporary understanding of the world come into being ?

#### How are we called to imagine the United States federal government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ?

#### The international system as we know it is not governed by structure but rather by a constant chaotic process of violent statecraft, the representational production of sovereign political identities that ground themselves in gendered and sexual normativities – to rehearse the grammars of the resolution is to rehearse the grammars of our death.

Montpetit and Weber ’17 -- (Melanie Richter Montpetit and Cynthia Weber, 2017, “Queer International Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, DOI:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.26, accessed 7-21-2022) -- nikki

State and Nation Formation How does Queer IR scholarship help us to understand state and nation formation? Like Mainstream IR scholars, Queer IR scholars study the historical rise of the modern interstate system, contemporary examples of state-building, and the politics of nationalism and national political identification practices. Like the work of Feminist and Gender scholars, Queer IR scholarship examines the role of gendered norms and identities in past and present processes of state and nation formation and thus the social construction of states, nations, and national identities. Taking these concerns further, Queer IR scholars study these in the register of sexuality. A classic argument in Queer IR on state and nation formation is V. Spike Peterson’s (1999,2013) scholarship on “nationalism as heterosexism.” Peterson’s research investigates how state and nation formation is not only socially constructed but works through ongoing processes of reproduction, resistance, and reconfiguration. Peterson’s Queer IR scholarship evidences the central role of gender and heteronormative norms and institutions in imagining or inventing nations, nationalism, and national identities. Drawing attention to how gendered and sexualized normativities fuel political identification processes and conflict, Peterson challenges state-centric conceptualizations of national groups and political identities found in Mainstream IR. Her queer analysis also challenges the implicit heterosexism underwriting much of the feminist scholarship on the fundamental role of gender identity and hegemonic masculinity for national identityconstruction. Peterson argues that early state-making processes were generative of gendered and sexualized norms and normativities, including heteropatriarchal marriage and family. In short, “making states makes sex” (Peterson, 2014A, p. 390). Peterson’s most recent work pursues these concerns through registers of intimacy in relation to heteronormativities and homonormativities (2014a, 2016). A prominent example for Queer IR scholarship that shows how state and nation formation is not a one-off occurrence but an ongoing process is the work of Cynthia Weber (1998A,1999, 2016A). Weber’s Queer IR scholarship on U.S.-Caribbean relations after the Cuban Revolution, for example, demonstrates how sovereign nation-states mobilized what she calls “queer performativities” in practice. Weber agrees with mainstream IR theorists thatmany U.S. policymakers and military officials perceived the Cuban Revolution as a crisis that jeopardized U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean region. By extending Mainstream,Feminist, and Gender analyses into the realm of Queer IR, Weber argues that this crisis of hegemony was related to two further U.S. crises—a masculinity crisis (which feminist andgender scholars identify) and a heterosexuality crisis (which Queer IR scholars identify).Weber reads key U.S. foreign policy documents and speeches to show how, contrary towhat one would expect, the United States addressed these crises of hegemony, masculinity, and heterosexuality by using what she called “queer compensatory strategies”—strategies that refigured the U.S. state in its Caribbean relations as queer(i.e., non-normative in relation to the gender and sexuality of the figural U.S. body politicthat appears in these documents) in order to appear to be hegemonically heteromasculine. Weber followed up on these classic Queer IR texts in her recent bookQueer InternationalRelations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge, where she explains some ofthe broader domestic and international sexualized logics at work in both state and nationformation and in the organization of international politics. Through her queerreconsideration of Richard Ashley’s work on “statecraft as mancraft” (see Queer IRMethods section above), Weber explains how what she calls “queer logics of statecraft” function in domestic and international politics to create what she calls “sexualized organizations of international relations” (2016a, 2016b). Recent Queer IR scholarship on sexual justice struggles show that contestations overLGBT rights have come to constitute a key terrain of state- and nation-building and theconstruction of supranational identity—both among proponents and opponents of LGBTrights. For example, Lind and Keating’s (2013) work on postcolonial state-building in thecontext of Ecuador’s recent turn away from neoliberalism shows that in the quest tocentralize authority, the Ecuadorian state relied on a mix of state homophobia and what they call state “homoprotectionism.” Other Queer IR research on state- and nation-building argues that “the international”consists not only of states and international organizations but also non-state institutionsand queer popular culture. Catherine Baker (2016), for instance, conceptualizes theEurovision Song Contest as a popular-cultural text/event produced by a non-stateinternational actor as an important sight and site of international relations.

#### Thus we affirm queer cyborg writing, a liberatory methodological queering of the contemporary technosphere that embraces a symbiotic subjectivity between human and machine and deconstructs the normative binaries that structure the social order of modernity.

Ghan ’20 -- (Ben Berman Ghan, 02-24-2020, "Queering the Cyborg: How the Hybrid Body Can Set Us Free," Strange Horizons, http://strangehorizons.com/non-fiction/queering-the-cyborg-how-the-hybrid-body-can-set-us-free/, accessed 7-20-2022) -- nikki

The Cyborg as a figure in popular culture—the body in a literal state of “human/machine symbiosis” (Katherine Hayles How We Became Posthuman 112)—is often conceived as a monstrous figure, as a figure of otherness, a being whose status as a hybrid has made it less deserving of the title of humanity. The Cyborg, when portrayed as an inhuman monster, has “always defined the limits of community in the western imagination” (Donna Haraway The Cyborg Manifesto 64). However, in embracing this hybrid status, the Cyborg need not remain a subhuman Other, but rather, can become the figure in which queer and repressed bodies might break free from the constraints that their normative culture places on them. This essay argues that the Cyborg, under critical posthumanist and queer theory, can range from hybrid subjectivities grafted to the human body, or inhuman bodies fused with human subjectivities, to bodies that have found an equilibrium in both their human/machine avatars, and finally, to figures that have become cyborgs of both the body and the mind. Subjectivity, throughout this essay, refers to how a creature sees its world, and how that creature sees and defines itself as a part of that world. A human’s subjectivity, for example, might involve an understanding of linear time and mortality, and an understanding of who they are in relation to others. A dog’s subjectivity, by contrast, might be similar to the human’s, but not identical, with its subjective understanding of time, and certainly of social structures, differing. How a machine or extraterrestrial might perceive themselves and their universe is further still from what the human subjectivity perceives. In short, subjectivity will be used as a shorthand for how characters are capable of thinking about their external and internal worlds. This Mind and Body Cyborg as a queer figure raises its head in Amal El-Mohtar and Max Gladstone’s 2019 epistolary novel This Is How You Lose the Time War, as two Cyborg bodies shed their previous subjectivities in order to find a queer understanding of one another. Through their altered subjectivities, the post-human Cyborg as a queer figure is one that can flourish and reach out to one another in new forms of "Cyborg writing" (Haraway 54) that the "pure" human world could never achieve. This is How You Lose The Time War opens with each of the two protagonists already in possession of two separate types of Cyborg bodies. Red—the agent of a post-singularity "techy-mechy dystopia” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 36)—represents the most traditional figure of the Cyborg as a human/machine symbiosis, whose “gyroscopes whir in her gut, lenses click beneath the camouflage jelly of those pure black eyes” (14). She operates in a world where these enhancements and implantations are not invasive but natural. Blue—Red’s initial opponent, and eventual romantic partner—descends from an opposing “viny-hivey elfworld” (36) future. Blue exists as a body in symbiosis not with the traditional artifice of technology but with a sentient nature represented as “Garden” (6). “Garden” stands as a potential alternative future to the AI intelligence of “Agency” (6) that created Red. To continue to call Blue a literal Cyborg is to acknowledge how “plant sentience and intelligence are […] explicitly associated with the mediation of machines” (Teresa Castro The Mediated Plant 11). Blue remains a figure of human/machine symbiosis, even if that machine has taken a different form (that of a human/plant-machine). Like Red, Blue sees her own body as natural, and Red’s as the unnatural. She emphasizes that while the Cyborgs of Red’s world are created artificially and decanted, the children of Garden are “grown […] seeds planted, roots combing through time” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 126). The struggle to overcome the dualisms of natural/unnatural is both a central conflict of El-Mohtar and Gladstone's novel and a critical project in queering the figure of the Cyborg, the hybrid body focused on breaking down the dualisms and binaries of normative human culture. When This Is How You Lose the Time War speaks of being infected by or "infiltrated" (8) by one another both mentally and physically, Red and Blue often speak of the act of reading as the most potent infiltration point for the writer. In a letter, Red—one of the two correspondents of the novel—acknowledges that their reading of each other has “built a you within me, or you have” (94). The novel treats the act of reading and writing as a way for Red and Blue to trigger personal "apocalypses" (defined below) of their subjective notions of purity and otherness within one another, with writing creating not new moments, but new worlds. “Letters are structures, not events. Yours give me a place to live inside” (94) argues Red, illustrating how Blue’s words alone have restructured her sense of self, and her sense of belonging. The novel's preoccupation with ways to instigate such personal apocalypses mirrors the very literal apocalypses on a planetary scale that both Red and Blue seek to trigger through history, travelling "upthread into the stable past or downthread into the fraying future" (10) to infect and destroy timelines by changing events in an attempt to “preserve what matters [for their own sides] and let what doesn't fall to dust: mulch for the more perfect future's seed" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 60). The planetary apocalypses throughout the story intend not to end the world, but to radically alter it. As I explain below, this is a posthumanist application of the term apocalypse, and the one best applied to how Time War treats change in both character and world. Creating not the physical but the cognitive Cyborg always requires these apocalyptic rearrangings of subjectivity in order to wipe away the binaries and dualisms of traditional human culture—binaries such as the strict gender norms of man/woman in a single binary (hetero) normative sexuality, or the dualisms of self/other, human/inhuman, or us/them that would keep the figure of the Queer Cyborg constrained. As Time War applies apocalypse on a global scale by rewriting events, it applies apocalypse on the subjective scale through Red and Blue’s literal writing of themselves and each other. Apocalypse, as applied to subjectivity, is not the "end to the physical world, per se, but the world as structured for the characters" (Glazier, Beck 5). Looking outside of Time War, the cognitive Cyborg received its post-apocalyptic birth in literature by coming into contact with transformative and apocalyptic writing. In Ted Chiang’s novella Story of Your Life, the protagonist Louise Banks correctly identifies how her personal apocalypse and global/societal apocalypse coincide “when ships appeared in orbit and artifacts appeared in meadows” (Chiang 2). In Chiang’s global apocalypse, the mere arrival of the alien is enough, as the presence of otherworldly beings forces the Earth to re-examine the idea of "human exceptionalism" (7) that is assumed by humanism. However, while the mere arrival of the Heptapods is the epoch for the global apocalypse in Chiang, for Louise, their arrival is only “how it began” (Chiang 2). While Story of Your Life only briefly concerns itself with the global apocalypse that the Heptapods herald, Chiang’s narrative keeps its focus on Louise's more personal apocalypse: the restructuring of her subjectivity. The radical change to Louise’s subjectivity goes beyond the presence of the alien, and actually hinges on the insights forced onto Louise by the Heptapods' languages, and more specifically the Heptapods' written language, which gives birth to Louise’s own “unique sense of apocalypse” (Glazier, Beck 5). The Heptapods’ written language—what Louise refers to as “Heptapod B” (Chiang 14)—suggests a version of temporality unlike the “sequential mode of awareness” (31) that Louise had previously experienced. Where human language—analogue language—uses separate symbols to act as signified/signifier for one another, Heptapod B suggests a "digital" mode of temporality, where there are no separate words or terms that can represent signified or signifier (Glazier, Beck 12). The Heptapods “experience events all at once” (Chiang 31) without being bound to sequence or linear cause and effect, and they express this “simultaneous mode of consciousness” (Chiang 32) through Heptapod B. Louise’s pre-apocalyptic life was “before [she] learned to think in Heptapod B” (Chiang 35). While there are instances where Louise truly experiences “past and future all at once” (36) as Heptapods do, Louise's subjectivity becomes “an amalgam of human and Heptapod” (Chiang 35). Instead of becoming entirely digital, as the Heptapods are, Louise's after(-)life is one which must incorporate both her previous human language and the "memories of destiny" (Glazier, Beck 16). Through these changes in language and writing, Louise revises her concept of the subject, as it forces her to reconcile different identities through her life. Her new subjectivity revises her many identities through time as single, married, divorced, childless, pregnant, a mother, and a mother grieving for her child into a single digital sense of self. The personal apocalypse that Louise experiences through this new language is one that shatters her humanist, static identity of "I" into an "I" of many simultaneous "multiple selves" (16). Louise's apocalypse ultimately results in not only a change but a radical expansion in her subjectivity. Chiang’s narrative then creates a type of cognitive Cyborg with an entirely “pure” physical human body, but a mind that has become a fusion, with an inhuman understanding being fused to a human subjectivity. However, the cognitive Cyborg can go further in muddling notions of human purity, as can be seen in Alan Moore's Saga of the Swamp Thing: Book One. In the comic, the protagonist initially believes himself to be only a literal fusion of plant and a human body, akin to the physical human/plant-machine symbiosis of Time War’s Blue. Though his subjective understanding of self has incorporated an inhuman body, he still maintains a self-image of a purely human existence underneath, separate and apart from the inhuman. But this notion of human purity is destroyed through contact with writing, when Swamp Thing stumbles upon writing about himself and his own nature. This writing reveals the origin and truth of Swamp Thing’s body and creation: he is not a human within a monstrous figure but "a mass of plant fiber that had somehow been infected with the consciousness of Alec Holland" (66). Returning to the idea of subjectivity being an infection, Swamp Thing becomes the inverse of Louise from Story of Your Life, an entirely alien body of inhuman origin, whose subjective understanding of the world and the self has become more like the human. Swamp Thing’s subjective self after this apocalyptic revelation is no longer that of Time War’s Blue, but a new cognitive symbiosis of human consciousness/plant-machine body. As with Time War, the figure of Moore’s comic had already begun as a kind of physical hybrid, but only through writing do they become a new kind of Cyborg through a fusion of human/artifice within the mind alone, free to cast off the constraints of their previous understanding of the self. The Cyborg of the mind, or the cognitive Cyborg, exists not in opposition to Hayles’s physical Cyborg, but as a less literal companion. Andy Clarke, in Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence, proposed that a Cyborg could be created out of any fusion between the "pure" human and the use of any artifice that the human might use to express themselves or enable their identities. Clarke alludes to the use of writing utensils, digital platforms, and other technologies that can become an extension of the self without the literal "intrusion of silicon and wire into flesh and blood, as anyone who has felt himself thinking via the act of writing already knows" (Clarke 5). This alternative method of Cyborg creation suggests it is not the physical hybrid status of the body that triggers the creation of the cognitive Cyborg, but how writing may expose a body to new ways of thinking about themselves. Returning to The Cyborg Manifesto, Haraway argued that Cyborg writing is "about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other" (55). This Is How You Lose the Time War creates an opportunity for two characters to engage in Cyborg writing as an active, rather than passive process, as they each receive their apocalypse through contact with the writing. Neither Red nor Blue are limited to the role of author or audience, but rather both serve as reader and writer for one another, each allowing the other a chance to redefine what it means to be a hybrid for both. Though Haraway originally posited how women of colour might be understood as the “cyborg identity” (54) most powerfully placed to be enabled through Cyborg writing, applying Cyborg theory to narratives like This Is How You Lose the Time War shows how other “taboo fusions” (52) that stray from the notions of purity that are “persistent in western traditions” (59)—such as those inherent in heteronormativity—might also be primed for the act of writing as a transformative process. The letters sent and shared between Red and Blue continually infect them throughout the narrative. In both purpose and style, they evolve throughout the novel from only short taunts and cruel allusions of what each believes the other’s world to be like to a “confession of real, curious ignorance" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 36) about the other's opposing world. Their ignorance of any real knowledge of one another has been fostered by both Agency and Garden's "manic compulsion to name the Enemy" (Haraway 9) as entirely Other. When these early letters speak of infection and infiltration, it is only in binary terms, each fearing the other is trying to entirely convert or “recruit” (36) them to the “enemy’s” side. However, Red and Blue’s letters to one another move into Cyborg writing once they begin to seek understanding over conversion. Curiosity and desire drive them to each attempt to "say something true" (37) about themselves to one another. In this quest for truth, Red and Blue move past writing in stifling binaries into the realm of storytelling, each attempting in letters to write their own origin stories to one another. Haraway also defined Cyborg writing as the act of “retelling stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities.” (Cyborg Manifesto 55). From the beginning, each origin complicates the binary definitions of what each Cyborg believes the other to be. Within the binary of their war, Red’s world is one of connection, a species all plugged into one another where “there is no mono-we, there are many uses […] pieces laid atop pieces" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 43). Red's cyborg civilization is supposed to be the one where the entire human race is in a constant state of symbiosis. However, the origin story that Red writes for herself destroys that image of constant connectivity with a tale of isolation and solitude. Blue’s image of Red’s world and Red’s identity is that of one massive “artificial god the size of mountains, built for making war” (64); so Blue is then asked to reimagine her idea of Red as a small girl who has purposefully walked away from the whole to be “the only person on that tiny rock.” (63). In writing her origin story, Red not only takes control of how she is observed by Blue, but it also allows her to subvert the myth of purity that her culture has placed upon her. Though Red's culture is one of vast sameness, in her writing, she can label herself "deviant" (64), as something other than only the cultural norm enforced upon her by both Blue's perceptions and Red's society. Similarly, the origin story Blue writes for herself is of one not subsumed by the myth of purity that is her culture, that her world demands one be a part of a greater whole, and though she is “enmeshed in this wholeness—they are not the whole of me” (72). Blue contrasts Red’s origin by being involuntarily “cut off” (123) from Garden, as opposed to Red’s self-imposed episode of solitude. In the choice to create and share these origin stories of themselves for each other through writing, Red and Blue as “cyborg authors subvert the central myth” (Haraway 55) of the normative cultures that would keep the one/other binary intact at all costs. While sharing each other’s origin stories through writing is an act of empowerment and fusion – empowering Red and Blue to tell their own stories, and making their writing a part of each other in the process—Time War goes further, giving Red and Blue a chance to retell the other's origin once they have told their own. They can perform this new fusion of entering each other's origin stories through time travel, Blue becoming the "something like a wolf" (63) that Red encounters, saving her from attackers during her solitude, and Red going back to give the infection of a "kiss and something to eat" (122) that had initially cut Blue off from her Garden, inoculating her against the poison that Red's Agency will later attempt to use to kill her. Both of these retellings allow the two Cyborgs to redefine the stories of their origins from events of barely surviving "enemy action" (121) to an event of being protected by a loved one. Having shared this act of Cyborg authorship, Red and Blue can no longer continue along the constraining dualism that their cultures insist upon. As they embrace each other’s writings, each taking the other’s story into their own, Red understands that “it’s wrong to call you enemy” (79). It is in the death of the idea of the enemy that the figure of the Queer Cyborg can finally be born. Red, having broken the binary holding her back, is allowed to admit, "I love you, Blue. Have I always? Haven't I?" (129). If the Cognitive Cyborg is a Queer Cyborg, as they are in Time War, it's the breaking down of the dualisms and restrictions inherent in a heteronormative subjectivity that necessitates that queerness. The body and mind under heteronormativity work to “affirm a structure, to authenticate [the] social order” (Edelman No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive 2-3) that man/woman is an absolute binary, there are two genders, and two sides to a single “pure” sexuality (that of heterosexual couplings), all of which is subsumed under the politics of what queer theory labels “reproductive futurism” (3)—the idea that the goal of all couplings must be to produce children, that by “transmit[ting life] to the future in the form of its inner Child” (3), life and romance gain their only meaning. If the goal of Cyborg writing is political—and all writing is political—then "Cyborg politics” (Haraway 59) is queer politics as well. In reference to Terry Eagleton’s 1990 play Saint Oscar, “you hold that a man is a man and a woman is a woman. I hold that nothing is ever purely itself, and that the point where it becomes so is known as death” (Eagleton, cf. Heaney 1995, 86-87). These binaries, imposed by culture and not nature, can be cast aside by those who reject the absolute power and authority of such binaries. As Red and Blue fall in love, Red states, “I want to be a body for you” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 129). The body, as constructed in Cyborg politics, stands as opposed to the body and its purpose under heteronormativity. Queer/Cyborg bodies and Queer/Cyborg politics are bodies of “those not fighting for the children [but fighting on] the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (3). The queer Cyborg is free to “subvert the structures of desire, the force imagined to generate language and gender” (Haraway 57). The binaries of man/woman, mother/father, and parent/child are not necessary destinies for the body of the Cyborg, who is free to seek out other forms of coupling, and pursue other desires. Or, in Blue’s own words: “Sex improves when decoupled […] from animalistic procreative desperation” (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 50). Cyborgs' bodies, unbound from the “purity” of the human body that is promoted by normativity, and indeed heteronormativity, do not need to "dream of community on the model of the organic [nuclear, or reproductive] family" (Haraway 9). Though queer couplings of course can have children (and heteronormative couples who choose not to reproduce are equally valid), and queer parents are as capable and legitimate as any other parent type, Edelman’s argument is not that queer culture cannot produce children, but instead that queer culture is one where the end result of love and couplings does not necessitate children, with love flourishing beyond the normative demand that reproduction be the end goal of coupling. Cyborgs are free to pursue new modes of community and ideas of love through their altered states of subjectivity, their hybrid status, and their place as a fusion of different modes of thinking/being. This Cyborg idea of love is not a separate concept from that of queer love under Edelman’s argument, but is an expression of queer love. Cyborg love, as Red and Blue love each other, is a love without the motivation of creating future generations, or a love constrained by the pressure to do so. They do not aim to find children, or necessarily a place within child-rearing culture, but instead aim only to find each other, without the ulterior motives or directives that (hetero)normative culture might demand of them. They do not dream of procreation, but only of one another. For the two hybrids of This Is How You Lose the Time War, the choice to become that cognitive Queer Cyborg through writing is embraced both as a state of mind and as a physical manifestation. As Red completes her apocalyptic transformation, she "reads Blue into her: tears, breath, skin […], she builds a model of Blue's mind from the words she left; models her body to the letters' measure" (El-Mohtar & Gladstone 183). Red takes the Cyborg writing of connection and origin and takes it into herself until "new organs bloom from autosynthesized stem cells to shoulder old bits of her away […] a different mind plays around the edges of her own" (183). Red becomes a new fusion, human/machine and human/plant-machine, forsaking all normative concepts of purity and dualism as she becomes a hybrid that is capable of crossing back and forth from the post-singularity future of her Agency to the Mediated Plant future of Blue's Garden. Still a Cyborg of Agency's origins, she is rejected by Garden. Nevertheless, no longer the pure Cyborg of her own culture, she cannot be accepted back. Her Agency, strictly adhering to the dualism of Us/Them, cannot accept the queer Cyborg as a creature no longer playing within the rules of normative dualism. The queer body of the Cyborg, that which has been achieved by an apocalyptic shift of subjectivity, cannot exist within binary culture. A queer culture, a Cyborg culture, is a hybrid of impurity that must create its own writing and politics, and must write its own origin story and future, not as a part of "pure" heteronormative culture, or as an option within normativity's binaries, but as something that exists as a new state, as a fusion of states. As Time War ends, Red and Blue have embraced one another as hybrids, and so no longer belong to Agency or Garden. They seek a Cyborg culture all of their own, a “bridge between our shifts” (198) that yields to neither. As Blue proposes in their final letter, the cognitive Cyborg has the power to defect “not to each other’s sides, but to each other” (198). Queer bodies and the hybrid bodies of Red and Blue can find each other not through the language of binary or heteronormativity or war, but by forging that new Cyborg culture through their writing, and through their cognitive states. When the queer Cyborg embraces Cyborg writing and embraces the power and changes and fusions that such writing brings, then the queer body is free. To quote the final words of This Is How You Lose the Time War, as the two cognitive cyborgs set out to become those new queer bodies for one another: "This is how we win" (198).

#### We take refuge in hybrid spaces, revel in the forbidden queer life that exists always already in between the lines – cyborg subjectivity is a process of queer technological assembly and reassembly that transcends the boundaries of normative international politics and identity constructions.

Carlson ’01 -- (Dennis Carlson, 2001, “Gay, Queer, and Cyborg: The performance of identity in a transglobal age,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 22:3, 297-309, DOI: 10.1080/01596300120094343, accessed 7-19-2022) -- nikki

To address that question, I want to turn to the metaphor of the cyborg queer, as suggested by the work of Donna Haraway (1991), an in uential postmodern philosopher of science. The cyborg is the creation of science fiction and fantasy, although, as Haraway observes, science  ction always represents a projection of contemporary cultural myths. Throughout the modern era, the cyborg has fascinated the public consciousness, ever since Mary Shelley introduced Frankenstein’s monster, the part-hu- man, part-animal, part-machine who would be free. The cyborg is often treated in popular culture as a monster, or a robot with no autonomy or free will—like the Borg on Star Trek: the next generation. But this is not always the case. Haraway finds in some feminist science fiction novels, and in films such as Blade Runner, a model for a progressive type of cyborg, one who is struggling to be free, like Frankenstein’s monster, but is now living in a postmodern age. In this form, Haraway suggests, the cyborg myth is both a reflection of and constitutive of a new type of human or posthuman subject, no longer divisible into a ‘mind’ and a body, and no longer separable from the technologies that locate it on a worldwide information web and in cybernetic feedback loops, a cyborg who has carved out limited freedom in a borderland space. The postmodern cyborg moves back and forth across identity borders. The cyborg is a metaphor for ‘shapeshifting’ subjects who exist at the boundaries and interfaces between outside and inside, between subjectivity, body, and technology, able to adapt to a heterogeneous and rapidly changing environment. They have no authentic unity or identity and can only be said to exist as partial, always in ‘guises’, always in the process of being assembled and reassembled out of parts circulating on the worldwide web, always part of a continuous feedback loop that connects everything in a cybernetic, global information age. In Haraway’s language, the subject is ‘stitched together imperfectly’ and always being restitched, without a master plan. If this postmodern cyborg is still only a fantasy, only beginning to be made into reality, Haraway suggests it is the future for more and more of ‘us’. It is the ‘postmodern collective and personal self’ (p. 163). The education of the cyborg occurs at the borderlands, that new hybrid space being constructed around the major national boundaries that divide peoples and cultural identities. This is the land, she says, of the mestizo, the queer, the postcolonial. Postmodern cyborg subjects also inhabit a cultural landscape in which identities are blurred, multiple languages are spoken, and different cultural traditions and rituals rub up against one another. We might take Gloria Anzaldua’s writing in her influential book Borderlands (1987) as an example. For Anzaldua, a Chicana lesbian, marginalized from the white, middle class women’s movement, marginalized within a patriarchal Mexican culture, and marginalized as a lesbian in a heteronormative culture, the borderlands is a permanent place of residence. The geographical borderland Anzaldua inhabits is that which separates Mexico from the United States, marked by ‘this thin edge of barbwire’. If this barbwire is symbolic of cultural hegemony and violence, it is a barbwire that does not frighten some—in fact many—from crossing over or under it every day. Those who are border crossers learn to shift back and forth from one culture to the other, speaking in diverse tongues, surviving by interweaving and juxtaposing ideas, literary forms, linguistic styles, and identities. Who now lives in the borderlands? The ‘prohibited’ and the ‘forbidden’ find it their home. In short: ‘the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead’. This is a territory, in short, for those who ‘cross over, pass over, or go through the con nes of the “normal” ’ (p. 25). Cyborgs and mestizos are metaphors for a new form of postmodern subject who no longer, according to Haraway, is caught in the ‘spiral dance’, no longer needs an Other to define itself. Haraway borrows a phrase from the Vietnamese film maker and postcolonial theorist Trinh T. Minha-ha—‘inappropriate/d others’—to refer to the cyborg subject who does not engage in self-definition through reference to dominant categories of ‘self’ and ‘Other,’ the kinds of identities offered to the late modern subject by identity politics. To the extent that cyborgs define themselves by identity labels it is always for strategic purposes. Politically, cyborgs prefer a politics of personal communicative freedom and strategic political mobilizations to a politics of welfare state progressivism and reformism, forms of politics that allow cyborgs to ‘join with another, to see together without claiming to be another’ (Haraway, 1991, p. 193). Rather than view gender, class, race, and sexual identities as the basis for a progressive politics, Haraway and other postmodern feminists seek to liberate us from the taken-for-granted character of identity categories. The cyborg subject is not accustomed to thinking about ‘race’ or ‘gender’ or ‘class’ or ‘sexual orientation’ as if these were naturally given and meaningful categories. In the subversion of identity in the new borderlands of culture, Haraway sees the possibility for weaving together a new hybrid identity, linked to a new affinity politics that draws people together based on common interest and lifestyle and that dissolves again when it is no longer useful. Affinity politics is the only kind of politics that makes sense in a postmodern world, according to Haraway, in which ‘none of “us” have any longer the symbolic or material capability of dictating the shape of reality to any of “them” ’ (p. 157). This all sounds very appealing and very liberating—to cast off the mask and shield of identity, to be free agents at last, engaged in constructing and reconstructing ourselves outside of the binary logic of dominant identity categories. Yet I remain somewhat suspicious of postmodern identity formation. We may live in a world in which borders are increasingly meaningless, and in which all identity is understood to be performance and representation. The worldwide information web and the global village may also now provide opportunities to build new kinds of  uid, af nity-group communities and shapeshifting identities. At the same time, we cannot walk away from the historic struggles over power that still define class, race, gender, and sexual identity in the postmodern world. We are participants, wittingly or unwittingly, in historic struggles against oppression and invisibility, and to suggest that these ‘old’ modern era struggles are no longer relevant, that we are now free, if we want to be, to creatively engage in our own self-production outside of identity, outside of the dialectic between self and Other, is to engage in a fantasy we should not mistake for reality. In an essay on ‘The “Uncanny”’, Sigmund Freud tells a story about riding on a train, half-asleep in his compartment, when suddenly he was jolted awake as the washing-cabi- net door across from him swung open. As he sat up, Freud writes, ‘an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a traveling cap came in’. Freud assumed that the man had taken the wrong direction and come into his compartment by mistake. ‘Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own re ection in the looking-glass on the open door.’ What was uncanny about the situation, he observes, is that ‘I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance’ (Freud, 1958, p. 248). Freud provides, in this brief example, a representation of the myth of the ‘double’; a myth based on the metaphor of the looking-glass self. The Other is an exteriorization of our own subjectivity, a construction of our own ego, a projection of part of ourselves we would deny, exclude, and repress. So Freud projects upon the Other in the mirror a dislikeable appearance, af rming his own likeability. But he also means to imply that his own self-likeability is constructed on shaky ground, that it is dependent upon the dislikeability of the man in the mirror. Yet the man in the mirror is a re ection of himself. We cannot but fail to see ourselves in the negativity of the Other we have created. To bring issues of identity into education is to help young people recognize that the degree to which the Other has been represented as a ‘double’, an alter ego re ected in the mirror. Hegel and Marx, of course, based a whole narrative of history on the dialectic between self and Other, making it the driving force of history. From this standpoint, identity is constructed out of the relationship between master and slave, between independent and dependent consciousness. The destination of history is the recognition that we no longer need these identity categories to de ne ourselves, so that difference dissolves and truth is once more uni ed. This modernist mythology of history has been pretty well discredited in recent years, both because of its utopianism and because the promise of unity is itself inconsistent with commitments to difference and diversity. But postmodern theory may offer only the negativity of this modern myth, rather than a transformative new mythology. Whereas modernism understands identity as requiring an Other, postmodern identity seeks to de ne itself without the need for ‘Othering’ practices. Whereas modern forms of identity formation emphasize a movement towards the unity of all oppositions, postmodern identity formation offers only a movement towards the dispersal of all unities, a proliferation of differences that never comes together in any coherent cultural politics. I think one way to proceed is down a path suggested by Judith Butler (1999). As a leading postmodern theorist of the self, Butler understands identity as performance and believes that a progressive cultural politics is about troubling all essentialistic treatments of identity. This seems to imply a cultural politics that is organized around af nity groups rather than fixed and unidimensional identity groups. For to organize around identity is to participate in legitimating identity categories, even though these categories have served to oppress women, people of colour, gays and lesbians, and the ‘working class’. Still, Butler backs away from this extreme, post-identity position. She is Hegelian enough to believe that identity in Western culture has been and continues to be a dialectical production. Within the historical dialectic between dominant and subordinated groups, identity categories are more than categories of oppression. They are also categories used in the slave’s struggle for freedom. At this historical juncture at least, she writes, the subject requires an identity forged out of ‘a radical and constitutive relation to alterity’. This means that there are limits to the idea of moving beyond identity, at least as ‘the point of departure for politics’ (p. xiv). At the same time, identity is never  xed or unidimensional. Various identity dialectics push the human subject towards continuous reconstruction. Butler observes that the self constantly  nds itself outside itself, without the possibility of a ‘return to a former self’. No return is possible because there is no recovery from ‘self-loss’, the losing of who we have been, the lack of a stable foundation upon which to construct a stable identity (p. xv). The subject is always recognizing itself through identity. But the moment it  nds itself is simultaneously the moment it begins to lose itself again, as identity is revealed as a mere representation, a performance, a re ection in the mirror. The moment that identity is used subversively, to afrm a liberatory politics, is also the moment it begins to be commercialized and stripped of its liberatory politics. Where does this leave progressive educators, scholars, and cultural workers? I think it leaves us trying to reconcile identity politics and post-identity politics rather than choosing one over the other. It means learning to afrm identity and troubling it simultaneously. For although identity may still be constructed as a relation between self and Other, the current categories of identity are not permanent fixtures on the cultural landscape, and self and Other can move toward a more equitable recognition. Given all this, it seems likely that sexual identity, along with gender, race, and class identities, will continue to play a part in constructing the postmodern self. Indeed, for all the talk about queer theory as a movement beyond identity, it may be appreciated as a new stage in an historic movement characterized by a heightened self-awareness regarding identities that were once largely taken for granted as naturally given. In some ways, gayness is even more rmly established as an axis of identity formation in the postmodern age, although its name and form keep changing. And lesbians and gay men, along with bisexual and transgendered people, are coming out, and thus afrming an identity, at a younger and younger age. One example of just how much things are changing is an event that took place in 1998, at a middle school in Falls Church, Virginia. David Grossman, the 13-year-old guest of honour, held a coming-out party one day after school, proudly af rming a gay identity before family and other gay teens (Steiner, 2001). If David’s story is not typical, it suggests that sexual identity is not going away, that gay/queer identity still serves a very important role in helping most homosexual and bisexual young people af rm their bodies and their desires, and also build an identity that is more than about sexuality, that involves solidarity with others and commitment to a cultural politics. At the same time, gay youth are still coming out into the margins, and the struggle against the commodi cation of sexual identity continues. Although the cyborg queer is a useful metaphor for a new phase in the conscious development of sexual identity at the margins, it is fraught with contradictions. The cyborg is a creature of the global web, the internet, and as we move into what Jean Baudrilliard (1983) has called a ‘hyperreal’ world, identity is increasingly hyperreal or virtual as well. We stitch a self-image together by cutting and pasting images and texts, by creating multiple personae. Virtual communities of identity replace ‘real’, geographical communities. Eugene Provenzo (1998) observes that these developments are for the most part progressive, that the worldwide web can provide a liberatory space for gay youth outside of the regulatory and normalizing power of the local community. The internet allows gay youth across America, even in remote rural areas, to participate in gay culture and build communities of af nity. But how liberatory, how politically aware, are these new virtual communities that we spend so much time inhabiting? As Darren Pascavage argues, ‘the Internet can quite literally keep gay youth “in their place”— speci cally, in front of the computer’ (2000, p. 9). And that place, as he notes, is increasingly commercialized. This means that the struggle over control of identity continues, as does the marginalization of gayness. The homecoming parade  oat sponsored by the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Alliance at Miami University which I referred to at the beginning of this essay was performing queer identity in the belly of the beast, one might say. But it was a performance that still kept gayness in its place, isolated to one  oat. The  oat signi ed that there is now a limited space for gayness, so long as that space is still a separate space, so long as gay people continue to be the Other. In such a context, one must af rm identity and trouble it simultaneously, constructing and reconstructing self and Other in the process.

#### The politics of the cyborg is a form of queer digital experimentation that affirms the ontological instability of queer life – we appropriate and reconstruct the technologies of modernity in order to transgress biopolitical boundaries of gender and sexuality and generate new worlds of possibility.

Haber ’16 -- (Benjamin Haber, 2016, "The Queer Ontology of Digital Method,” Women's Studies Quarterly , FALL/WINTER 2016, Vol. 44, No. 3/4, QUEER METHODS (FALL/WINTER 2016), pp. 150-169, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44474067.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A16ac84823d870932dfbc4dad72c01232&ab\_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

For many in the field, the idea of queer method will always sound hope- lessly discordant - an awkward codification of a deliberately unstable and ontologically interdisciplinary discourse. If academic method describes a procedure, a codification of disciplinarily grounded rules, then we might imagine that queer thought would thrive mostly through provocation and deconstruction, not the building of a new canon. Indeed, to the limited extent queer method has been articulated, it has typically been to bring queer theory to method - subjecting the epistemological assumptions of fieldwork and textual analysis to critical scrutiny. While this tendency to mobilize queerness as a critical verb preserves maximum theoretical malleability while usefully complicating the assumptions of academic systemization, there is a limit to the political efficacy of queering existing methodologies. Of course there will never be a queer method, but the time has come to shift: from queering methods to experimentally using methods to more widely distribute queer politics, sociality, and sensibility. My focus here is encouraging queer digital experimentation in the practices of the everyday by appropriating, hacking, and even construct- ing networks of social, corporeal, and environmental sensors. While I'm not arguing that the built architectures of sensing and tracking data - networked, embodied devices like the Fitbit, ambient environmental sensors like Nest, or the oedipally named, versatile sensors of Mother by Sen.se - are queer, the increasingly pervasive underlying technology pro- vides possibilities for distributing a queer politics of ontological intercon- nection and indeterminacy. This sense of possibility, however, rests on an uncomfortable resonance between data capitalism and queer ontology that requires a critically engaged and reflexive methodology. Reaching into the beyond of biopolitics (Clough and Willse 2011), I look at capitalism and digital media after "the normal." As queer theo- rists continue to debate the value of critical orientations to normativity (Wiegman and Wilson 2015; Halberstam 2015), I explore the emergent postnormative, where the modulation and capitalization of bodies and populations rests less on broad cultural and technical averaging. In sug- gesting this realignment of queer attention, I do not discount the strik- ing persistence of wildly inequitable distributions of violence and death through the calcified norms of sexual, racial, classed, and otherwise corpo- really marked social violence. Rather, I hope to galvanize queer critical ca- pacity toward new forms of sociocorporeal modulation and classification and encourage experimentation with those quantitative and digital meth- ods typically dismissed or ignored by queer theorists. By foregrounding queer experimentation with digital methods, I look to balance an oppo- sitional epistemology with the more active development of "transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities" (Haraway 1990, 154). How might we create new open-ended circuits using emergent tech- nologies to proliferate forms of relationality and bring queer notions of ontological indeterminacy and interconnection into consciousness? While the notion of using digitally processed quantitative data to pro- mote a queer indeterminacy might sound counterintuitive to some, it is a strategy that reflects the intensified biopolitical modulation that defines our age. While submitting "our" data to networks gives us free (Facebook) or subsidized (23andMe1) products, we rarely have access to these pref- erences, traces, or bodily processes. Therefore, while this networked data gets used by corporate entities to serve us ads or design our drugs, we are blocked from reimagining its social utility except in highly circumscribed conditions.2 In part, I'm advocating for queer theory to take a hard look at the quan- titative methodologies of what Nigel Thrift calls "knowing capitalism," the increasingly big business of studying and modulating the everyday (2005). Notably, the first stop of capitalisms "micro-sociological turn" (Thrift 2012, 148) is sex and relationality. Social connection is an almost unfath- omably massive enterprise, and companies like Facebook, Twitter - and a million upstarts - have a voracious appetite for difference. Its worth bald- ly stating: these are sociological companies with a narrowly instrumen- tal focus involved in not just knowing but actively modulating social life. And as I have argued elsewhere, companies like Facebook have monetized queer notions of sociality: the mutability of identity through the event and over time, the centrality of nonfamilial community in the understanding of the self, the celebration of recognition and visibility as core strategies of political engagement, and the interest in the nontextual, performative, and ephemeral (Haber 2016). Robert Payne has similarly suggested a queer modality of network culture that promotes a "multiplication and com- plication of intimate relations, the promiscuous commingling of self and other, self with self, user with interface, public with private, individual with social, and leisure with labor" (2014, 2). While these are infrastructures that many are already familiar with, more intriguing and concerning for me are still-emergent computational systems that attempt to build on the randomness-inflected development of life itself - circuitry that strives toward the complexity and plasticity of neural systems in the brain. There are even suggestions that biodigital sys- tems will increasingly try to harness the "realm of extension and thought at the inanimate level" (Parisi 2012, 45), to try, in other words, to monetize the indeterminacy and potentiality at the heart of all matter. In short, while I am arguing that queer theorists should take advantage of the indetermi- nate potential of digital networks, we must also sharpen our critical voices, as capitalism is increasingly able to profit through an alignment with queer ontologies of sociality, embodiment, and materiality. Queer method must be a witness to violence, and it must be performa- tively involved in the creation of new worlds. Knowing capitalism - much like the genealogy of queer indeterminacy I draw from - is increasingly concerned with the above and below of consciousness, the strange and monstrous assemblages that bypass our phenomenological experience of Cartesian boundaries. I draw connections between queer writing about materiality and biological systems with technoscientific investments also inspired by the indeterminacy of life and matter. I also look to blur and break down boundaries between queer and feminist theory, a split that has been hopelessly overdetermined. This is not to say that queer theory and feminist theory are the same, or that they always get along, but that there have been important crosscurrents of continuity in rejecting a determined body, subject, and form of relationality. I then highlight recent theoretical engagement with the work of Alfred North Whitehead by media scholar Mark Hansen, as perhaps offering a vision of this queer methodological potential, and I end with a discussion of the politics of queer method. With the ascendancy of a conservative LGBT agenda, including the nationalization of gender-neutral marriage law and impending changes to military rules allowing trans-identified folks to serve openly (Cooper 2016; Schaefer et al. 2016), queer ideas and queer politics have never been more needed, and methodological in- vention is key here as well. While corporate-owned social networks are solidifying their hold on the distribution of ideas, we are asked to believe assurances from Facebook s social scientists that the movement of media across their proprietary networks has more to do with "individual choice" than algorithmic predestination (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamie 2015). An active experimentation with the forms and formulas of digital media, espe- cially as it increasingly colonizes the depths of the body, is perhaps the key challenge of queer politics in the twenty-first century.

#### Our praxis takes shape in the dissonant gaps of normative international relations – the 1AC destabilizes the monolithic signification of cisheteronormativity that the resolution’s political project relies on.

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What is queer? Why are queer international theories relevant to international relations? What might queer investigations of international relations look like? While debates about the meaning of the term “queer” and whether or not queer can be or ought to be defined rage on (Butler 1994; Warner 2012; Wilcox, this forum), many self-identified queer scholars cite Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s description of queer as their point of departure. Sedgwick suggested that queer designates “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (1993:8).2 Sedgwick’s exposition of queer makes clear the affinities queer studies has to feminist studies and gender studies—with their analyses of the political work that gender, sex, and (sometimes) sexuality do—and to poststructuralist studies—with their analyses of the political work that multiple significations do. Yet queer studies is neither reducible to feminist studies, gender studies, or poststructuralist studies. Nor is it the sum total of these theoretical dispositions. As an academic practice, queer studies has been and remains, as Teresa de Lauretis described it, an attempt “to rethink the sexual in new ways, elsewhere and otherwise” in relation to but also beyond traditional Gay and Lesbian Studies, Feminist and Gender Studies, and Poststructuralist Studies (De Lauretis 1991:xvi; Rubin 1992; Butler 1990). The “elsewhere” of queer studies about which de Lauretis writes has generally functioned to locate queer international theories outside of the discipline of International Relations (IR), largely because queer has been regarded as “otherwise” to what most IR scholars have been schooled to understand as international relations theory and practice (Weber 2014a). While the advantages and disadvantages of categorizing queer international theories as “elsewhere and other-wise” to a broader body of work called IR theory are still hotly debated in the discipline (Weber 2014b), there is a growing recognition among many IR scholars that the distinction between international relations theories and queer international theories upon which such debates rely is unsustainable. This is for at least four reasons. The first reason has to do with what queer studies and queer international theories are and do. Queer studies and queer international theories primarily investigate how queer subjectivities and queer practices—the “who” and the “how” that cannot or will not be made to signify monolithically in relation to gender, sex, and/or sexuality—are disciplined, normalized, or capitalized upon by and for states, NGOs, and international corporations. And they investigate how state and nonstate practices of disciplinization, normalization, and capitalization might be critiqued and resisted (Weber 1994a,b, 1999; Duggan 2003; Puar 2007). This is precisely what Foucauldian-informed international relations scholarship does, albeit usually without an explicit focus on nonmonolithic genders, sexes, and sexualities. Second, why a focus on nonmonolithic genders, sexes, and sexualities matters for the discipline of international relations is in part because states and states’ leaders in particular have made it a focus of their domestic and foreign policies. How states, for example, answer questions about the normality or perversion of “the homosexual” and “the queer” and how these two figures are related to one another currently influences how some states make domestic and foreign policy. For example, claims made by Putin’s Russia and Museveni’s Uganda that “the homosexual” and “the queer” are perverse led each country to formulate domestic policies that were to varying degrees punished by some states and international organizations (Rao 2010, 2012, 2014; Weiss and Bosia 2013). In contrast, the Obama administration’s figuration of “the homosexual” but not “the queer” as normal led it to champion “gay rights as human rights” as part of its foreign policy (Clinton 2011), a general and specific foreign-policy position that queer scholars critique (Duggan 2003; Puar 2007, 2010; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014). Third, queer international theories explicitly engage with what many IR scholars regard as the discipline’s governing dichotomy—order versus anarchy. Among the ways the “order vs. anarchy” dichotomy functions (and, importantly, fails to function) in international relations is by articulating “order vs. anarchy” as “normal vs. perverse” and, more specifically, as “hetero/homo-normative vs. queer”—which is one of the dichotomies that queer theorists investigate and resist. When an order vs. anarchy dichotomy is constituted and sustained by a hetero/homo-normative vs. queer dichotomy in international practice (as it is in the above examples regarding Russia, Uganda, and the United States), any distinction between a general IR and a specific so-called Queer IR disappears. For investigating how these dichotomies function is (or ought to be) of central concern to both queer international theorists and IR theorists more generally. Finally, the breadth of Queer IR investigations now extends to what are arguably the three core domains in which IR scholars claim expertise—war and peace, international political economy, and state and nation formation.3 What this discussion suggests is that there is no definitive distinction between something called IR and something called Queer IR. Having said that, though, it is important not to lose site of the unique, critical difference “queer” makes— ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically—to investigations of international relations theory and practice. Ontologically, Queer IR scholars focus on queer ontologies that do not or cannot be made to signify monolithically. These include trans\*, inter, cross, and pan gendered, sexed, and sexualized bodies—be they physical, geographical, political, historical, economic, ideological, or other.4 These queerly figured bodies are often analyzed intersectionally through and in relation to figurations of race, age, ability, and class (for example, Nash 2008). Epistemologically, Queer IR scholars recognize that knowledge and ignorance in and about international relations are intricately bound up with sexual knowledge and sexual ignorance. This was Sedgwick’s general conclusion, based upon her observation that twentieth-century Western culture depends upon knowing who and/or what it means to be homosexual—because the heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy supports so many other meaningful distinctions. Sedgwick’s list of meaningful distinctions includes public/private, domestic/foreign, discipline/ terrorism, secrecy/disclosure, natural/artificial, wholeness/decadence, and knowledge/ignorance (1990:11). When critically employed, these matrices of knowing and/or not knowing allow us to reconsider not only a variety of heterosexual/homosexual dichotomies but also a variety of cis-gender/trans\* dichotomies. In light of Lisa Duggan’s observations about how homonormativity functions in twenty-first-century Western culture—as “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (Duggan 2003:50; also see Duggan 2002)—contemporary Queer IR scholars recognize how various homonormative/homodeviant dichotomies increasingly are used to make sense of and to order intimate, national, and international relations. Informed by such queer epistemologies, Queer IR scholars employ methodologies that (like poststructuralist methodologies) do not seek to uncover “the truth” of sexed, gendered, and sexualized bodies, assemblages, institutions, and orders (Foucault 1979). For in what I call a queer logic of the and/or,5 such “truths” are never stable and their representation is never guaranteed; therefore, any attempt to represent them as if they were stable is understood as a political act. For this reason, Queer IR scholars instead track when queer figurations emerge and how they are normalized and/or perverted so that they might challenge but also support heterosexual, heteronormative, cis-gendered, homonormative, homophobic, and trans\*phobic assumptions, orders, and institutions. The resulting “deviant knowledges” of international relations these methodologies produce can disorient Disciplinary IR knowledges not only about queer subjects (Ahmed 2006) but also about international relations subjects and the discipline of IR as a subject. What research themes and questions follow from queer understandings of international relations? I would suggest that there are at least (but not exclusively) three, often overlapping, indicative sets of research questions that Queer IR scholars have been and are generating. The first set of research themes explores how “queer” and “queering” are mobilized in international relations theory and practice. These questions often investigate how queer and queering challenge “the normalizing mechanisms of state power to name its sexual subjects: male and female, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual, natural or perverse” (Eng, Halberstam, and Munoz ~ 2005:1) in intimate, national, and international relations. This has led queer international theorists to consider: • Which figurations in/of international relations do not and cannot be made to signify monolithically in terms of gender, sex, and sexuality, and how research focused on these queer figures might make it possible to think and to do international relations differently (Weber forthcoming); • How queer(ing) nations, states, sovereignties, and empires affects international theory and practice (Weber 1998a, 1999; Peterson 1999, 2013, this forum; Agathangelou et al. 2008); • How queer(ing) the intimate relations of family and households queers the international (Peterson 2010a,b, this forum); • How queer(ing) mainstream IR theories like the “territorial peace” potentially rearticulates what the discipline of IR is and can be (Sjoberg, this forum; and more generally, see Wilcox, this forum; Nayak, this forum); and • How queer(ing) borders (Sjoberg, this forum) and movement across borders by queer subjects (Fortier 2002; Gopinath 2005; Luibheid 2005, 2008; Arondekar and Patel forthcoming) might unanchor international relations from its obsession with sovereign nation-states as its relatively fixed object of study. This first batch of themes might give the impression that the queer (and Queer IR) research questions queer(ing) generates are always transgressive and transformative. This is not the case. Indeed, to reduce queer and/or Queer IR to some heroic championing of an always already dissident figuration is to overlook how “queer” is mobilized to constitute and preserve various hegemonic imaginaries of sex, gender, and sexuality and the powerful assumptions, orders, and institutions they support. It is, therefore, vital to pose a second set of Queer IR research themes and questions that take account of how “queer” is sometimes claimed in the name of normalizing and depoliticizing understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality rather than contesting them. Research questions that explore these dimensions of queer often investigate how the nonmonolithic character of queer signification—a queer logic of “and/or”—is appropriated by hegemonic actors, alliances, and orders as a national and international strategy of governance through securitization and marketization. How, for example, do states, international alliances, international orders, and international institutions present themselves as: Simultaneously straight and/or queer, as I argue the United States (US) performs its hegemonic masculinity in relation to the Caribbean (Weber 1998a, 1999); • Simultaneously politicizing and/or depoliticizing, as Duggan’s account of how homonormativies sustain a plethora of depoliticizing neoliberal institutions and aims in the name of a selective politics of inclusion suggests (2003); • Simultaneously exceptionally tolerant and/or intolerant of LGBTQ populations, often in the form of policies that praise so-called modern states for their tolerance as a way to further abject as intolerant and intolerable so-called traditional populations, as Puar (2007), Kuntsman (2009), Schulman (2012), and Remkus Britt (forthcoming) argue supports Israeli policies of occupying Palestinian territories; • Simultaneously pro-LGBTQ and/or anti-LGBTQ, as Lind and Keating argue is the case with present-day Ecuadorian state policy (Lind and Keating 2013; Lind, this forum); • Simultaneously protective of LGBT citizenship rights and/or dangerous to these same citizens because of the specific ways LGBTQ citizens are incorporated by states, as Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco argue through their analysis of how “queer necropolitics” functions (Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2013b)? In so doing, these scholars have generated a range of useful concepts and ideas that enable a rethinking of specific aspects of international theory and practice, including how actors, orders, institutions, and alliances are formed through and sustained by “queer compensatory strategies” (Weber 1999), “homonormativities” (Duggan 2003), “pinkwashing” (Puar 2007), “homonationalisms” (Puar 2007), “homoprotectionism” (Lind and Keating 2013), and “murderous inclusions” (Haritaworn et al. 2013b). These analyses have also led to speculation on what kinds of “queer protest” and “queer protesters” might be the most effective in challenging conservative mobilizations of queer (Rao 2010; Duggan and Kim 2011–2012). Finally, a third set of themes and questions generated by Queer IR scholars and scholarship considers what being a Queer IR scholar and doing Queer IR scholarship does specifically in and to the discipline of international relations, especially Disciplinary IR. For example: • How do disciplinary strategies like shunning on the one hand and the “gentrification” of Queer IR research on the other give the impression that “there is no queer international theory?” (Weber 2014a,b); • As LGBTQ issues become significantly more visible in foreign policy, might it be at the discipline’s peril to erase Queer IR scholars and scholarship and to relinquish their domains of analysis to other (inter)- disciplines like Global Queer Studies? • Could acknowledgment of Queer IR scholarship broaden and deepen understandings of what Disciplinary IR claims as its three core domains of research excellence: state and nation formation, war and peace, and international political economy? • Might such analyses generate a novel range of theoretical insights that are primarily informed by both queer theory and international relations theory, particularly because both of these theoretical perspectives have so much to say about (in)securities? • If so, should Queer IR scholars enter into a proper institutional alliance with Disciplinary IR—into a “gay marriage” of sorts—with (in) security functioning as their axis of sameness/similarity? • Would this “queer the discipline of IR”? Is “queering the discipline of IR” possible? Or would the discipline of IR never accept a theory that “elevates perversion to philosophy”?6 As this discussion suggests, queer theorizations of international relations exist, they are relevant to core international relations questions and topics, and they have long been generating robust international relations research programs. The contributions to this forum evidence and further these research programs, making clear the critical difference queer can make for international theorizing.

#### Debate is a site of social formation – we retool the pedagogical processes of this space in service of reparative queer kinship that forms enduring bonds of solidarity and care within an environment of paranoid antagonism.

Ensor 17 (Sarah Ensor, English Language and Literature, Ecocriticism, gender and sexuality, JUNE 01 2017, “Relative Strangers: Contracting Kinship in the Queer Ecology Classroom,” <https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article-abstract/89/2/279/5184/Relative-Strangers-Contracting-Kinship-in-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext>; accessed 1/5/2022) ng

If this model of contracting kinship requires acknowledging our corporeal vulnerability, then it seems necessary to acknowledge, too, that this year in particular (2016) has made us viscerally aware of bodies at risk. Among the many sources of exposure that we continue to face is the changing climate of higher education, whose current condition makes it easy to believe that optimism in (or, indeed, about) academia is naive at best and actively harmful at worst. But within an environment that fosters paranoia, pedagogical kinship may not only become legible through a reparative reading practice but also may be a powerfully reparative social formation. For such a model enables a form of care that is embodied and improvisational, responsive to and inspired by the way in which vulnerability and community, contingency and possibility (for teachers and students, as for matsutake21) so often are intertwined. Although administrations increasingly hope that teachers’ and students’ relationships to the university—and to each other—will be contractual, the fact remains that our contracting takes place not only in the legal but also in the bodily sense. As opposed to being a means of institutionalization—of the standardization of relationships, the reproduction of existing values (and forms of privilege),22 and the kind of conservative resemblance among past, present, and future that often characterizes both kinship structures and higher education—this model of pedagogy is characterized by provisionality, surprise, and spread. The classroom exceeds the increasingly corporatized institution at the same time that it is housed within (and inseparable from) it, calling to mind the subtly spatial logic of reparative reading. Pedagogical modes of kinship thus come to resemble the “plethora of only loosely related weak theories,” brimming with “tenderness, wit, inventive reading, obiter dicta, and writerly panache,” that, in Sedgwick’s (2003, 136, my emphasis) account, are “invited to shelter” within the strong paranoid theory of a book like D. A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police. Indeed, as Sedgwick repeatedly insists, the reparative posture (with its forms of care) is structurally inseparable both from paranoia itself and from the Kleinian depressive position—and thus is responsive to, not avoidant of, fear and harm. But “its fear, a realistic one, is that the culture surrounding it is inadequate or inimical to its nurture”; as a result, “it wants to assemble and confer plenitude to an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self” (149, my emphasis). The ethical possibility of caring for others “is founded on and coextensive with the . . . very often fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and nourishment in an environment that is perceived as not particularly offering them” (137). Perhaps an institution such as mine is precisely the proper site for such an experiment in care. Unlike on traditional campuses, where students more often than not are following an expected trajectory (high school to college to employment), my students already have considerable experience with the “deroutinized temporality” (and openness to surprise) that Sedgwick (148) deems foundational to the reparative gesture. And unlike on traditional campuses, where students in any given classroom find themselves already sharing considerable common ground—from age range to family background, from spirit for the school’s football team to fraternity affiliation—my students are strangers to each other in a much more fundamental way. They are veterans of Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan, who sit facing the door to preclude being startled and who miss class for appointments at the VA Hospital. They are parents and grandparents who put younger generations through school before deciding to return themselves. They are twenty- and thirty-somethings who are being priced out of their hometown, for whom our city’s rapid gentrification and booming housing market are not fodder for abstract debate but rather embodied realities lived on a daily basis. They are adults who have had entire careers as reporters, social workers, and administrative assistants, who have found themselves on our campus after losing their jobs or deciding to change course. For those who are closer to traditional college age, my institution is hardly ever their first stop. Graduates of community colleges or students whose initial foray into higher education ended in abandonment of one form or another, they have found their way to our campus in the wake of other experiences of learning, often ones that did not lead where they planned. Like Sedgwick, they have long been “attune[d] . . . to a heartbeat of contingency” (147). Like Tsing’s subjects, they inhabit “salvage rhythms” (2015, 132). As with my pedagogy, their paths have already gone astray. Ultimately, their status as college students does not indicate any kind of elite escapism from the world’s patterns of circulation but rather a different mode of participating in—and being affected by—them.23 When such students (and I) become kin, then, the result is neither flat likeness nor any kind of codified bond. The aim is not for those who find themselves in my class to choose each other as lifelong friends (although sometimes they do) or for our kinship to be an institution that rivals (or even provides an alternative to) the broader university that houses us. Instead, we respond to the ongoing damage of the past and the emerging damage of the present with immanent gestures of community that help us move together, uncertainly, toward uncertain futures. Our kinship—like the reparative posture—fosters a “position from which it is possible . . . to use one’s own resources to assemble or ‘repair’ the murderous part-objects into something like a whole—though . . . not necessarily like any preexisting whole” (Sedgwick 2003, 128). Invested in hope without naïveté, in a mode of repairing that is not the same as healing or absolving, such practices evince care precisely in the absence of durability and optimism precisely in the absence of guarantees. In improvisational, unpredictable, and steadfastly material ways, through our own local practices and “nonce taxonomies” (145), we seek to make things better not only for each other but also for the community that accrues at the thresholds of our urban university’s porous bounds. We reckon with the ways in which higher education has abandoned us without ourselves abandoning it. Eventually, however, we do walk away from the classroom, a fact that might foreground the interplay of provisionality and endurance in this model of care. For the resulting marks—the imprint—may be permanent even if the relationships themselves are not enacted again in the future (and perhaps cannot be replicated outside the social milieu of the classroom). As the texts on our syllabus reminded us, fleeting interactions can have enduring effects. For instance, Dean, writing about the forms of consanguineous kinship developed via (voluntary) infection with HIV, insists that the encounters responsible for transmission queerly resemble marriage, insofar as they involve a lifelong commitment (to one’s own body, if not to the often-multiply anonymous body that infects one). These encounters, then, are “as far from casual . . . as one can get” (Dean 2009, 85); consequence endures even if relationality does not. In direct contrast to the line from a fictional song that comprises the title of Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, I must always let my students go. And in letting them go, I trust that in some way, shape, or form our kinship will persist, that the material we shared (both in the sense of our readings and discussions, and in the sense of our resultant consubstantiality) will continue to matter. As in Weston’s (2001, 161) analysis of Youngblood’s transfusions, “These are not solidarities that endure but solidarities that allow people to endure.” My students and I—like all good kin—help each other to endure, in the sense of “to undergo without succumbing.”24 As with any emergent ecology, our kinship—“fugitive” (Tsing 2015, 255), “elusive” (282), “effervescen[t]” (255), “ephemeral” (255)—does not itself solve the problems that have brought us to this point, nor does it offer us a predictable program to follow in the face of the future’s uncertainties. (Needless to say, “kinship” is not now listed among the learning outcomes I am required to include on my syllabus.) However, like the “tiny actions” that, in Kirksey’s (Kirksey, Shapiro, and Brodine 2014, 49) account, have “the potential . . . to make the world a more livable place,” like Berrigan’s (2014, 169) experiment in contagion, which is “genuine in its reach toward empathy and self-care” even if its “intervention is inevitably deficient,” and like the interspecies assemblages that remind Tsing (2015, 282) that while it is “not easy to know how to make a life [within the ruin], much less avert planetary destruction,” “luckily there is still company, human and nonhuman,” this social formation limns the extant presence of alternatives both within the sanitized, corporatized university and to the habits of thought that so often keep us from reading higher education otherwise. By attending to such relational possibilities within the troubled ecology of higher education, we might catch “the scent of the latent commons” (282)—one thing, it seems, that reparative queer pedagogy can pleasurably and ethically track.

## 2AC---Case

### 2AC -- AT: IR Good

#### IR theory is an intrinsically failed politics – the methodological landscape of IR is a repetitive fantasy of discipline that seeks coherence through the imposition of totalizing rules-based theories – embracing the queer indeterminacy and incomprehensibility solves.

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In the wake of the enduring popularity of the argument that there might be an “end of IR theory” (Dunne et al., 2013), we see a world in which IR theorizing is alive, even if only in repetitive fantasy, and key to disciplinary identification for whatever “IR” is. Some of the responses to the “end of IR theory” argue for a retreat from grand theory to middle-level theory (e.g., Lake, 2013); others warn of a “cacophony” that needs categorization to be comprehensible (Jackson & Nexon, 2013, p. 543); still others call for either re-terming schools of IR (Michelson, 2020) or combining analytic approaches (Grieco, 2019). While we see theory’s continued importance even in scholars’ confusion about its appropriate role, we recognize, with those who declare theory’s end in the discipline, that something has changed in the structure and function of theorizing among scholars interested in global politics. That something, we argue, is the simultaneous recognition of and denial of the failure of IR theorizing. We contend that IR theorizing is both failing and necessarily failed, but that does not make it over. Instead, we argue, drawing on queer theory, that failure in/of grand IR theory is something to be celebrated and actively participated in. With many queer theorists (e.g., Halberstam, 2011), we argue that failure, rather than a normative bad, can be a necessary corrective to the intellectual and disciplinary stagnation implied by and implicated in practiced and accepted standards of success. We argue that overwrought debates about the state of IR theorizing could learn from queer methodology (e.g., Weber, 2014a) and queer theorizing (e.g., Weber, 2016a) not only about global politics but also about the nature of knowledge and disciplinary politics. Queer IR has asked how cultural ideas about gender and sexuality shape global politics, and how heteronormative, homonormative, and cisnormative frameworks have shaped the ways the world works (Richter-Montpetit, 2018). It has also turned its lenses inward, asking why queer scholarship has had as little influence on IR theorizing as it has (Weber, 2016b), and how queering IR could change IR’s methodological (Weber, 2014a) and theoretical (Weber, 2014b) landscapes. This article looks at a small but in our view important piece of that puzzle—how taking queer work seriously might provide insight about the (sometimes endless) state-of-the-field debates. We see these state-of-the-field assertions, arguments, and debates as first and foremost recursive. Sometimes they are romances, explaining the breaking developments that provide hopeful next steps for a blooming field (e.g., Acharya, 2014; Berenskotter, 2017). Sometimes they are tragedies, spelling gloom and doom for IR as an enterprise (if not academia as a whole) or even global politics itself (e.g., Aistrope & Fishel, 2020; Stevens & Michelsen, 2020). Other times, they are dramas with various players and various arguments taking various starring roles in sparring matches (e.g., Jackson & Nexon, 2009; Parashar, 2013). Sometimes they are histories, tracing the past into the present or the present into the past (Alekseyeva, 2016; Schmidt & Guilhot, 2019). Sometimes they are sociologies, explaining how this and that theory relates to this and that other theory (Aris, 2020; Barkin & Sjoberg, 2019). Sometimes they are serials, explaining how particular approaches ebb and flow or evolve (e.g., Epstein, 2013; Guzzini, 2013). Sometimes they are sports reports, talking about which side wins what when (e.g., Acharya, 2005; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). Most state-of-the-field evaluations make the various protagonists and antagonists (theories or theorists) seem so at odds, so different, and the stakes of the debates so dire. We argue that, with few exceptions, these stories, despite their different forms, different characters, and different plotlines, are all the same. They are more often than not the product of gender, sex, race, sexuality, national origin, education, and employment privilege that produce a narrow view of what is and what should be, based on the practices that have provided the success from which the privileged writer writes. As Weber (2014b, p. 29) argues, “disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative result of the so-called ‘mainstream’ agendas of learned societies, universities, independent funding agencies, and governments … as they are the performative outcome of so-called ‘dissident’ practices” (citing Ashley & Walker, 1990; Soreanu, 2010). In fact, Weber suggests that the radical critical edge of IR and its mainstream “foes” are really “intricately intertwined positions” which “produce a disciplinary IR that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline” out of power rather than legitimacy (Weber, 2014b, p. 29). In concrete terms, we argue that the current “state” of state-of-the-field stories and debates is intimately and necessarily tied not only to heteronormative, traditionalized rules and norms of scholarly practice but also to heteronormative, traditionalized understandings of success, failure, and their value. In this article, we argue that the things that the state-of-the-field literature agrees on betray a narrow and problematic approach to what knowledge is, how it works, who has it, and how it can be. We suggest that IR on these terms is always and already a failed enterprise, no matter what spin the stateof-the-field literature puts on it. IR fails to reach any expected or desired end of the enterprise of IR theorizing. It fails to achieve coherence or fails to approximate some measure (citations, downloads, and publisher quality) socially understood as failure’s opposite. It fails to find clarity or directions. It fails because it must—its idealized goals are unachievable and require it to be something that it cannot be, and remain its seductive unquestioned/unquestionable ends, despite an obvious need for reevaluation and, possibly, the embrace of failure (Baudrillard, 1991 [1979]; Halberstam, 2011). Rather than arguing that IR’s success and failure need to be redefined, we contend that IR’s success and failure need to be normatively reinterpreted. We argue that seeing IR as a failure, and embracing its failings, provides a realistic and intellectually grounded path for IR’s “futures,” putting to rest the state-of-the-field fairy tales and encyclopedias once and for all.

#### The paradigm of IR relies on the valorization of traditional research as a metric of “success” – voting negative imbricates debate in the echo chamber of normative political theory that accumulates rigid forms of knowledge while reproducing the exclusion of queerness.

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We argue that knowledge cumulation in IR is a fantasy reified by paradigmatic clusters and the mimicry of research standards and practices in the natural sciences (e.g., Elman & Elman, 2001, 2003). The “evidence” of “knowledge cumulation” in IR comes as much from the ritualized practice of research behavior as it does from any “true” or genuine notion of knowledge cumulation. One has “succeeded” in the enterprise of IR by cumulating knowledge, and the work of “successful” scholars is by definition cumulated knowledge. Cumulation of knowledge as a standard of success is a condition of possibility for the desirability of success in the field. That ritualized practice at once is institutionalized as success and institutionalizes the need for research success, reified and reproduced by hiring, tenure, merit raise, and promotion standards. This ritualization is a signifier that what counts as knowledge in the field, in particular research programs and more generally, is performative (Barad, 2007; Butler, 1990; Weber, 1998)—where standards are set by their utterance and repetition rather than by some external “objective” standards of (narrowly) good science or (more broadly) good research (Baudrillard, 1991; Shepherd, 2008; Williams, 2003). Scholars iterate and reify standards of measurement of knowledge in each piece of scholarship which “succeeds” in the field, and these iterations make it a paradox for scholars to both occupy the methodological, epistemological, and political space that falls outside of inherited standards and succeed. Outside -the -mainstream work’s underrepresentation in the places understood to be publishing “success” is overdetermined, and the correlation between mimicry of traditional scholarship and “success” of critical scholars a given. We mean “performative” in the sense that Judith Butler uses it (Butler, 1990, 1993), particularly as she talks about it going hand in hand with a Foucauldian notion of disciplining,8 where “performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability—a regularized and constrained repetition of norms” which resonate as “ritualized production” (Butler, 1993, p. 60). This frames performativity as a “specific modality of power as discourse” (Butler, 1993, p. 139) where the politics of the signification and the politics of the sign meet, an act of territoralization, of production, of installation—which does not have to be alone, singular, or unidirectional. Since performatives are their own referent (Butler, 1993, p. 159), they proliferate as manifestations of the power underlying them and interact relatively on the basis of that relative power. In this context, “performances” are actions and events, iterations and reifications, and context-specific, which “bring a subject into being” relationally.9 To escape the recursive, performative loop of “disciplinary success,” we argue that it is important to see the possibility that knowledge cumulation is not, and should not be, a given in IR research. Instead, we argue that the idea itself is an inherited empty signifier with unspoken content which governs the production of what we understand as disciplinary IR. Traditionally, the idea of knowledge cumulation is firmly grounded in a neopositivist understanding of social science, in which the role of theory is to collate observed empirical regularities across cases or what Waltz calls laws (Waltz, 1979). While this interpretation is critiqued in most critical IR, “cumulation,” in that work, becomes a term without clear conceptual content. The paradigmatization of IR theorizing distracts from a particular theory’s internal conditions of possibility by introducing incompatible conditions of possibility drawn from an inherited disciplinary sociology of what knowledge is and how it works. As such, any acknowledgment of the idea of cumulativity from within specific exercises in reflexive IR creates the grounds for necessary failure within those exercises. The simultaneous rejection of traditional “cumulation” and continued performance of acts of cumulation can be understood by seeing the ways that silence frames cumulation in critical IR. We learn from feminist theorists that the unspoken is as important as if not more important than what is spoken (Charlesworth, 1999; Kronsell, 2006), coming from attention to how IR’s others are omitted, excluded, kept out, and not mentioned (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004; Tickner, 1988). We argue that IR’s silences tell us more about the state of knowledge cumulation in the discipline than looking for standards that tell us what we do know. Accordingly, we ask on principle what any given research program does not take account of and how accounting for those omissions could changes analysis. We focus on both visible omissions (like the concepts that a research program fails to incorporate) and invisible omissions. Invisible omissions are those that are unhearable by a research program— normally left out or ignored by both the researchers that form the core of the research program and their critics (Butler, 2001; Edkins et al., 2012; Hansen, 2000). By “unhearable,” we mean either that the omitted content falls outside of the boundaries set for dialog or is assumed by all stakeholders to be by definition irrelevant (for deeper analyses see MacKinnon, 2006; Spivak, 1988). Unlike its visible omissions—variables that its scholars and their critics have added to, re-operationalized, expanded on, or suggested the inclusion of—invisible omissions are often not treated as omissions at all within particular scholarly boundaries.10 The discipline’s “collective” standards for knowledge production, then, can be understood as constituted by social performances of dominance rather than founded on some given or objective notions of what science should be. Rather than being objective judgments of quality, statements like “this is good science” and “these results are robust” are signs without referents used to discipline (Baudrillard, 1995). The invisible disciplining nature of the performative standards of knowledge cumulation is part of the story of Butler’s understanding of performativity. The other part is attention to who is excluded by claims to knowledge cumulation (generally as well as in specific paradigmatic situations), what is left out, and on what axes. These disciplinary standards (both in the conventional and Foucauldian sense) make invisible their own impossibility and their related necessary failure. For example, a submission to a traditional IR journal in the United States or Western Europe which makes an interesting argument, but is not in the format of, methodologically acceptable to, inclusive of the same forms of evidence traditionally used in, and good science to that journal’s traditional reviewers is unlikely to succeed in getting published.11 This will generally be justified with reference to the “quality” of the piece, and rarely if ever will questions of sex, race, gender, class, and other axes of exclusion be discussed as producers of the standards that then exclude on “quality” where “quality” has been set up in a way that excludes all performances of scholarship which are not mimicry of a particular Western, liberal model (Paolini, 1999).12 Even editors and reviewers who note the exclusionary effect of these standards will often mourn that and move on, imagining the only possible alternative being lacking standards, and seeing such a lack of standards as more insidious than the exclusionary effects of using certain sets of standards. “Knowledge cumulation” then becomes a set of reified and artificial standards rather than a journey for truth or interest. The answer to this quagmire is sometimes a liberal politics of inclusion (e.g., Nedal & Nexon, 2018)—how do “we” get more women, more minorities, and more people from underrepresented places in the world to be able to meet the standards of good scholarship in the field? That liberal politics of inclusion, while well-intended, can be read as a (subtle, perhaps accidental) expansion of the violence it (formally) seems to abate. It fails to question the utility of the existing standards of good scholarship and assumes that those currently excluded would be happy to change the form, shape, and/ or nature of their scholarship to fit within the (unquestioned/unquestionable) mold of good scholarship, either loosely or strictly understood. As Puar (2006) argues, liberal “inclusion” to absorb the other within can be as violent as if not more so than exclusion even as it appears progressive. That violence is the reproduction of naturalized, bounded identities when identities are liminal and messy when not policed (e.g., Agathangelou, 2013; Haritaworn et al., 2013; Scott, 2013). The bounded nature of IR inclusion excludes liminality, messiness, and outsideness (e.g., Malksoo, 2012 ¨ ). Expanding the boundaries of IR to include any given particular excluded work maintains an illusion of stability, hiding what is unstable; it maintains an illusion of certainty, hiding what is in doubt; it maintains an illusion of coherence, hiding the rebellious, the failed, and that which remains outside (e.g., Sjoberg, 2017). Queer theorizing of the liminality involved in unstable sex/gender identities shows that even that which is presumed to be the most primordial (sex identity) is really liminality hiding under supposed definition (e.g., Weber, 2016a). Translated to thinking about inhabitability, this theorizing suggests that the apparent safety of (constituting then occupying) inhabitable space hides liminality and uncertainty, and perhaps danger, under its supposed (empirical and normative) clarity (Haritaworn et al., 2014). Therefore, “all the repressive and reductive strategies of power systems are already present in the internal logic of the sign,” such “that violence is an inevitable byproduct of signification” (Baudrillard, 1981). In this way, not only do traditional standards of knowledge make invisible their own impossibility, they hide the violence of IR’s denials of failure and continued insistence on traveling failed paths despite the condemnation of failure and the privileging of success. IR’s continued recursive enactment of its settled “standards” despite their obvious failure and exclusiveness makes invisible the raced, classed, and sexed impacts of those standards and their apparent objectivity. Baudrillard’s work provides a path for navigating this disjuncture between signs (IR’s “standards”) and referents (the fantastic notion that “good scholarship” exists objectively) (Baudrillard, 1975). He argues that “only ambivalence, as a rupture of value… sustains a challenge to the legibility, the false transparency of the sign… questions the evidence of the use value of the sign (rational decoding) and of its exchange value (the discourse of communication).” This ambivalence, Baudrillard argues, “brings the political economy of the sign to a standstill; it dissolves the respective definitions of symbol and referent” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 150). Endorsing the inclusion of nontraditional perspectives, classifying and categorizing them, and assuming inclusion’s possibility may all have violent impacts (for discussions of the violences of inclusion see Haritaworn et al., 2013, 2014; Mbembe, 2019). Moving of the signification “knowledge” from any referent to which it was originally tied makes method and research performances of scholarship, rather than (the illusive) scholarship itself. If “research” is a performance of scholarship, “standards” for research serve to disguise the fantastic nature of knowledge cumulation. As such, there is no space for liminality, uncertainty, change, inadequacy, and failure in structural rather than passing senses. Yet looking beyond the discourse of certainty, those pervade IR. A Baudrillardian ambivalence toward research programs and their truth statements can reveal the recursivity of IR’s standards of knowledge cumulation. This is because condemnation or rejection of any given research program and its truth statements endorses its assumptions about truth, as well as some of its assumptions about what the international arena is and how it works. As such, the idea that IR knowledge cumulation can be nothing but fantasy is straightforward. If the reification of standards of knowledge cumulation is a signification divorced from a referent, where the recovery of the referent is conceptually and practically impossible, then knowledge cumulation is and will always remain an empty signifier. The only question is how that empty signifier directs and is directed. We suggest that, in IR, more often than not, knowledge cumulation directs and is directed by discursive seduction. In Baudrillard’s words, seduction is “that which extracts meaning from discourse and detracts it from its truth” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). What makes a discourse of knowledge, of science, and of progress seductive “is its very appearance: the aleatory, meaningless, or ritualistic and meticulous circulation of signs on the surface, its inflections and its nuances. All of this effaces the content value of meaning, and this is seductive” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). Therefore, if there could be an interpretive discourse of knowledge cumulation that reached truth value, that truth value would be selfdefeating, since “the meaning of an interpretive discourse, by contrast, has never seduced anyone.” This is the fundamental contradiction, in Baudrillard’s terms, that makes standards for knowledge cumulation in IR internally impossible. He explains that “every interpretive discourse wants to get beyond appearances; this is its illusion and fraud. But getting beyond appearances is appearance, and is hence subject to the stakes imposed by seduction, and consequently to its own failure as discourse” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). As such, what is left in/of the failed discourse can only be the fantastic, and pretensions to success hollow.

#### Reject their disciplinary scholarship – the potentiality of international theory exists in the liminality of politics, in the possibilities opened by embracing queer instability and failure.

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If IR’s state-of-the-field debates are alternatively narrativized fairy tales, we have a replacement. We suggest that the fairy tales’ idealized end can be found not in success but in failure; not in agreement but in controversy; not in aggrandized claims but in careful thought; not in stability but in liminality.15 It is hitching our wagon to a failure of a discipline and acknowledging that failure that constitutes and creates the possibility of a happily ever after for IR theory. We see the answers to many of these questions bound up in a disciplinary IR that has racist, sexist, heterosexist, and cissexist intellectual orientations and remains silent about them and often the assumptions that prop them up. But even work which decenters or critiques these exclusions in IR, in our view, is positioned compared to or in opposition to the discipline’s existing structure. Rather than being disappointed that IR theories are exclusive, cannot be reduced to a single theory, cannot account for global politics as a whole, and cannot present grand narratives of their competitive advantages visa-vis other approaches, we suggest highlighting and inhabiting these failures. Questioning the terms of disciplinary success as lying in a tightly choreographed dance (peer review in elite journals) or a popularity contest (citation count), or even in the “science” of knowledge cumulation, we ask why empty signifiers continue to dictate value in a wide variety of channels in IR. But we do not think redefining success will “solve” this “problem,” no matter how well-intended or radical the redefinition is. Note that we are not denying the existence or importance of significant transgressive work within IR, work that rejects grand narrativizing, or other explicit or implicit attempts to embrace failure. We are under the impression that authors critiqued here might actually agree with our critiques, either placing themselves within them or taking exception to them. We are not looking to signal virtue or to exclude, simply to suggest an explicit alternative approach. Instead of looking for an alternative, emphasizing some of the “good” transgressions, finding another way to succeed, or recasting success, we look to deconstruct IR’s logics of success and failure, and, with them, its mimicry of reified standards and its fantasies of knowledge cumulation. We see rewards in embracing IR theory’s failure to live up to IR theorists’ expectations of it. With Halberstam, “perhaps most obviously, failure … disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between…winners and losers” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). Declaring, and embracing, knowledge cumulation failure (and thus, IR’s intellectual failure) “allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). The relevant norms in IR are the fetishization of science, the fetishization of progression and progress, and the establishment and reification of boundaries of what ideas matter to the field. In embracing failure and escaping those punishing norms that are as violent in their inclusion (e.g., Haritaworn et al., 2014) as they are in their exclusion, “queer studies offer us one method for imagining, not some fantasy of an elsewhere, but existing alternatives to hegemonic systems” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 89). It “can be a potent form of critique,… a refusal of the norm, an indifference to assimilation, and a route to other ways of being in the world” (Halberstam, 2012). Here, the alternative to the hegemonic system of claims of knowledge cumulation is the queer, understood as both liminal and anti-heteronormative, as a foundation for theorizing more nuanced understandings of knowledge than success or failure at cumulation. If scholars find their affirmation in (hollow) confirmations of their claims to knowledge cumulation, a queer politics of failure suggests a different direction. As Halberstam recommends, “rather than resisting endings and limits, let us instead revel in… all of our own inevitable fantastic failures” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 187). Reveling in fantastic failures, in terms of a queer critique of the fantasy of progressive knowledge cumulation, has two elements: celebrating research as failure and confronting the future given that embrace. Queer theory suggests guidelines for embracing failure; “failing is something queers do well”—not (only) in the self-deprecating sense of laughing at (one’s own) flaws, but also in the more fruitful sense of exposing the ridiculousness of norms by failing to live up to them. In this sense, queer failure is “a map of the path not taken” (Weber, 2014a, 2014b). As such, “queerness offers the promise of failure as a way of life,…but it is up to us whether we choose to make good on that promise in a way that makes a detour around the usual markers of accomplishment and satisfaction” (Halberstam, 2011, loc 3281). “Failing” to meet expectations and being fine repudiates the salvation narrative that accompanies the “right” rules and norms and lifts the often terrible consequences of falling outside “the norm” while removing the privileges of “belonging” to the category of success. The exposure and analysis of queer failure denaturalizes the coherence of knowledge-production performances to show the vapidity inside. We see the replacement of “all-encompassing global theories” with those “subjugated knowledges” which have been “buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systemization” as a key first step but insufficient by itself (Halberstam, 2011). Turning IR’s “losers” into its “winners” would both serve social justice and unsettle the binary itself, but rejecting the categories writ large would both upset the politics of exclusion in those categories and discourage the win-seeking behavior that makes state-of-the-field debates. Celebrating failure instead “provides the opportunity to use [failure’s] negative effects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life” where “the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3, 4). The “toxic positivity” in IR theorizing is the attachment to the utility of grand theory that cumulates knowledge which makes the inequalities in the discipline appear to be organized by some sense of objective quality, where “success happens to good people” and good research while failure happens to bad work or bad people (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). Instead, we see those inequalities as structural and standards of success in IR as political. IR’s happily ever after, then, if it is to have one, must be in the failure, in the mess, and in rejecting both inherited interpretations of success and of the normative relationship between success and failure. It must be not only in not meeting expectations of any given state-of-the-discipline proselytizing but also in instead realizing that IR cannot and should not approximate those expectations. It is not a progressive discipline with a singular end or an exercise in progressive knowledge cumulation. It is instead necessarily undisciplined—it must put aside the straightjackets of research standards, the ego-stroking of aggrandized claims, and the authorial voice of the telling of the discipline’s past, present, and future—to embrace liminality and the necessity (and beauty) of failure. The irony of this argument is not lost on us. Halberstam, making the queer theory case for celebrating failure, has become a very successful academic by many of the traditional disciplinary standards, and The Queer Art of Failure is a successful academic text. Many of the critics and supporters cited here have built on academic success by their engagement with the argument. We are bringing the case to IR, publishing it in a academic journal, through the traditional mechanism of peer review, from the comfort of secure and permanent academic employment. We poke holes where those holes can be seen by those who would police the boundaries between winners and losers. This article does not “practice” as it “preaches,” to itself upend the “winners” and “losers” in disciplinary IR—it is couched in both necessary and unnecessary hypocrisy. But positionally at the very least, our celebration of failure is itself a failure—implicated in our interest in and disciplinary IR’s promotion of success. We are not arguing that failure can be made pure or that it should be—only that it cannot and should not be escaped, especially for the glorification of success as its perceived opposite. As we fail at failure to demonstrate the fantasy of success, we envision a happily ever after of failing, un-discipline, and diversity rather than a faux idealism of synthesis, aggrandizement, “science,” and disciplining.

## 2AC -- FW

### 2AC -- FW -- C/I

#### Counter-interpretation – affirmatives must defend an epistemic or political trajectory in response to the resolution. This views the resolution as a jumping off point rather than an endpoint and includes strategies of queer digital engagement as well as political reformism.

#### Prefer our interpretation --

#### 1 -- Ethical Correction DA -- The entirety of the 1AC was an impact turn to rehearsing the grammars of the resolution – if we win our aff we win that this resolution is a flawed starting point for debate and that only an interpretation that includes corrective ethical filters on the resolution can solve

#### 2 -- Erasure DA -- their interpretation naturalizes a pedagogy of normativity that invisibilizes the queer body as a site of violent political contestation – you should question the utility of the skills they produce – prioritize the transgressive educational practice of our model.

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Queer pedagogy and questions of gender identity and sexual orientation For many American researchers and activists, the concept of queerness seeks to incorporate bodies that lost visibility during the gay movement of the 1960s and 1970s. From this perspective, the gay and lesbian movement was normalized as it adopted heteronormative practices (like marriage and the adoption of children) to gain public acceptance. The term ‘queer,’ then, attempts to recover individuals erased by this normalization, such as feminine boys, transsexual people, transgender people, and non-binary or gender non-conforming people among others. Briefly retracing a possible historiography of queer theory, by the beginning of 1970s, gay literary studies began to flourish in the American academic world. As the gay movement started to seek out and create its own culture and identity, it began to look not only to the past but also to the future. In the 1980s, U.S. political activism, still maintaining its attention to the past, adopted the word ‘queer’ as a driver of the movement, a word that up until then, had been considered the most commonly used homophobic term in the country. In other words, the political movement reincorporated a term, previously carrying a negative connotation, trying, in this way, to deconstruct its pejorative meaning. Taken up by the academy, queer theory seeks to denounce the heteronormativity that influences even the gay movement. That is, the gay movement is accepted only to the extent that it conforms to certain social values pre-established by society, rejecting those who do not follow that norm.2 Teresa de Lauretis (1991) states that the term ‘queer’ should function as something that causes discomfort, juxtaposed to the words lesbian and gay in the subtitle to mark a certain critical distance from the vocabulary used in the past. For De Lauretis, queer is the ‘non-canonical,’ polyphonic, transgressive, and problematic. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2008) too affirms that the term constitutes a moment, a movement, a continuous motive. Queer pedagogy, based in these ideas of a queer theory against normalization, seeks to contribute to practices of education, analyzing the fluidity and the mobility of society and affirming that educational institutions should not attach themselves to one set model, since these ideals end up alienating, even excluding, certain individuals. For Britzman (1998), queer theory transgresses seemingly stable representations and, in this sense, queer pedagogy works to question situations of apparent normality in the classroom and concerns itself with the social production of what is learned. Queer pedagogy does not seek the ‘correct’ method or the ‘right’ questions, but rather the possibility to question our practices or notions of equality and acceptance. Just as queer theory sought to distance itself from the markers of gender associated with gay and lesbian studies, queer pedagogy offers everyone involved in academic spaces, whether they be heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual, etc., the possibility of understanding issues of sexuality from a new angle. As Louro (2001) explains: “(…) a queer pedagogy and curriculum ‘speak’ to everyone and aren’t only directed at those who recognize themselves in this subject position, that is, as queer subjects.”3 (p. 256). Queer pedagogy offers a critical view of the practices of exclusion that are naturalized in the classroom by a banal heteronormativity4 that makes all those who don’t fit into a certain standard invisible. As Britzman (1998) demonstrates, queer theory recognizes the exorbitant normality in effect and the ways in which that normality ignores queer pleasures, practices, and bodies. Neither does said pedagogy seek merely to trade one norm for another, to simply leave a heterosexist binary for a heterosexual–homosexual modality. A queer lens for pedagogical practice would mean observing the varied possibilities of expression of sexuality without the necessity of labels or fixed identities. The recognition of different forms of expression would broaden an individual’s perspective, without that person having to necessarily adopt one of these fixed identities, allowing them to acknowledge these identities or even recognize themselves in said identities. It becomes necessary, then, to question and challenge dominant models in schools today so that socially favored groups are not the only ones visible, including as well other bodies that are still oppressed by different spheres of society. Queer pedagogy can help us in two ways. First, by problematizing the very school structure, the normalization of teaching per se and of the fixed and exclusionary content that is presented. Using a queer lens would involve, for example, discussing why terms like gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender do not find space in school vocabulary and why when they do, it is only through insults that should be silenced. More than prohibiting that students or even teachers use these words as insults, it is important to have a discussion of such use. To be gay or transgender is part of the identity of an individual and as such, should be included in the day-to-day just as ethnicity, religion, and many other aspects should be.5 As Britzman (2012) explains, queer pedagogy aims at ‘something different than a plea for inclusion or merely adding marginalized voices to an overpopulated curriculum.’ (p. 297). It is not the normalization of the ‘different’ that queer pedagogy proposes, is to ‘recognize difference outside the imperatives of normalcy.’ (p. 304).

#### 3 -- Academic Politicization DA – debate as a political discipline is defined by the process of delineation between valorized and antagonized modes of knowledge production – resist the call of the negative to act as the procedural enforcer of counterinsurgency and embrace a queer interpretation of the resolution that calls into question the pervasion of state politics and its production of dominant ideological narratives.

Smith and Lee ’14 -- (Nicola J. Smith, Donna Lee, 1-20-2014, "What's Queer about Political Science?," Volume: 17 issue: 1, page(s): 49-63S, AGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-856X.12037, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

As Laura Shepherd (2012) notes: ‘The idea of a discipline (noun), in the academic sense, clearly derives from the verb: both relate to establishing clear boundaries between what is right and good (behaviour/research) and what is wrong and bad (behaviour/research); both have ways to correct transgression when an uninitiated (or resistant) person strays [original emphasis]’. We would like to take this further and argue that it is through the very process of disciplining (verb) that an academic ‘discipline’ (noun) such as political science comes into being. That is, it is precisely through the construction, maintenance and policing of carefully-demarcated boundaries that political science becomes constituted as a discipline: the centre is not separate from the margins but is constituted in and through them (Doty 1997). Important here, then, is how political science has come to be defined as a field of study and, in particular, how ‘politics’ is seen to be the natural preserve of the state. Many of our students have undertaken A-levels in ‘Government and Politics’ and a number of political science departments in the UK and internationally currently feature ‘Government and Politics’ in the title.9 And one of the first—and most central—questions most first-year undergraduate students are asked to address is whether or not politics and government are synonymous (with the tacit message that, no, they are not the same but, yes, they do nevertheless ‘naturally’ go together, hence why the question is posed). A key problem regarding queer theory here is that it has not, as yet, had a great deal to say about the state (although see for instance Duggan 1994; Bernstein and Reimann 2001; Brandzel 2005). But it also reflects how states and bodies are nevertheless imagined to reside in different realms: the state is often seen as synonymous with the ‘public’ sphere of politics—a world of government, power and collectivity—whereas the body is frequently imagined to reside in the ‘private’ sphere—a world of intimacy, selfhood and individuality. Yet feminist scholarship has long sought to highlight how this supposedly straightforward division between states and bodies is, in fact, deeply gendered. Indeed, a central project for feminist theory has precisely been to reveal how the state itself is often coded as masculine: that is, it is associated with the public realm of political power and decision-making and, as such, with masculine influence and identity (Youngs 2000a). The body, in contrast, is frequently coded as feminine in its multiple associations with nature, emotions, sexuality, vulnerability, reproduction and the family (Hooper 2000). In so doing, feminists have sought to expose and challenge the complex ways in which ‘body politics’ become invisible, denied and erased (for a detailed discussion see Jenkins 2005). Charlotte Hooper (2000, 39), for instance, has explored how rational masculinity is organised around a series of gendered dualisms (including public/private, mind/body, and inside/outside) that include a ‘fantasy of disembodiment’ which ‘depends upon the apparent invisibility or absence of bodies in social discourse, so that masculine reason could be separate from and untainted from the body’. As such, feminists have sought to reveal the ‘problem of the missing body’ in social and political discourse in order to expose and challenge how this very invisibility is steeped in, and (re)productive of, power relations (Youngs 2000b, 1). In this way, feminists have also sought to show how bodies and politics are intertwined, for the body is: ... a place for political mobilization interconnected with other sites of resistance and political action ... bodies are not external to political processes but firmly enmeshed in them, even if they are not necessarily the defining site for action. The lived experience of the body, the identity and definitions attached to bodies, inform and are connected to all political struggles (Harcourt 2009, 23).10 Queer Theory and Political Science One of the most crucially important contributions of feminist political analysis, then, has precisely been to gender the state (for a review see Kantola 2006) but also, more fundamentally, to show how the personal is political and, consequently, to shift the focus from politics-as-government to politics-as-power. This latter notion is, of course, shared by many political scientists—indeed, to quote one of the aforementioned textbooks, Hay’s (2002, 168) Political Analysis states: ‘power specifies the sphere of the political: power is to political analysis what the economy is to economics [original emphases]’. What is interesting, though, is that although political science has a great deal to say about power, so too does queer theory. Queer theory is, in fact, centrally concerned with the (re)production of power relations; power is, in short, what queer theory is about. Although there is no one approach to power in queer studies—rather, power represents a key site of contestation within queer theorising—queer scholars frequently ask questions about power that ‘seek to expose the limitations, unstable foundations and power-laden assumptions of the “straight” political, psychological, cultural and economic discourses that govern us’ (Griffin 2011, 50). At the same time, while queer theory has much to say about power as it relates to sexuality, it can also denote ‘any form of research positioned within conceptual frameworks that highlight the instability of taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations’ (Browne and Nash 2010, 4).11 It is not (just) sexual norms but rather norms per se that a great deal of queer theory seeks to expose and destabilise. As Butler writes: ... power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms, including the subject position of the critic; and ... this implication of the terms of criticism in the field of power is not the advent of a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather, the very precondition of a politically engaged critique. To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises and extends its own power play through recourse to tropes of normative universality (Butler 1994, 6–7). Rather than being (only) interested in what truths are, then, queer theory (also) asks us to consider what ‘truths’ do—that is, it asks: ‘What gets to be constituted as “truth” and what are the material effects of this?’ So, for example, rather than asking a question such as ‘What does it mean to be “human”?’ (or, put differently, ‘What is the essence or truth of “the human”?’), queer theorists might ask a rather different question: ‘What gets to be constituted as “human”, and what doesn’t? Who gets to be included in “the human”, and who is left out? And what are the material effects of this, in terms of the ability of the “less-than-human” to live a fully liveable life?’ (for a detailed discussion see Butler 2001). An important purpose of social and political theory is thus to critique how specific appeals to ‘truth’ become presented as universal and timeless rather than as contingent and contestable and how this can in turn legitimise violence and disadvantage within and across particular political, economic and cultural contexts. Indeed, this is a further reason why queer theory is written out of political science— because it seeks to destabilise rather than to discover foundational truths, it is dismissed as therefore being apolitical (and even downright unethical—see for instance Martha Nussbaum’s outright condemnation of Butler’s work in Nussbaum (1999)). Yet, as we’ve noted above, queer theory is fundamentally concerned with questions of power and—far from rejecting ethical enquiry—instead aims to uncover and critique how particular moral orders become naturalised, necessitated and thus positioned as being beyond ethical scrutiny.12 Equally, what queer theory does is to encourage reflection on what it means for something to be ‘political’. What gets to be constituted as ‘political’ and what doesn’t? What gets to become an object of ‘politics’ in academic enquiry and, indeed, public deliberation more broadly? What gets to be studied, discussed, contested, written about, cited, lectured on, and what doesn’t? In short: what’s in and what’s out? More than this, queer theory also insists that what gets to be counted as ‘political’ is itself political—it is a product of the exercise of power, with real material effects. In this sense, queer theory seeks to politicise ‘the political’ itself.

#### 4 -- Linear Education DA -- Modern day education functions along linear logic – the construction and formation of subjects in certain ways after time. Our argument is that these forms of linearity are exactly what is used to create “docility” from queer subjects, forcing them into discreet indentitarian formations through the process of chrononormativity.

Kim ’17 Kim, Jainey Jung Yeon, "Picturing Queer Death: Alternative Instantiations of Temporality within Process Art." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2017. KZaidi

What, then, is Time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.7

In his series of lectures titled “Birth of Biopolitics,” Foucault formulates the idea that the delimitation between state and society marks the turn from liberalism into neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, as Foucault defines it, is a political rationality that merges the social sphere with the economic sphere as a means to reduce state services and shift the language of responsibility and morality onto the individual subject body. Within neoliberalism, there is a shift in governmentality and social regulation “in the sense that subjects are increasingly conceived and conceive themselves as entrepreneurs of the self, who attempt to maximize their human capital.”8 As Thomas Lemke goes on to explain:

The neoliberal forms of government feature not only direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being responsible for them. The strategy of rendering individual subjects "responsible" (and also collectives, such as families associations, etc.) entails shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc. and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible ... The key feature of the neoliberal rationality is the congruence it endeavors to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational individual. It aspires to construct responsible subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts.9

This “neoliberal rationality” roots itself through different regimes of truth, the types of discourse that get accepted as truth and established as hegemonic within the system in power. For example, in neoliberalism the language of morality becomes ascribed onto economic responsibility, and the neoliberal subject replaces the regulatory mechanisms of the state as a self-regulating subject, or human capital, of the free market. Therefore, neoliberalism becomes a determining factor in the societal and governmental response to AIDS in the form of what Leo Bersani calls “malignant aversion,” in which the funding for research and treatment for AIDS was delayed, a push was made towards testing rather than curing, and policies were made that had more to do with protecting straight communities from being penetrated rather than with saving queer communities. More specifically, in response to AIDS, “a public health crisis [was] treated like an unprecedented sexual threat” brought on by the queer body and its inability to police and regulate its own desires, and there was a “general tendency to think of AIDS as an epidemic of the future rather than a catastrophe of the present.”10 Therefore, during the AIDS epidemic, queer bodies within the neoliberal system became synonymous with death caused by an individual moral failure and sexual threat.

I engage with the term chronobiopolitics from a Foucauldian perspective in which we understand neoliberalism to be a configuration of power relations that is not only an intensification of capitalism and capitalist exploitation of bodies, but also a system that creates biopolitical regimes of truth11 that establish social practices necessary for the sustainment of neoliberalism as absolute. In this thesis, I situate linear temporality and chrononormativity as one such example of a regime of truth that neoliberalism asserts on the queer body with AIDS in order to regulate the individual subject body. Elizabeth Freeman describes this regulatory structure of temporality as such:

Naked flesh is bound into socially meaningful embodiment through temporal regulation: binding is what turns mere existence into a form of mastery in a process I’ll refer to as chrononormativity, or the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity. And I mean that people are bound to one another, engrouped, made to feel coherently collective, through particular orchestrations of time: Dana Luciano has termed this chronobiopolitics, or “the sexual arrangement of the time of life” of entire populations.12

The heteronormative structuring of social reality works under this very assumption of a chrononormativity that is linear and progressive, in which milestone markers of individual development—grade school graduation, college, career development and advancement, creating a nuclear family—are enforced and adhered to properly. The failure to adhere to this chrononormative timeline is seen as a failure to produce and mature into a moral, responsible member of society. Particularly in regards to productivity and the individual responsibility to maximize one’s own “human capital,” time becomes synonymous with money, and every minute becomes a commodity that must be capitalized on. Linear time becomes central to the organization and the maintenance of the commercial structure of society: hourly wages, monthly rent, time-interest rates, and built credit over time—things that visibly queer bodies of the late twentieth century did not often get access to.

#### Queer temporality produces space and time for queer lives, enabling us to think gender and sexuality differently

Shafer 17 [Alexander Phillip. *Queering Bodies: Aliens, Cyborgs, and Spacemen in Mexican and Argentine Science Fiction*. Diss. UC Riverside, 2017. <https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt1tx0h3jx/qt1tx0h3jx.pdf> //gc

Cyborgs are not the only figures in science fiction that get us to question heteronormativity and other regulatory means; aliens, and other posthuman figures also abstract notions of the self and Other, the importance of the body, and queer relationships, particularly through the homosocial bonds these figures form with humans and non-humans alike. In this dissertation, the major questions I will address are: How does science fiction provide spaces and temporalities that allow us to relate to and understand diverse queer subjectivities? How does Latin American science fiction use colonial narratives of space travel to make evident the connection between gender, race, sexuality, and coloniality? How does the construction of non-human and quasi-human subjects in science fiction represent the intersection of categories of race, class, and sexual orientation? In order to understand these question, it is necessary to understand the study of Latin American science fiction, my use of queer theory to approach these questions, as well as the study of race, gender, and sexuality in science fiction criticism in general. I rely heavily on queer theorists’ work on space and time, and their connection to science fiction. One way to understand queer lives is in terms of “sexual orientation.” Sara Ahmed explores the spatial component to orientation, as the word orientation implies direction, the creation of space, and the relationship of people and objects in that space (1). In phenomenology, it involves “intentional consciousness,” the direction of attention 5 towards certain objects and away from others (27). Queer phenomenology, an idea I will return to in Chapter 1, offers one lens to see queer space and time; it seeks to view the way the world is oriented to privilege certain groups and exclude others. Sexual orientation affects the way we inhabit and experience a world already set before us, and thus understanding queer space can offer a glimpse of how to configure the world to be more inclusive. By analyzing queer spaces, we think outside the normative spaces created for and by gender and sexuality. Halberstam seeks to modify “postmodern geographies” to account for queer spaces and temporalities: Queer work on sexuality has to respond to canonical work on postmodern geography by Edward Soja, Frederic Jameson, and David Harvey and others that has actively excluded sexuality as a category for analysis precisely because desire has been cast by neo-Marxists as part of a ludic body politics that obstructs the ‘real’ work of activism (6).1 Halberstam makes queer lives central to questions about the creation of social space and class. Halberstam asks us to think beyond epistemologies that exclude gender and sexual orientation. By looking at these spaces, Halberstam and Ahmed construct a discourse that includes queer lives in ways that are sometimes overlooked. Doing so illuminates the presence of subjectivities often ignored in hegemonic discourse, such as rural queers or queer people of color. Opening up the category of queer to be that which goes against the norm in more general terms, Ahmed specifically allows us to think outside of the given spaces for things. In terms of queer phenomenology, this means carving a space in 6 phenomenology for queer lives as well as queering the way we think about inhabiting spaces already set before us. In other words, the world privileges certain groups by creating patterns and social and physical spaces that are more easily inhabited by some than others. Another dimension to understand queer lives is in terms of time. Queer temporality creates not only space but time for queer lives. Halberstam explains that there are “queer” subjectivities, such as HIV positive subjects or even the unemployed if we use the term queer more broadly, that go against heterosexual logics of reproductive and family time (6). These lives exist outside the “normal” capitalist schema of marriage, children, labor, and longevity, and acquire value based on other temporalities. Thus, time and space can be analyzed from a queer perspective. Queer includes that which goes against the norm, but also the sexual orientations associated with the word queer. As an inclusive not simply one but the other, looking at queer subjectivities rather than simply identities allows us to view queer lives from a multifaceted perspective within restricting what does or does not constitute the category such as a term like gay. Analysis of science fiction texts goes hand in hand with an analysis of queer space and time. Science fiction texts help us to get a better view of the structures of power that are frequently invisible; by creating new worlds, new alien races, and alternate histories, the familiar is rendered unfamiliar, and the unfamiliar becomes familiar. Darko Suvin theorizes that there is a relation between the world of the reader and the science fictional setting that is “estranged” to the reader in a process he calls “cognitive estrangement” (12). Borrowing from Bertolt Brecht’s examination of vanguard theatre, the idea is that 7 science fiction estranges the familiar world of the reader through a far-off time or place (or differing future or past). Science fiction, rather than estranging the world of the reader to the point of non-recognition, like surrealism, relies on tools of cognition to understand the unfamiliar. This frequently requires the reader to engage with scientific principles that render the story possible to the mind of the reader. 2 Science fiction then, through means of cognitive estrangement, forces us to reckon with the norms of society, such as gender, race, social hierarchies, and economic inequalities. Science fiction allows us to consider the reconstruction of gender as something one does rather than something one has; Like the ideas articulated by Ahmed and Halberstam, science fictional time and space is often queer time and space; alien bodies abstract notions of gender to the reader. The fictional space of science fiction allows writers to test the limits of the body and particularly gender.3 Judith Butler asks us in Undoing Gender to imagine a world beyond a gender binary: "fantasy is essential to an experience of one’s own body or that of another, as gendered” (15). Thus, gender itself is created in space and time, and in the imagination as much as being something one performs or does. Science fiction is a privileged site for imaginary worlds and spaces, and can be for the reconceptualization of gender and sexuality as well.

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Fairness

#### 3 -- Epistemic disobedience is good -- refusal to conform to the rules of the game calls into question the assumptions that sustain the normalization of queerphobic violence within debate.

Mignolo ’09 -- (Walter D. Mignolo, 2009, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society 26.7-8 (2009): 159–181, <https://www.academia.edu/3763158/Epistemic_Disobedience_Independent_Thought_and_Decolonial_Freedom?auto=citations&from=cover_page>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts [themself] in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean 4 Theory, Culture & Society 26(7–8) and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker. In semiotics, a basic distinction has been made (Emile Benveniste) between the enunciation and the enunciated. The distinction was necessary, for Benveniste, to ground the floating sign central to Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology and its development in French structuralism. Benveniste turned to the enunciation and, by doing so, to the subject producing and manipulating signs, rather than the structure of the sign itself (the enunciated). With this distinction in mind, I would venture to say that the interrelated spheres of the colonial matrix of power (economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity) operate at the level of the enunciated while patriarchy and racism are grounded in the enunciation. Let’s explore it in more detail (Benveniste, 1970; Todorov, 1970).

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Predictable Limits

#### 1 -- The negative’s call to predictable activist strategies is a thinly veiled move to institutional cooption – unpredictable modes of symbiotic relationality are key to effective strategies of queer resistance.

Demir ’20 -- (Aylime Aslı Demir, 2020, “Unpredictable Activism in Times of Uncertainty,” Museum International, 72:3-4, 178-187, DOI: 10.1080/13500775.2020.1873515, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

Following an attempted military coup in Turkey on 15 July, 2016, a country that was already being governed under a state of emergency witnessed, through decree laws, the closure of pro-democratic NGO publications, detentions, arrests, and the narrowing of permitted public spaces. Thousands of academics and tens of thousands of public employees were dismissed, while hundreds of association-based publications were shut down. The members of the association Academics for Peace were fired from their positions without first being prosecuted, and the presumption of their innocence was ignored. Meanwhile, courses and theses on critical theory, feminism, gender, LGBTQI+ and queer studies were suddenly removed from university syllabi. Most academic research on gender, LGBTQI+ and queer studies was disrupted, and with the dismissal of academics who served as a bridge between academy and activism, social movements’ sphere of influence shrank even more. After all these losses, it can be said that social opposition constituents were subjected to a collective trauma. Hundreds of people lost their lives, and thousands of opponents, journalists, human rights activists were denied their freedom, detained and arrested. Moreover, the ability to imagine a future democratic life was shattered. Ultimately, LGBTQI+ activities were indefinitely banned in Turkey in November 2017 so as to include the whole of Ankara and the Istanbul Beyoğlu district—which are also the heart of LGBTQI+ activities, actions, and life. The governorship listed ‘social sensitivities and sensibilities’, ‘public security’, the ‘protection of public health and morality’ and the ‘protection of others’ rights and liberties’ as motivations for the ban on LGBTI+ activities. In announcing its decision, the government released the following statements, republished in English on the Kaos GL website: We were informed through various social media and several printed and visual media organs that several movie, cinevision, theatre, panel, interview, exhibition etc. events including several social sensibilities and sensitivities will be organized in various locations of our city by various non-governmental organizations in the name LGBTT (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transvestite) and LGBTI (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex). This situation was evaluated as that social media shares at stake may provoke one section of public with different social class, race, religion, sect and regional features to show hatred and animosity in the disadvantage of other section, therefore clear and imminent danger towards public safety may arise; also, considering that this may jeopardize public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and morality, and protection of rights and liberties of others; as a result of several social sensibilities there may occur provocations and reactions by several sections towards groups and individuals who want to attend intended event. (Kaos GL 2017b) Just as Kaos GL Association had organised the Future Queer exhibition in order to launch a new public platform and space—one designed to create breathing room following the 2015 bombings—the organisation decided to stage innovative performance and unpredictable tactics in 2016, following the military coup attempt and after an ISIS plot to target the Kaos GL association’s offices was revealed. These new tactics had to be unpredictable, because the government was already aware of almost every tool of traditional activism. It had assimilated these tools and emptied all of the concepts that were meaningful for activists’ struggle. For instance, cases that were opened against those who encouraged attacks against LGBTQI+ people were dismissed by concluding that the perpetrators had exercised their right to freedom of speech, and that the state was obliged to protect the people’s right to freedom of speech, lest the police would be asked to respond to every call in which the word LGBTI was pronounced. Between 2017 and 2018, Kaos GL organised its second contemporary art exhibition, entitled Colony4 within the borders of the Fatih Municipality, in Sultan Ahmet Square. They chose it precisely because it is situated within one of the most conservative regions of Istanbul, and since there was no ban on LGBTQI+ events in the area. Without specifically naming the organiser or using terms such as ‘LGBTI’ in literature and without making any announcements in Kaos GL publications, Colony spread through word-of-mouth and earto-ear as much as silently, developing into a space of 4,000 square meters and an event that included some thousand voices (Fig. 4). In the age of the Anthropocene, in which humans themselves have been revealed as a geological force, and amid a climate of terrible uncertainty and fear which is created by unmanned air vehicles and suicide bombers, Colony set out to explore the possibilities of symbiosis, associations and interspecies relationships between humans and non-humans— even if the desire of bio-genetic studies is to create the ‘perfect’ human. The exhibition bulletin reads as follows: Fostered by the globally immediate socio-political juncture, artistic production, and academic discourse, Colony brings the definition of ‘human’ into question. Engaging critically with the means of making knowledge, science, technology, and politics, the exhibition questions that which privileges the human species by attributing a prioritised conception of existence to mankind. Through the agency of intimating a body and bodybeings, Colony gathers together artistic inquiries that reconsider constructed dichotomies such as human/nonhuman, nature/culture, and organic/ synthetic. Across moralism(s) and between female-male morphologies fixed in procreation, Colony explores the constitutive ways in which nature’s sanctions of normativity operate. Interfaced with discussions around language and gender, the exhibition probes for contemporary (collective) bearings that evade self-constituted, human-centered narratives derived from the alliance of culture-historysociety-power. Through the scope of post-human and queer critique kinship, colony embodies a range of perspectives that discuss these critical narratives.’ (Colony exhibition bulletin 2017) In the Turkish landscape, institutional support for artists is rare. Accordingly, following this exhibition, Kaos GL founded the Ankara Queer Art Programme, considering processes of artistic production in order to expand the limited opportunities for organising exhibitions and make such initiatives sustainable. The International Guest Artist House provides residencies for artists to work and live in Ankara for two months at a time, and supports their research and artistic projects. Today, while international travel remains risky due to the pandemic, the programme is continuing to offer financial support to artists and manages its consulting work online. Doing uncertain politics Over the past few years, we have witnessed countries that invented globalisation begin to adopt antiglobalisation policies, as right-wing, populist and nationalist politics gained momentum. But the walls that states have built up in order to protect themselves from immigration or free trade do not protect them against the climate crisis or from terror. When bombs started to arbitrarily explode in the streets of Ankara, the city was shocked by the knowledge that the victims were completely random, and shaken by the thought that anyone might become the victim of a terror act anytime, anyplace. Those in the crowds who wore thicker clothes than the seasonal norms, or those who ran away were not protected from the bombs; similarly, individual measures taken against the unpredictability that Covid-19 has created do not confer total protection from the disease. The state of not knowing what will happen no matter what one does has a horrific tendency to pacify individuals, who are paralysed with worry. Since the government knows by heart the current tools and probable moves of the resistance, we need to devise different tactics and exit the current ‘cat and mouse’ game. To respond to a government who desires to monopolise the power of creating uncertainty through governing that uncertainty, queer activism might represent a way of doing uncertain politics: one that offers the quickest and most effective responses against oppression. For instance, when officials told LGBTQI+ activists ‘you can’t gather in Istanbul’, we transformed numerous streets into spaces of action, effectively saying ‘Well then, we will spread out across the city’. When they said ‘You cannot walk beyond the barricade’ in İzmir, we responded by running back from the barricade. When they said ‘You cannot gather to protest in the streets’ we transformed the sea into a space of action and activism by taking a ferry. My sense is that we can find some inspiration in such a movement with regards to unpredictability. Traces of this form of activism can be observed in the work of one of the artists featured in the Colony exhibition (Abud Efendi Mansion, 2017-2018), Kerem Ozan Bayraktar. His video, entitled ‘Mimicry’, focuses on the ‘machineplant’ relationship (Fig. 5). The work, presenting footage from an orchid factory, reads the relationship between machines and plants as a symbiotic one. As in the biological evolutionary processes through which the cultivated orchids had been attracting bees in order to ensure their reproduction, within this contemporary factory setting, orchids ‘attract’ the machinery, namely the technological processes designed by human beings. This type of relationality negates the common assumption that the species that can sustain their existence through the evolutionary process are the fittest ones; since the orchids most capable of adapting to and cooperating with other species are constantly evolving and adapting enhance their survival capabilities through enabling the machines that are integral to their life cycles. Of course, the history of social movements can give us an idea of who our possible future alliances will be. However, if we see the basis of activism as affirmation of life, these alliances can change with every new situation encountered, like an orchid’s relationship to a machine. Else, the organic and inorganic world, as well as the history of activism, can seduce the survival strategies expected from our identities.

#### 2 -- Ground determines the impact to predictable limits – if they get substantial ground it zeroes their internal links to fairness and education – we link to any tech engagement bad arguments, normative IR/institutions good, NATO good, alternative queer methodologies, progress good which generates competition for almost any politically oriented CP

#### 3 -- [EXTRA] The negative’s imposition of certainty is a technology of fascism that enables the exertion of interpersonal control as a proxy mechanism for dealing with the inherent unpredictability of the world – unpredictability is a radical delegitimation of state power.

Demir ’20 -- (Aylime Aslı Demir, 2020, “Unpredictable Activism in Times of Uncertainty,” Museum International, 72:3-4, 178-187, DOI: 10.1080/13500775.2020.1873515, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

This article explores the political and artistic potential of ‘unpredictable’ forms of activism: ones specifically devised in response to attacks on the Turkish LGBTQI+ movement by right-wing populists within the AKP government led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially since 2015. Reflecting on the 2019 Conference in Marseilles at MUCEM—La Méditerranée du genre, de la résistance et des stratégies (The Mediterranean of Gender, Resistance and Strategies)—which spurred me to write the present article, it strikes me that at the time of that event, the world had not yet been tested with Covid-19. Although the growing spectre of the global climate crisis had already generated a significant sense of uncertainty and insecurity, we were still unfamiliar with the experience of our ‘safe’ realities and norms being swiftly swept away. We could not yet conceive of a reality in which we would not be able to hold the hand of our beloved at a funeral; or of the fact that our health insurance would not protect us amid hospitals full to capacity. Since the global pandemic swept the world, we have experienced the (co)dependency of our bodies with a sense of horror—representing, for the first time in modern history perhaps, such a globally reaching experience of radical uncertainty. Against all promises to the contrary, we are witnessing, in the time of Covid, how international bodies, states and institutions—no matter how ostensibly prepared they had been—cannot fulfil their responsibilities in protecting the public (or in certain cases prefer not to). At a moment when we are confronted with radical uncertainty, we are simultaneously facing the fact that we often have little choice but to act individually against collective risks. These individual actions include washing every surface or object you may touch with disinfectants, covering your face with masks even though public health authorities release contradictory and shifting statements around their protective capacities, or regretting your lack of good health insurance coverage and the precarious position it puts you in if you do get ill. From time to time, we become ‘good citizens’ who demand the harshest penalties for those who do not wear masks or disobey the rules of lockdown; or we establish a sense of personal ‘security’ by refusing access to our residential buildings for those who do not have the privileged position to stay at home, such as delivery people, service personnel and health workers—temporarily exerting a sense of control over our environment. In short, even for overprivileged individuals with excellent healthcare coverage, protected residences shielded from the outside world, and the ability to stay safe at home during a pandemic, all of us are confronted with radical unpredictability and incalculable risk in this age of Anthropocene. Moreover, with the challenges posed by neoliberalism—specifically the 2008 financial crisis and the Syrian War, which both sent reverberations around the world— right-wing populism has gained significant influence and political ground. As a way of doing politics, right-wing populism is noteworthy for its hybridity and adoption of uncertainty as a form of governing. It is hybrid because there is little consistency between the right-wing populist, charismatic leaders currently heading several countries around the globe—from Orbán to Bolsonaro and Trump—and the economic, political, judicial, scientific, philosophical, religious, moral and aesthetic ideologies and policies they represent and promote. For instance, while liberal values are adopted in some economic decisions, social rights might be accompanied by conservatism, pro-immigration policies by nationalism (and from time to time, even fascism). What is significant here is that while this ideological hybridity is not perceived as a negative trait by populist governments, which arguably thrive on inconsistency, it has an unpredictable power over citizens, because we do not know how such leaders will behave nor what they will do next. In The Anthropology of the State, Marc Abélès (2012) suggests that in order to legitimise political power under the law of reason, classical political philosophy differentiates between two conditions, natural and civic: On the one hand, there is a natural condition in which individuals are left to their own devices and this leads to an anarchical positioning. On the other hand, there is a civic condition emanating from the contract. In a literal sense, a political bond occurs only in the latter. Also, what conditions the existence and pérennité of the political bond is represented with its dual qualification in the forms of bringing together and empowerment. (p. 20) Thus, in order to remove the difficulties people face living in a lawless environment in which chaos dominates, the state will claim to bring fair, universal social solutions, which will determine the grounds of its legitimate power. Of course, this duality has been questioned in many instances and respects. For example, it can be said that the central objective of much research in political anthropology is to question this dichotomy established between the state and what supposedly existed prior to its formation. However, in the contemporary and neoliberal era, this duality has been blurred by the state itself, which instead opts for a mode of governing that fosters deep uncertainty. Even within the social sciences, the dualities generated by modern states, which are also legal entities, can be described in these terms: normal and abnormal, legal and illegal, permitted and unpermitted, public and private, etc. We witness how the lines between them change place arbitrarily, or become uncertain through government policy. Thus, when the distinction between what determines ‘normal’ and ‘outside of the norm’ suddenly become meaningless, not only are the laws of science that indicate the norm—which we can think of as something that repeats itself, or as rules—suspended, but so is the logic of law, on which states and governments are based. While the Enlightenment and its heritage has served as a common reference point for centuries, its notion of human rights is annihilated when the law itself is used as a tool for human rights violations.

## 2AC -- K -- Capitalism

### 2AC -- Perm

#### 1 -- Relational deconstruction DA – the perm solves best – including methodologies of queer social deconstruction enables a reenvisioning of class struggle through the lens of capitalism as a subjective construction rather than a preexisting formation and reshapes collectivity through the embrace of difference – prerequisite to effective resistance.

Green ’06 -- Doctoral Student in Sociology at the University of British Columbia (Brian Green, 09-05-2006, “The currency of queer theory for class analysis: remarx on subjectivities, class struggle, and subversion,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 14:4, 139-144, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

In the last decade, a powerful voice has emerged in social theory from its origins in cultural studies and discourse analysis. Loosely gathered under the label queer theory, this body of work has introduced substantial challenges not only to the heteronormativity of most social theory but also to the ways feminism, gay and lesbian studies, and analyses of inequality in general, have implicitly reproduced essentialist notions of identity and consciousness, thus constructed limits to their own subversive potential. Queer theory is less a homogeneous, coherent school of thought than a dialogue across disciplines that seeks to multiply the questions asked by social analysis. Emerging from more general trends toward deconstruction associated with poststructuralist thought, it takes as its starting point the social construction of apparently fixed identities, the reliance of such identities on presumed binary oppositions of difference which inhere in them, and the always unstable, always partial hegemonies of ‘the normal’ in real human life. In Seidman’s words “identities are always multiple or at best composites, with an infinite number of ways in which “identity components” . . . can intersect or combine. Any specific identity construction, moreover, is arbitrary, unstable, and exclusionary” (Seidman 1994, 173). Not only do constructions of identity always entail constructions of their opposite but, because those opposites are ideal-typical poles, they also produce unintended gaps on the continuum between them. And it is not so much in the recognition or affirmation of the ‘Other’ as here, on the multiple and shifting terrain between identities (i.e., the in-betweens of gender, race, and sexuality), that the potential lies for subverting essentialism altogether (Butler 1990; Seidman 1994, 173). This, then, is also where the importance of queer theory lies—not so much in the particulars of its diverse analyses of discourse, culture, theory, or law, but in its insistence upon the subversion of apparently dichotomous relationships rather than simply their inversion or recognition (Namaste 1994, 230). Such an analytic focus has significant implications for our understanding of, and political engagement with, relations of domination and resistance, including class relations. In fact, I would suggest that queer theory does for our understanding of identity struggle what Marx did for our understanding of economic struggle— historicizing its assumptions, identifying its subversions, articulating its alwaysalready existing potentials. And in doing these, it provides an opportunity to engage the relations of capital and class not as a set of immediately conquerable institutions but as a complex of ongoing relationships which is continually challenged, reconfigured and reinforced through the daily interactions of individuals and collectives (Namaste 1994, 224). How it does this, and the implications of that strategy for political class struggle, can be seen in the questions queer theory asks of more traditional approaches to gender inequality and heteronormativity, and the alternative political approaches those questions engender. Building on its roots in poststructuralism, queer theory interrogates not only the marginalized Others of social norms, but the dynamic and ever-shifting relationship between the poles; that is, rather than emphasizing the invisibility of women in patriarchy or of gays and lesbians in heteronormativity, the role those Others play is examined as always-already interior to the normal (Namaste 1994, 222). This is much more than a philosophical or discursive exercise, as too many Marxists are quick to assert—stressing the relational puts front and center the questions of interaction, of contestation, and of resistance. It implies that the binarisms upon which so much of identity is constructed cannot be preexisting, that neither pole in a dichotomy can be primary or natural, and that the formation, location, and interaction of such ‘opposites’ are the very substance of their continued reproduction. And if that is the case, resistance and alternatives become that much easier to locate as well, for three reasons: the recognition of identity as plural opens space for subversion, which can potentially include distinct and even apparently antagonistic groups; the emphasis on constructedness reveals that so-called normative identities (i.e., white, heterosexual, middle class) are no less unstable and partial than marginal ones, despite the significant privilege attached to them; and antagonism can never be rooted in immutable characteristics but must always and everywhere be located in existing relationships and the political strategies people employ to negotiate and renegotiate those relationships (Namaste 1994, 225). All this puts queer theory in marked contrast to more traditional approaches to social inequality, even those which sought radical political change. For example, previous theories of feminist and sexual liberation often tended to reproduce rather than subvert essentialism and binarism by opposing a unitary, victimized subject to a hegemonic norm, whether defined as male, heterosexual, or both. This can be seen in a wide range of politically motivated, even ‘revolutionary’ work, from radical feminism’s celebration of womanhood and privileging of lesbianism, and Dworkin and MacKinnon’s construction of an all-encompassing, inherently oppressive male sexuality, to Kristeva and Wittig’s searches for origins and even Wilkinson and Kitzinger’s arguments for political and identitarian unity in gay liberation struggles (Butler 1990; Bell 1994; Ingraham 1994, 213–5; Seidman 1994, 170; Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1994). In each case, patriarchy and heterosexuality remain constructed as universal and as intact; even where their naturally occurring status is called into question, they are seen as constructed upon real biological difference or imperative. Thus the hegemony of heterogender (Ingraham 1994, 204) is taken as a preexisting fact, rather than a recurrent tension, and the only possibilities for resistance are formal equality within existing parameters or inversion (but continued maintenance) of the hierarchy. By critiquing the tendency of much feminist and gay liberationist work to reproduce binarism, queer theory attempts to accomplish a rethinking akin to that brought about by postcolonial and black feminist thought in regard to assumed norms of whiteness—to promote a politically meaningful solidarity not on the basis of inherent sameness, but of constructed difference, not on the assumption of permanent, fixed identities but on fluid, partial, and contingent notions of selfhood and alliance which acknowledge multiple, intersecting relationships.1 Such a perspective may at first glance appear contradictory to the formation of political class solidarity in that it deemphasizes points of commonality, but on deeper examination, what appears is not a rejection of solidarity but a different conception of it. The point of commonality is not a universal sameness of oppression, not an unbesmirched essence buried beneath learned behavior, but the fact that we all share the experience of living with hierarchy-based identities, that we all experience only partial and unstable adjustment to identitarian regulations, albeit in different and even contradictory ways (see, for example, Wright 1997), and that all identities are at best incomplete, complex, and transitory. The resultant solidarity, then, is not one of a taken-for-granted unity or a presumed shared utopia, but rather a strategic solidarity which sees the sexual/ gender/race/class landscape itself, rather than any one, identifiable position on that landscape, as the common enemy. This, in turn, opens space for a plurality of resistances which can be seen not as competing but as mutually supporting, and provides for the possibility of alliance across sectoral divides. All this presupposes a very different approach to political struggle than we have been accustomed to. The broadly defined Left—be it feminist, Marxist, gay libera tionist, or nationalist—has tended to ground its political strategies and end goals in terms of an easily identifiable opponent: the class war rages between capitalists and workers; the feminist struggle between men and women; the sexual liberation struggle between straights and gays and lesbians; the antiracist struggle between racists and nonracists, as though real human relationships ever correspond neatly to such idealtypical poles. And while such oppositional organizing offered a means of establishing political community and articulating the value of alternative knowledges and alternative ways of living, in each case what was taken for the enemy was an embodied product of the system rather than the relational system itself.2 That is, the relation capital produces capitalists and workers, as though these were ahistoric, unchanging and easily identified categories; the gender system produces men and women, as though individuals were a necessarily wholly or permanently one or the other; the racialization process produces whites and blacks, as though these were somehow natural and timeless categories, rather than shorthand for a vast and ever growing range of miscegenations and racial and cultural identities. In each case, however, these presumed dichotomies are, in real human relationships, only-ever partial, can only be defined contextually, and are subject to constant redefinition. What needs to be analyzed and targeted politically, then, is not the individuals associated with various positions within such relational systems, but the systems themselves. Individuals are socially located not due to any essential characteristic which inheres to them, but due to their positioning within relationships and their roles in either reinforcing or subverting relations of domination. Rather than a retreat from conflict, then, the emphasis on relationships and systems helps to focus the object of struggle more clearly, to engage class, gender, heteronormativity, and racialization as processes of social reproduction rather than always-already existing states of being. What is more, it can accomplish these without either denying identity’s political relevance, as so many Marxists tend to do, or obscuring the play of structure, of material life, of laboring practices in seemingly ‘nonclass’ struggles, as is too often common in poststructuralist analyses. The emphasis on process and relationship is particularly well articulated by Judith Butler, for whom the starting point of analysis is a Nietzschean distinction between ‘doer’ and ‘deed’. This acknowledgement that identities and institutions are products of social interaction rather than preexisting states requires that we maintain an analytic and political focus on the ways that social relationships are produced and reproduced, on how they are constituted through their ongoing performance; “there need not be a ‘doer behind the deed’, but . . . the ‘doer’ is invariably constructed in and through the deed” (Butler 1990, 142). It is human action and interaction which is primary; thus, the political field is made more open to the subversion of normalcy and the multiplication of alternative potentials. Thus, while the political usefulness of Butler’s own work is limited by its focus on discursive production and individual interaction to the exclu sion of class struggles and laboring practices (Hennessy 1996, 225–8), her presentation of the problem has important implications for materialist, class-oriented analyses.3 Indeed, what are material institutions but the long-term and presumed-immutable outcomes of a previous relationships? What are ‘structural barriers’ but the concrete material implications of ‘doing’ or ‘performing’ social life according to culturally, politically, economically, militarily enforced rules of interaction? Thus it is here that we come to the concrete, political significance of queer theory for class struggles and for alternative ways of living: the queer theory approach provides an alternative set of questions which emphasize not only individuals in social relationships, but the production and reproduction of those relationships themselves, and the always existing gaps and breaks in social systems. When articulated with reference to concrete, material outcomes of relationships, queer theory emphasizes the production of alternative alliances and strategies which engage the reproduction of inequality as social process rather than as hegemonic entity, and provokes a political strategy in which liberation is not something ‘found’, but is achieved through ongoing processes of struggle, of solidarity in difference, and of relationship building. Queer theory, then, is not only or even primarily about understanding sexual diversity, but represents a significantly different approach to political analysis, and one which holds enormous potential for class analysts and class movements which seek an alternative to the legacy of Second and Third International Marxist-Leninist orthodoxies. It is an alternative way of thinking about social relationships which emphasizes process rather than product, subversive potential rather than end goal. Its implications for class analysis and political class struggle are to be found in the way it constructs domination and resistance as dynamic, as relational, as potential. Process and relationship become the central concerns not only of analysis, but of struggle as well, so that subversion is something to be uncovered and exploded, rather than implanted and left to fight a war of attrition for some always promised yet never attained state of bliss.

#### 2 -- Queer Marxism DA – queer engagement with Marxist utopian imaginaries grounds their movement in embodied queer/trans histories that foreground capitalist accumulation, exploitation, and alienation – class analysis is inseparable from the reproduction of social identity.

Raha ’19 -- (Raha, Natalia, 9-2-2019, "Queer capital: Marxism in queer theory and post-1950 poetics,” Sussex Research Online, https://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/86259/, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

Queer theory engaging with Marxism has reinvigorated key Marxist concepts by grounding theories of sexuality and queer and trans histories, cultures and texts into histories and readings of capitalist social transformation and accumulation. This includes the Marxist concepts of the commodity, value, labour, the gendered and racial division of labour, totality, reification, surplus population, primitive accumulation, racial capitalism, crisis, history and capital. These concepts have been engaged with to varying degrees of detail and Marxist orthodoxy, by drawing from different eras in Marx’s (and Marxist) thought – at times from the optimistic Young Marx of the 1844 Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts (1959), from the revolutionary Marx and Engels of The German Ideology and The Communist Manifesto, from the Marx of Capital. Queer Marxists also draw strongly from twentieth century Marxist figures such as Georg Lukaçs, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch and C.L.R. James. As I detail in Chapter 1, Gayatri Spivak’s reading of Marx’s labour theory of value (1988) has a profound influence on queer Marxism’s conception of value. Furthermore, while often not directly cited, the strong influence of Louis Althusser’s critique of ideology (1971) is evident in some contributions (Ferguson 2004, Liu 2015). The aforementioned Marxist concepts have been studied and applied to deepen important current subjects within queer theory, including the history of sexuality, utopia (of course also a subject of Marxism), affect, queer of colour critique and race, embodiment, gender, activism, and the political economy of sexuality more broadly. For instance, the influential work of Floyd (2009) and Hennessy (2000) connects the transformations of discourses of sexuality (of sexology and psychoanalysis) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with developments in capitalist production and consumption. Hennessy and Floyd deploy Georg Lukács’ theory of reification (1971), a touchstone for the development of Western Marxism in the interwar period, to theorise the reification of sexual subjectivity and sexual desire (I discuss this work at length in Chapter 1). The variation in Marxist orthodoxy has had a positive influence on the development of queer Marxism within queer theory, allowing for heterogeneity in critical and theoretical approaches in the uptake of Marxist concepts. Indeed, as Floyd writes, queer Marxism pushes Marxism “to speak to certain dimensions in social and historical reality powerfully illuminated in queer theory’s relatively brief history, dimensions that Marxism has little history of acknowledging, much less examining” (2009: 2, 4). The endeavour to challenge he epistemological limits of Marxism has been particularly fruitful in the development and uptake of queer of colour critique as a mode of analysis, as I discuss below. However, queer Marxisms have at times foregone structural critique that connects queer life and culture to political economy and the critique of capital. In addition, the muted engagement between queer Marxisms themselves seems to have had an adverse effect on the theoretical consistency of, and collaboration within, the discipline. For instance, addressing early work by Floyd (1996), Hennessy highlights the lack of “studies that examine the historical relationship between the formation of new sexual identities and the reifying cultural logic of an emergent commodity culture” (2000: 97). This is the key thesis of Floyd’s The Reification of Desire (2009), which undertakes a detailed queer reading of Lukács as I detail in Chapter 1. However, Floyd’s text only minimally attends to the important queer Marxist work of Hennessy (2000), Joseph (2002), Tinkcom (2002) and Ferguson (2004).16 Such a lack of engagement with other queer Marxist texts has undoubtedly affected the development of the field within queer theory. An example of the theoretical heterogeneity of queer Marxism is found in the roundtable discussion ‘Queer studies, materialism, and crisis’ in the GLQ special issue (Crosby et al. 2012). The discussion pays particular attention to queer Marxism’s “orientation to political-economic questions” (127), utopia and totality, racial capitalism and capital’s need to make certain bodies disposable in its pursuit of accumulation. The discussion brings together prominent contributors to queer Marxism and queer theorists addressing class and queer liberalism. Floyd explicitly historicises the uptake of certain concepts in queer theory, such as utopia in the work of Muñoz (2009) and Edelman (2004), as “symptomatic of a moment in which capital’s colonization of the future appears both unassailable, as a familiar neoliberal narrative would have it [… and] transparently violent in a way that may suggest the opposite: accumulation’s radical fragility” (Crosby et al. 2012: 128). On this point, he emphasises that Marxism and queer studies arrive at the same conclusions. Furthermore, building upon his reconsideration of totality in The Reification of Desire, Floyd asks “Can one ‘re-pos[e] the question of totality’ without implicating oneself in an imperial, American universalism?”, and while gesturing towards Marx’s value-form highlights the “problem of grasping the ways in which capitalism’s gendered, racialized and sexualized violence is inseparable from … capitalism’s simultaneous identity and nonidentity with itself” (138, emphasis added). Two contributors strongly emphasise the relationship between capitalism, racialization and queer studies’ address of marginalised figures and groups. Lisa Rofel emphasises the importance of a queer hermeneutics for understanding capitalism’s drive for universality across “Euro-American metropoles” which is “undone by the ‘difference’” of the history of the “postcolonies”, and for understanding the relation between the value form, bodies and the value of marginalised lives (129). On the subject of racial capitalism, Fred Moten emphasises, citing Cedric Robinson (1983), the centrality of “racism not as capitalism’s instrument but as its conditions of possibility”, alongside the role of “regulative desire” in the pursuit of capitalist accumulation (130). Robert McRuer emphasises queer theory’s interest in “provid[ing] some account of capitalist modernity, neoliberalism, or globalization” must necessarily address “the invalidated and unthinkable”, crip “figures that are sick, infected, deranged, addicted, scarred, wounded, or traumatized” (131). He notes that queer Marxism must remain invested in crip and Mad bodies and lives (as I consider in Chapter 4). Dean Spade’s contributions describe the pain of the NGO-industrial-complex’s “eclipse” of grassroots LGBT activism, which has transformed queer politics into “a site for building white power” (135) through carceral regimes and non-redistributive equality politics, and highlights the importance of a critical trans politics that cognises “the material conditions of existence and the distribution of life chances” (143). In contrast to these approaches that connect the structural forces of capitalism globally to contemporary narratives of development, the transformation of queer politics by capital, and the situation of marginal queer lives within these contexts, Heather Love details her interest in working-class queer writing, sometimes by writers of colour, which “focuses on the lived experience of structural inequality” (131). For Love, this work however decentres its focus on capital and “can seem to lack a revolutionary horizon” (131). She emphasises that “this refusal of the choice between revolution and capitulation is what makes this tradition queer”. 17 Love’s pessimism seems to miss the potential of reading or theorising such lived experience into materials and ammunition of queer Marxism.

#### 3 -- [EXTRA] Marxism should be theorized alongside queer theory

Liu 20 (Petrus Liu is Associate Professor of Humanities at Yale-NUS College and the author of Stateless Subjects: Chinese Martial Arts Literature and Postcolonial History. DECEMBER 01 2020, Social Text (2020) 38 (4 (145)): 25–47. <https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-8680426>; accessed 1/7/2022) ng

Queer theory, even as elaborated by authors closely identified as arguing in favor of a radical linguistic constructivism, turns out to be a materialist theory of social structuration with affinities to Marxism. Queer theory does not argue that identity is fluid, mobile, definitionless, or freely chosen; rather, it shows that identity is produced by constraints, social norms, and other specters of the material beyond one’s knowledge and agency. Insofar as both queer theory and Marxism emphasize such primary ties to unknown Others as a source of human vulnerability as well as sociality, both are committed to a materialism even when the material remains unnamed, unidentified, or reduced to a spectral presence. The point of material analysis is not to reassert the priority of the economic but to show that questions of gender and sexuality are part of a matrix of social interdependence that connects the self to others beyond borders—geopolitical, ethnolinguistic, religious, or otherwise. These others may speak different languages, inhabit any kind of socioeconomic organization, and subscribe to a variety of cultural beliefs and customs. Hence, there is no reason to assume that a material analysis must begin with American capitalism, free wage labor, or class relations. Instead, a genuinely materialist analysis must look beyond the borders of the nation and provincialize US queer theory and Marxism as mere participants in a global conversation. While both queer theory and Marxism have largely relied on philosophical notions of ethical alterity to argue this point, philosophy can get us only so far. It is imperative for us as a field to move past philosophical questions of the Other in Kant, Hegel, or Levinas and begin seriously engaging the scholarship produced by the “actually existing others.” The kind of work that we read, produce, recognize, and disseminate as queer theory is all but one variant of a global discourse—there are many queer theories in the world that are generating valuable insights from different archives and social formations. Rather than asking whether queer theory is translatable or applicable to non-Western societies, we need to learn from their academic work and participate in international and translingual conversations. This move is logically demanded by the question of the material. My analysis of the material in queer theory and Marxism aims to show that the reduction of Marxism to an economic doctrine and the subsequent characterization of queer theory as its culturalist corrective reflect the provincialism of US multiculturalist politics. In the United States, the liberal-pluralist paradigm continues to be the primary language for progressive social policies, which has produced a deeply entrenched impression that the primary obstacle facing queer people is discrimination, mis- recognition, or other forms of mental judgment that impede parity in participation. Seeing the LGBTQIA+ “issue” as a battle against discriminatory attitudes and patterns of evaluation, critics believe that the proper remedy is the promotion of “diversity and inclusion” in the workplace or education. What the language of diversity and inclusion leaves out, of course, is the critique and analysis of the historical processes that authorized certain individuals to decide whom to include, tolerate, and accept in the first place. The implicit message to queer and other oppressed people is that, instead of questioning and demanding fundamental changes in the existing relations of power, they can rely on the good will of enlightened individuals in positions of power to bring about social change. The liberal-pluralist language of diversity and inclusion presents a reformist strategy to assimilate the disenfranchised into the national polity in accordance with mainstream views, instead of a transformative strategy that reconfigures relationships of power and expands the field of gender possibilities. A materialist methodology is a timely response at this critical juncture to counter the liberal-pluralist ideology that gender and sexual minorities only suffer from prejudices or invisibility. With materialist theories like Marxism and a rehabilitated queer theory, we can move past the fantasy that formal legal equality is all we need to eliminate oppression around the world. Though queer theory is haunted by the material, it has also necessitated a rethinking of the material.

### 2AC -- Alt

#### 1 -- The aff solves it -- queer technological engagement infects the capitalist machine of commodification and consumerist desire and “collapses the grid” of neoliberalism

Blas 9 (Zach Blas is an artist and writer based in London. His work engages technology and politics and has been exhibited internationally at venues including IMA Brisbane; Museo Universitario Arte Contemporáneo, Mexico City; Whitechapel Gallery, London; and ZKM Center for Art and Media Karlsruhe. 2009, “GRID: Viral Contagions in Homosexuality and the Queer Aesthetics of Infection,” <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4720v3rx>; accessed 1/5/2022) ng

Queer Technologies proposes a queer grid. If the virus is life exploiting life, Queer Technologies’ formation of a grid calls for an exploitation of the queer self to manufacture difference, that is, to combat the dominant viral GRID of homosexuality, a queer grid must replicate and mutate the dominant never-being-thesameness to produce its own queer never-being-the sameness. Queer Technologies aligns with Alan Liu’s notion of “destructive creativity”—a creativity that goes “beyond the new picturesque of mutation and mixing to the ultimate form of such mutation and mixing: what may be called the new sublime of ‘destruction.’ [. . .] the critical inverse of the mainstream ideology of creative destruction [. . . a] viral aesthetics.”[14] This aesthetics becomes like a repetitive stream of disidentifications—disidentifying as queer cryptography, repetitively infecting the infections of mainstream ideology at the risk of obliterating one’s own “hygiene.” Queer Technologies locates the potential of such an aesthetic viral infection in queer affect. Queer affect as a type of cryptography--nonhygienic ways of being, living, experiencing-- generates a life-resistance that, in its contingencies, mutations, and infections with global capital, produces another queer, viral grid that is an “illegible and incalculable” artificial life to GRID, as it is always forming its life in relation/exploitation to this dominant GRID. A queer GRID is mapped through the potential of relationalities and affects generated in a Queer Technologies event, situated within the context of the encounter between the body in contact and the autonomy of the technological product. The affective encounter holds the potential to explode out into a queer collective force. To diagram this reveals the topological possibilities for queer world-making on and off GRID.: the queer grid is both visible and invisible. Queer Technologies identifies these material practices as queer capitalism. If, in viral capitalism, the commodity is the virus, Queer Technologies produces and manufactures its own line of commodities as political products to infect the desiring-product logic of GRID that constitutes the biosocialities of homosexuality. Queer Technologies refers to its products as gay bombs. Appropriating the mid-90s US Air Force proposal for the development of a biochemical weapon that would turn combatants of war gay, gay bombs, as queer political products circulating in GRID, explodes and infects GRID’s viral logic. Simply put, the circulation of Queer Technologies must exploit capital. Queer Technologies executes this through a variety of tactics: shop dropping, barcode manipulation, price based on cultural institute of dissemination, e-business scams, free giveaways at rallies, and fake tech support centers. Queer Technologies has commenced developing sets of maps and battle plans that are referred to as GRID. Queer Technologies uses the same name for its own queer grids as well as the dominant GRID to virally bind them linguistically and etymologically, in that Gay-Related Immune Deficiencty (G.R.I.D.) is always left as a trace (an infection) within the term “grid.” As Queer Technologies circulates within various cities and geographical areas, at sites such as Target, Best Buy, Circuit City, RadioShack, Wal-Mart, Borders, Barnes & Noble, Apple, and other places of technological consumption, Queer Technologies diagrams and situates these products--gay bombs--within a grided structure. These queer grids, once mapped out, are distributed all over the areas they correlate to: on billboards, sidewalks, signposts, websites, store fronts, etc. Akin to a Situationist dérive, these queer grids attempt to restructure the replications of homosexuality virally produced by GRID. Queer Technologies’ grid project fashions a new topology: these circulated diagrams and situated products in various consumer outlets work toward producing another type of virality that emerges from the fusion of map and territory--viral in that it uses the same logic of viral capitalism: the queer grid allows itself to constantly change and mutate with the dominant GRID to continuously infect capital; it is its own mutation engine that produces queer never-being-the-sameness. The queer grid will crash, succeed, re-chart, change always, replicate always. Its value lies within the fact that each node in the topology--as a gay bomb- -has the potential to explode into a queer relationality, encrypted by another grid, that can generate a whole new set of infections against GRID. Queer Technologies, through all its various tactics--broadly defined as viral aesthetics, infects GRID with another grid. Perhaps these escapings from GRID are momentary, fleeting, but they continue undoubtedly. Escaping the face, the representation, the image, the formation that infects the biosocialities of homosexuality generates the potential for a new viral logic of new queer biosocial formations, a new monstrosity of the homosexual flesh. Queer Technologies calls this flesh theSoftQueerBody—a social, artificial flesh, a materialism of everything, infected as queer.

#### 2 -- Futurism DA -- the alternative relies on a hetero-prophetic trajectory of progress that relapses into the universalizing institutional politics of cisheteronormativity – refuse the logic of programmatic future-making and instead turn inward to acts of micropolitical resistance.

Giffney 8 (Noreen Giffney, Proffessor at University College Dublin Ireland, “Queer Apocal(o)ptic/ism: The Death Drive and the Human,” Published in “Queering the Non/Human, 2008, pp 64)

Reproductive futurism imposes, according to Edelman, 'an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in die process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations' (2). Reproductive futurism absorbs all challenges and translates them into more of the same. It operates in a similar way to Monique Wittig's concept of the straight mind in that 'when thought of by the straight mind, homosexuality is nothing but heterosexuality' (1992,28). Reproductive futurism is a more specific term than heteronormativity in that it describes the process through which heterosexuality becomes heteronormative. Heteronormativity is thus a term to describe a conglomerate of effects while reproductive futurism signifies the process through which such effects are wrought. It is all-encompassing, operating at the level of ideology so that it sets limits on, not just what we think or do, but also on what and how we desire. Desire itself becomes reproductive futurism in its 'translation into a narrative', 'its teleological determination' through politics which 'conforms to the temporality of desire', 'the inevitable historicity of desire' (Edelman 2004, 9). Reproductive futurism is, what I call, 'heterocycloptic', bound up with the desiring gaze and the setting-out of a developmental trajectory of 'progress' moving endlessly towards a 'better' future, in the process imposing a panopticon ¬like self-surveillance: 'It's a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised' (Foucault 1980, 156). It is apocalyptic in the sense that desire itself becomes a trap, a disciplining device in which the norm becomes inextricable from the natural. This technology of power — a 'coercive universalization' (Edelman 2004, 11) operates at the level of fantasy and through the figure of the Child: 'the Child has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and come to be seen as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust' (11). In this, the Child becomes inextricably linked to the future and in turn to politics, and is thus reduced to a trope delimiting what will get to count as the future in advance. Reproductive futurism I believe exercises power contradictorily through a web, a net, a grid. It encourages, perhaps contradictorily, the proliferation of desires - a looking-out as opposed to a gazing-within - in the service of repressing any conscious self-awareness of the death drive. Reproductive futurism is therefore, what I term, 'hetero-prophetic' in that it tries to set out programmatically what will transpire in the future; a future 'endlessly postponed' (13), thus holding the present to ransom. If it is invested in eschatology, it is only as a veneer to discipline those into enslavement to its ideals.

#### 3 -- Conformity DA – communist organizing inevitably excludes and silences queer members by forcing them to conform to their ideal vision of the proletariat. Communist movements have historically been homophobic and claimed that being lesbian arises from unjustified hostilities to men and was an example of developing a lifestyle under capitalism. Don’t let them get away with just saying “not us”; multiple examples of communist movements being exclusionary, and their alt doesn’t do anything to actively include queer people.

**Devrim 12** (Libri Derim writes about their experiences in the Revolutionary Communist Party. “Out of the Red Closet: Gay and lesbian experiences in the previous communist movement” Kasama, January, 2012. https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-8/kasama.pdf) alowenstein

Much has been written about the Revolutionary Communist Party and its ban on gay people within its ranks. Some of us are familiar with the specific anti-gay rationalizations the RCP promoted for thirty years – including its notorious argument that same-sex attrac- tions are a politically reactionary, personal-ideological choice. But what was going on within the RCP was not just a stubborn and arrogant “error of line”– it was also an actual practice that had an impact on real people and real struggle. That is what I want to write about, including what it was like to live “in the closet” inside a communist organization. I want to talk about what it was like to be attracted to the dream of revolution – and then be told that my lesbian feelings were ideologically part of a corrupt and oppressive world order, and that I force myself to have sexual relationships with men in an effort to develop the sexual feelings I was told I was supposed to have, as part of being a revolutionary. I want to talk about the way decent but incredibly ignorant communist com- rades were instructed to correct me, my feelings, and my behaviors. And how, within a movement hoping to carry out liberation, the awful arguments and pressures of anti-gay bigotry were reproduced and enforced. RCP cadre and leaders looked people like me in the eyes and told us to change, conform and be silent — or else get out. At the height of the AIDS crisis, they knowingly opened a horrible split between com- munist activists and those fighting rightwing attacks on gay people. They reproduced within revolutionary ranks (and using “communist” rhetoric) the prejudices, arguments and repressive practices of rightwing re- ligious nuts – and they tried to promote such views more broadly within the left. It seems that most **queer revolutionaries were attracted to what the RCP was putting out**. That they’d go take out the RCP’s newspaper, the Revolutionary Worker, get involved, and **then someone would meet with them to have serious talk about “the Homosexual- ity Question,” and then they would disappear.** In that respect, I was a bit different. I got involved before I came out. After meeting the revolutionaries of the RCP, I joined the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade (RCYB), really throwing myself into it. I was con- vinced that a possible revolutionary situation might be just around the corner (remember that slogan, “Revo- lution in the ‘80s – Go for it!”?). All my free time was spent building for the work this party was doing in my area: I was going to dem- onstrations, taking the paper out, talking to everyone about Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM), postering a couple times a week, going to meetings. It was my whole life. Falling in love Then I started feeling attracted to another girl who was hanging around the RCYB. She was really funny and cute and smart. I thought she was great and I really respected her, especially the way she stood up for what she believed at school, how she would face off the cops at a demonstration without fear, the way she was al- ways ready to take the paper out even when the rest of us got discouraged by all the rejection. I wanted to be around her all the time and I thought about her con- stantly. Everyone else could see I had it bad, but I never noticed! She gave me her green kaffyah and I wore it all the time, even when I went to bed. I always wanted to ride in the same car with her when we went some- place. Her high school was across town from mine but I’d always try to find a reason to go to her side of town to take the paper out in the afternoons so that I could be with her. Finally, one of the other guys in the RCYB said something about me acting like I was in love with her. They were all teasing me about it. I realized that I had had feelings for girls for a while and I started to come to terms with the fact that I was a lesbian. A family’s anger... When I came out, everyone at home was upset. I was prepared for their reactions, I’d heard other stories from teenagers who had come out about how they were rejected or kicked out of the house, so I was ready to face that from my family. My family was upset and angry. They were disap- pointed in me and wanted me to just “get over” what- ever young adult phase I was going through that made me “think” I was gay. I was so depressed that they couldn’t accept me, their daughter, for who I was. But knowing my family’s conservative background, I had expected them to have a negative reaction so it didn’t surprise me. ...then the rejection by comrades What really shocked me was how leaders in the RCYB and the RCP reacted when I told them I was gay. I have to say that none of the other Youth Brigade members had a problem with it except one guy. He was a little immature and made a joke about how he didn’t mind if a girl was gay but there’s no way in hell he’d sleep in the same room with a guy who was gay. (We’d just stayed at a motel when we traveled to another city for an event and all of us had shared a room). But re- ally most young communists of my generation never thought that being gay was wrong – it was something that had to be imposed on us from without, and was done without ever really hearing or respecting our insights. But while the comrades in the Youth Brigade were fine with it I was really shocked by how hostile the RCYB leaders were. I was immediately separated from the rest of brigade – they stopped having me there for meetings and paper discussions, I wasn’t invited to take out the paper or go running in the mornings, and when I showed up at the bookstore for an event I was told to leave. Being educated I didn’t understand the reaction. Finally, after several months of being excluded from everything and with virtually no communication from Youth Brigade leaders, I received a phone call telling me to show up for a meeting at a coffee shop across town the next weekend. Several Youth Brigade leaders were there as well as two RCP leaders (one of whom had never spoken to me before but was clearly in charge). Everyone was very serious. I was pretty intimidat- ed and scared. They were there to explain to me what reality was, and what a communist view supposedly was: Why be- ing a lesbian arose from unjustified hostilities toward men as a whole, how it was like being a feminist-sepa- ratist, and how in the new society, men wouldn’t hurt women and so women would no longer respond to their oppression by becoming gay. Their argument was that lesbianism was a form of reformism – because it sought relief from oppression by developing a lifestyle within capitalism. They made a series of deductive arguments – very divorced from reality and my own situation – that les- bianism was an ideological choice that embodied a re- formist political program and that was therefore not compatible with being a communist revolutionary. Let me remind you that all of this was happening to me when I was a high school student – just barely starting to sort out life, love and sexuality. Looking back it seems clearer they had reproduced within revolutionary ranks (and using “communist” rhetoric) prejudices, arguments and repressive practic- es that were not far removed from rightwing religious nuts and homophobes. I was very young and pretty naïve I guess – I took what I was told at face value as the communist verdict on gay people, and on me. But at a gut level I couldn’t reconcile the idea that my feelings for other girls meant that I was being bour- geois. I still was attracted to other girls, even when I berated myself for feeling that way. I was told that I was viewing the girl in the RCYB that I liked as a sex object, that I was objectifying her because I had sexual thoughts about her. In one painful meeting (at a Burger King – I never wanted to eat there again after this!) I admitted tear- fully that, yes, I had imagined seeing her naked while masturbating. I felt really guilty. **I was pushed into the closet as a price for being considered a revolutionary by those I respected**. And this was doubly painful: I was forced to deny my own feelings in public self-criticism, and I was being trained to confront my continuing feelings as reactionary in the privacy of my own mind. Under watch Once I started being allowed back to Brigade ac- tivities I apologized to this girl for objectifying her; but she just laughed and gave me a hug and said not to worry about it. Local RCP leaders and the Youth Brigade coordi- nator kept me away from her though, and talked about sending me to live in a Brigade house in another city for the summer. That idea was dropped after I failed geometry and had to go to summer school, but for the next year or so, I was closely watched. However, I was spouting the party line, so I was “welcomed” back in the fold. But part of me wondered, what would happen if I didn’t accept what I had been told to believe. A few years later there was another change in the division of labor, I was sent to go work in another area with a new group of people. I had left high school and gotten my GED so I was anxious to start working full time and not having to depend on my family. When I was told to apply for a particular kind of job and live in a shared apartment with some other party folks, I complied. I didn’t really have any reason not to, even though I knew that living with people would be like being at the brigade house full-time; I would never be away from people who could scrutinize my actions and “tell on me” to my leadership. This whole time I had been repressing my feelings, trying to just pretend that they didn’t exist. My leadership brought up homosexuality during a paper discussion and I started defending a group of gay activists and one of their slogans. I was criticized by everyone but this time I didn’t back down, I kept on saying that I didn’t understand the RCP’s position on homosexuality. (Actually, I did understand, but I didn’t feel like I could say that I didn’t agree, it felt safer to just say I didn’t understand).

#### 4 -- Straight Time DA -- generates an “official time line” that glosses over the complexity of violence(s) our critique illuminates. The perm works to “tease” out good police practices from the “bad,” performatively demonstrating their refusal to examine structural interdependence. Their step in the “right direction” is a step in a “straight direction.”

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As a queer criminological text, this book issues a broader challenge to the discipline of criminology. It is a call to question the production of ‘official time lines’ and simplistic dichotomies for the exclusions that they engender and the complexities that they gloss over. Rather than tease out the ‘good’ police practices and strategies from the ‘bad’, a critical and historical queer optic allows us to appreciate the mutual constitution and interdependence of these categories, the slippages and continuities between them in practice, and the powerful forces that reproduce and circulate them. Rather than view the uneven and coercive effects of policing as products of the actions of biased, deficient, or ill-equipped individual officers, we should broaden our analytical framework to account for the historical genesis of policing as a heteronormative and settler colonial project. This reminds us of the importance of preventing (and pursuing accountability for) the immediate harms of policing and punishment—whether as activists or scholars—without getting swept up in the administration of these systems and therefore invested in their continuity. Instead, we might consider strategies to demilitarise and disempower police (McDowell & Fernandez 2018), as well as dedicating more resources towards exploring community-based responses to harm (Kim 2018). As an emerging field of study seeking to distinguish itself from ‘mainstream’ criminology, queer criminology has much to benefit from engagement with abolitionist and anti-carceral feminist thinking (Carlton & Russell 2018; Stanley & Smith 2011; Thuma 2015). We must remain attuned to the violence that underpins the state’s promise of protection. Rather than accepting it at face value that the incorporation of previously excluded groups signifies historical progress and positive change, this book has sought to illustrate the exclusive and regulatory effects of the politics of recognition. My hope is that the narrative presented in this book sparks new questions about the relationship between sexual and gender politics and police power. The surface support for LGBT rights amongst police leaders might indicate success on some levels for LGBT activists who have long fought for queers to be seen as other than criminal and to have access to state protection when it is needed or desired. However, the adoption of LGBT rights language and symbols in by police public relations produces ambivalence and hostility towards police within LGBT movements (Russell 2019). Evolving LGBT-police relations prompt renewed discussion about the role and effects of policing in society, for queers and others. Queer Histories and the Politics of Policing has sought to make sense of contemporary strategies of governing sexuality and gender—the histories from which they emerge and the futures they foreclose—and the threads of resistance running through them.

### 2AC -- AT: Identity Politics

#### Class-analysis that attempts to eschew identity politics is just a ruse for white middle class men to feel included and lead the marginalized in the glory of the revolution. It is an invisible form of white paternal saviorism that pushes identity through the back door of anti-capitalist movements.

Ross 2000 [Marlon B., Professor, Department of English and Carter G. Woodson Institute for African-American and African Studies, “Commentary: Pleasuring Identity, or the Delicious Politics of Belonging,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 4, pages 840-841]

Although in his contribution Eric Lott targets Professor Michaels's comments and his own recent feud with Timothy Brennan (who unfortunately is not included in this volume) rather than Ken's argument, what Eric says about “left and liberal fundamentalists” who “simply and somewhat penitently” urge us to “‘go back to class’” could also be directed at Ken's conclusion. Ken writes, “Crafting a political left that does not merely reflect existing racial divisions starts with the relatively mundane proposition that it is possible to make a persuasive appeal to the given interests of working and unemployed women and men, regardless of race, in support of a program for economic justice.” On this one, I side with Eric, rather than Tim and Ken. Standing on the left depends on whose left side we're talking about. My left might be your right and vice versa, because it depends on what direction we're facing, and what direction depends on which identities we're assuming and affirming. Eric adds, "Even in less dismissive [than Tim's] accounts of new social movements based not on class but on identities formed by histories of injustice, there is a striking a priori sense of voluntarism about the investment in this cause or that movement or the other issue—as though determining the most fundamental issue were a matter of the writer's strength of feeling rather than a studied or analytical sense of the ever-unstable balance of forces in a hegemonic bloc at a given moment." I agree, but I'll risk mangling what Eric says by putting it more crassly. **Touting class or "economic justice" as the fundamental stance for left identity is just another way of telling everybody else to shut up so I can be heard above the fray. Because of the force of "identity politics," a leftist white person would be leery of claiming to lead Blacks toward the promised land,** a leftist straight man leery **of claiming to lead women or queers, but**, for a number of complex rationalizations, **we in the middle class** (where all of us writing here currently reside) **still have** few **qualms about volunteering to lead**, at least theoretically, **the working class toward "economic justice."** What Eric calls here "**left fundamentalism," I'd call,** at the risk of soundingharsh**, left paternalism**. **Of the big identity groups articulated through "identity politics," economic class remains the only identity where a straight white middle-class man can still feel comfortable claiming himself a leading political voice, and thus he may sometimes overcompensate by screaming that this is the only identity that really matters—which is the same as claiming that class is beyond identity.** Partly **this is because Marxist theory and Marx himself** (a bourgeois intellectual creating the theoretical practice for the workers' revolution) **stage the model for working-class identity as a sort of trans-identification, a magical identity that is transferable to those outside the group who commit themselves to it wholeheartedly enough**. If we look back, we realize even this magical quality is not special to a history of class struggle, as whites during the New Negro movements of the early twentieth century felt that they were vanguard race leaders because they had putatively imbibed some essential qualities of Negroness by cross-identifying with the folk and their culture.

## 2AC -- K

### 2AC -- K -- Afropessimism

#### Their theorization of Black death is inapplicable to Black queer subjects -- Black queer subjectivity exists in a space of injury, marked by perpetual conditions of vulnerability and openness to violence rather than bound by non-existence – only including an analytic of queerness can account for the ways the afterlife of slavery uniquely demarcates Black queer life.

Avilez ’20 -- (GerShun Avilez, 2020, “Black Queer Freedom: Spaces of Injury and Paths of Desire,” Urbana: University of Illinois Press, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

Black Queer Freedom: Spaces of Injury and Paths of Desire begins with a consideration of Big Freedia’s account of her life because her experiences can help us think through the boundaries of queer freedom and, specifically, the social threats that are directed toward the Black queer body. Simply moving through space—that is, walking down the street, going to work, traveling across state or national borders, or interacting with institutions—proves to be especially risky business for racial and sexual minorities. This book explains how attending to and challenging such threats constitutes the defining element in the work of Black queer cultural producers. Black Queer Freedom presents the argument that queerness, meaning same-sex desire and gender nonconformity, does introduce the threat of injury, but artists throughout the Black diaspora use queer desire to negotiate spaces of injury.3 I show how Black queer bodies are perceived as social threats, and this perception, in turn, results in threats (physical, psychological, socioeconomic) against these bodies. The Black queer body is immersed in a veritable threat feedback loop. With the spatial metaphor of the feedback loop, I describe the circular thinking that makes minority groups be perceived as perpetual threats. This loop characterizes a situation in which a majority group feels threatened by the presence of a minority group, and this feeling encourages material and symbolic violence against the perceived threat of the minority group, which ironically strengthens (through discriminatory logic) the social perception of the minority population as menacing and troublemaking. This threat loop— that minority bodies are assumed to be threatening whether or not they pose an actual threat—constitutes the space of injury and creates the conditions for Black queer vulnerability. This space of injury for the Black queer body is not necessarily about a particular architecture or location; it is more about the perception and engagement of that body. The space of injury is potentially any space that a queer body occupies or moves through. The point here is not to avoid precision in specifying the space of injury but, instead, to make clear how for many artists and thinkers, it is vital to recognize the possibility of injury in all locations and resist the desired belief that certain places may be assumed to be safe (such as, home, family, or places that claim to be queer friendly). The space of injury actually describes the Black queer body as it exists and moves through space. I do not seek to cast this body as having injury inhere to it; rather, I make the point that because of social norms and dominant ideologies, this body may always be on the verge of injury. Given this idea, I contend that Black queer individuals are injury-bound subjects. I develop this idea through Abdul JanMohamed’s conception of the death-bound-subject and theories of Black social death.4 JanMohamed defines this subject as one that is formed “by the imminent and ubiquitous threat of death” (2). It is a subject bound to and constantly directed toward death. His discussion is useful because it provides a framework for recognizing the social construction of vulnerability for the Black (male) subject in a hostile racial climate. I shift focus from death to injury because the threat of death does not fully capture the multiple kinds of threat (microaggressions, intimidation, humiliation, displacements, detention, defamation, medical abuses, and misgenderings) that racial and sexual minorities experience. One could argue that every physical threat implies the threat of death, but I think the overemphasis on death obscures the nuance and complexity of the multiple kinds of vulnerability minorities face. Freedia’s concern about getting a beatdown is first a fear of injury—physical, emotional, and social. An emphasis on different manifestations of injury illuminates how a broader array of interactions can create conditions of vulnerability, and this more capacious sense of social threat provides the opportunity to consider how gender and class dynamics inflect the threats posed by racism and homophobia.5 This book reflects my careful analysis about how threats of queer injury work assiduously along lines of sex and gender expressions. Throughout this book, the reader will find an explicit focus on the experiences of queer women and queer men with nonconventional gender expression. I work from the understanding that gender expression and identity are imbricated with same-sex desire and can deeply impact if and how one experiences social threat. This recurring attention to the role of gender in the experience of injury indicates the intersectional approach of the methodology as well as a recognition on the level of the argument that all queer bodies may face injury, but all of those bodies do not experience injury in the same manner or to the same extent. Injury, like queerness, is not one-dimensional.6 In a move toward thinking about injury and with a focus on queer bodies that might be injured but not killed, this volume builds on Darius Bost’s bold intervention into Afro-pessimism and the emergent discourses on Black social death.7 Bost insists, “In the context of slavery’s afterlife, asserting the presence of black gay bodies signals how contemporary theories of antiblackness replicate the historical processes of secondary marginalization experienced by blackness’s others” (15; emphasis added). What this critic points to is that which gets lost in the overemphasis on death and absence, especially when we talk about queer bodies, which are often already marginalized if not absent from the narratives and records of the past. My framework of injury emphasizes embodied presence rather than physical or epistemic absence. I take seriously material and epistemic violence but am mindful not to lose sight of the specific realities of queer embodiment within those paradigms.

#### Including queer desire and sexual life in their analytic paradigm generates zones of possibility for insurgent Black life within the conditions of social death – non-normative desire contests the perpetual “threat status” of Black queer being and moves towards an autonomous articulation of life.

Avilez ’20 -- (GerShun Avilez, 2020, “Black Queer Freedom: Spaces of Injury and Paths of Desire,” Urbana: University of Illinois Press, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki

In bringing injury to the fore, this book also prioritizes desire as a means for contesting or simply dealing with social threat. In the context of a pervasive environment of death, the question of desire becomes secondary in JanMohamed’s analysis. He explains, The imminent, unpredictable possibility of death makes [this subject] live in such a way that his being is consumed with the preoccupation of avoiding the possibility of death. On the other hand, the same structure requires him to control his desire to live as fully as he would like since stepping out of the bounds of his social-death could easily result in his death. He is thus obliged to control and repress his own desire for a full life. The deathbound-subject’s “life” is thus defined by the need to avoid the possibilities of life as well as the possibility of death. (19; original emphasis) JanMohamed does a skillful job in tracing out the systematic constraints that render the death-bound-subject a liminal figure who often must restrain or control desire with the goal of self-protection. However, the move to limit or restrain desire is not a prominent concern for Black queer artists and thinkers. Even as they trace out the exact kinds of restraints that JanMohamed describes, the artists considered in this book consistently and defiantly express desire and claim a freedom within restriction. I track an embracing of life and a declaration of desire, both of which are done within the context of injury. The recognition of the ubiquitous nature of many kinds of threats makes the insistence on life and desire more important and their articulations more compelling. The injury-bound subject is a subject who desires, a subject defined not solely by injury but by desire (i.e., affection, unrestrained pleasure, freedom of movement, self-definition, and unencumbered embodiment), and it is the threat of injury that often informs the investment in disruptive desire. These desires become the subject of artwork by Black diasporic artists, and I evaluate the means for expressing such desire and explain the artists’ detailing of the social and psychological contexts of threat. Throughout, this book demonstrates how desire is understood to be a space of freedom as well as a strategy that redefines space. This desirous freedom is not a panacea that solves all problems, nor is it necessarily long-lasting; nevertheless, it offers moments of satisfaction, control, and autonomy. Sometimes, a simple kiss can make one feel freed for a moment. My emphasis on desire in the context of injury builds on recent work from Black queer theorists around questions of the erotic and pleasure. In his exploration of the social significance of unprotected, or “raw,” sex to Black gay men, Marlon M. Bailey advances the concept of erotic (sexual) autonomy in exploring how gay men choose sexual practices in the context of structural drivers. He insists that there is a need to develop a method that “accounts for sexual desires and practices—the contradictions between them—and the social factors and conditions” that shape the paths of and contour those desires and practices.8 As much as his essay is about the value of taking pleasure seriously in studies of Black gay male sexual practices and HIV/AIDS, it also reinforces the point that desire is always expressed in a sociocultural setting, a setting that may be anti-Black and determined by social and economic disparities. For Bailey, raw sex becomes one means for a resistant expression of individual desire and a technique of critiquing prominent discourses about queer vulnerability. In a different context but a similar conceptual register, Amber Jamilla Musser argues, in her extended consideration of sexual objectification of minoritarian women’s bodies, for the importance of stressing embodied pleasure.9 Musser’s book centers around what she calls “brown jouissance,” a concept that emphasizes sensual embodiment (“fleshiness”) that brings together pleasure and pain, subjectivity and objectivity (3). She refuses an understanding of pleasure that might be understood as moving beyond the body (“jouissance” in the psychoanalytic sense). Musser rejects a binary understanding of racialized female embodiment as either being perpetually objectified or simply liberated in a way that might ignore the kinds of structural realities that Bailey describes. In my reading, brown jouissance is a framework for analysis more than a simple description of a kind of pleasure. Brown jouissance is not just about asserting a pleasure-centered subjectivity. The analytic highlights the social conditions that work around and often against the subject; it reflects a “move toward the space around the individual” as it accentuates expression of the sensual for the individual (42). For both Bailey and Musser, defiant assertions of erotic pleasure push against axes of discrimination. What I take from this body of work is that pleasure may be a tool for undermining acts of interpellation but only when queer pleasure is made visible within its restrictive contexts can we fully discern and evaluate the queer subject. Pleasure must be a primary analytic, but pleasure considered in a vacuum tells us very little. It is for this reason that I emphasize threat and forces that seek to limit expressions of queerness in my consideration of desire. The critical move to attend to the “space around” is a way to shed light on the dynamics and complexities of the threat feedback loop. In drawing attention to the “space around,” I consistently detail how this space—consisting of social elements, including laws, public opinion, built environments, family, and employers—determines the social legibility of queer bodies and influences individuals’ relationships to their bodies. The space around bodies informs our understanding of the bodies themselves. I am interested in bodies in space.

Intersections and Dissents: Black Studies and Queer Theory

Before discussing the particularities of Afro-Pessimism and Queer Negativity, definitions

of queerness and blackness, along with their general fields, are needed to place the overall

relationship between the two. Of course, queer theory arose as predominantly white in its subject

matter and considerations. Writers and theorists, such as Roderick A. Ferguson, Barbara

Christian, Evelynn Hammonds, E. Patrick Johnson, José Esteban Muñoz, Jasbir K. Puar, Kathryn

Bond Stockton, and Jack Halberstam, have attended to the field’s treatment of race “as an

addendum.” However, more work needs to be done in this regard, for the whiteness of queer studies still persists. We see this most explicitly in the ways in which queer theory and queer of

color or black queer theory appear as separate entities in disciplinary categories and even indexes

of books. Even if one considers queer of color theory as a subfield of queer studies, the blackness

in the theory must be stated; otherwise, queer theory assumes whiteness.

A similar dynamic applies to black studies, for unless queer is stated in the title of black

studies or in one of its projects, heterosexuality prevails as the assumption. Homophobia in the

black community is certainty a partner in this, which has been thoroughly critiqued by Audre

Lorde, Barbara Smith, and other black feminist theorists. Similarly, systematic racism speaks to

queer theory’s white default. This is not to say that the black community is more homophobic

than others or that racism and homophobia are comparable injustices. The point is that social and

political discriminations penetrate these theoretical modes. The fields’ focuses certainly

contribute to this issue, as queer theory attends to sexuality and black studies to race. The issue is

not the areas’ concentrations but is the assumptions which underlie their projects and manifest in

their scholarship. In other words, queer theory and black studies have enacted the norm of the

other: queer as white and black as heterosexual.

These theories and communities at large still enact these norms, perhaps, on more subtle

levels or, perhaps, not so subtle registers. We witness this in one recent controversy concerning

the rainbow flag. In the summer of 2017, the city of Philadelphia redesigned Gilbert Baker’s

original rainbow layout by adding two stripes to its rainbow—one black and one brown placed

above the rainbow. Philadelphia’s flag was a part of the city’s More Color More Pride campaign,

aiming to illustrate gay liberation’s need for and enactment of inclusivity. Despite the flag’s

intentions, its new design drew harsh criticism within the white gay community, as the critique

### 2AC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

#### queer + indigenous time !

**Rifkin 17**, Dr. Rifkin’s research primarily focuses on Native American writing and politics from the eighteenth century onward, exploring the ways that Indigenous peoples have negotiated U.S. racial and imperial formations. His work explores the roles of gender, sexuality, affect, and eroticism in those processes, addressing legal and administrative frameworks, textual representations, and forms of everyday experience. “Beyond Settler Time”, <https://doiorg.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1215/9780822373421>Pg 36-40

The notion of a generic life cycle organized around conjugal union and reproduction functions as perhaps the most prominent way of envisioning the everyday meaning of continuity. Such an account positions marital couplehood as necessary for procreation itself, and thus the survival of the human species appears to depend on bourgeois family formation and homemaking. J. Jack Halberstam refers to these “conventions of family, inheritance, and child rearing” as “reproductive temporality,” suggesting that “queer uses of time and space develop, at least in part, in opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and reproduction.”123 From this perspective, queer experiences of time run athwart of a projected life course organized around heterocourtship, conventional marriage, and the generationality of the nuclear family.124 More than imposing a particular vision of proper desire and kinship dynamics, this conception of a regular life weds personal development to a universalizing account of the movement of time. That process can be described as chrononormativity, which Elizabeth Freeman defines as “a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts” and in which “historically specific regimes of asymmetrical power” appear as “seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines.” Furthermore, “these teleologies of living, in turn, structure the logic of a ‘people’s’ inheritance: rather than just the transfer of private property along heteroreproductive lines, inheritance becomes the familial and collective legacy from which a group will draw a properly political future.”125 The heteronormative presumption that the nuclear family and its privatized domestic arrangements serve as the basis for human futurity per se casts the legal, political, economic, and spatial dynamics necessary to sustain that social formation as simply the immanent basis for the unfolding of time itself, as inevitably providing the framework for thinking the past, the future, and their relation to the present. Here Freeman builds on Dana Luciano’s notion of chronobiopolitics, developed in Arranging Grief, which Luciano defines as “the sexual arrangement of the time of life.”126 In addition to being institutionalized in various ways, this specific developmental path comes to serve phenomenologically as part of the perceptual tradition through which people reckon with the possible, and heteronuclearity provides the background against which other modes of making a life appear as queer deviations or perverse orientations.127 By seeking to challenge the legitimation and proliferation of straight time (which itself can be understood as a denial of, in Bergson’s terms, the “qualitative multiplicity” of temporal experience), queer critique helps draw attention to how ordinary experiences are influenced by the momentum of dominant formulations of time as well as how such experiences might run in another direction, opening onto forms of temporal feeling that do not fit officially endorsed inheritances and trajectories.128 In other words, queer analyses help open ways of registering the imposed straightness of time while also highlighting alternative kinds of temporal experience. These kinds of questions about how one conceptualizes the proper shape of a life certainly resonate with the ongoing subjection of Native peoples to projects of assimilation that seek to inculcate ostensibly civilized ways of being in-time. In fact, the imposition of heteronormative social dynamics has been a key part of the U.S. government’s efforts to supplant Native modes of collectivity, casting extant Indigenous forms of association, occupancy, household formation, and governance as merely vestiges of a bygone time.129 Many of the initiatives within Indian policy have worked to reorient everyday forms of Native feeling and practice, seeking to alter the experience of time so that U.S. legal geographies and claims to sovereignty provide the background. That chronobiopolitical project depends on an encompassing chronogeopolitics, implicitly positing the givenness of U.S. territoriality and jurisdiction as the self-evident basis for understanding the movement of time. In particular, the allotment program employs reproductive temporality in ways that justify the jurisdiction of the settler state (chapter 3), and a similar aim can be seen at play in the reduction of Native peoplehood to quantities of procreatively transmitted Indian “blood” (chapter  4). Queer theorizations of temporality, then, aid in understanding Native opposition to such policy framings. From this perspective, such resistance appears not as a refusal of the modern but as an expression of alternative experiences of time that persist alongside settler imperatives, and are affected by them, while not being reducible to them. This kind of queer scholarship further challenges the implicit developmentalism of notions of a universal now, placing under significant pressure the historicist presumption that the past is an alien space separated by an unbridgeable gulf from the present. Carolyn Dinshaw has suggested the need to move beyond a notion of history as straight, as an unfolding “causal sequence” that, as such, rules out “an expanded range of temporal experiences—experiences not regulated by ‘clock’ time or by a conceptualization of the present as singular and fleeting; experiences not narrowed by the idea that time moves steadily forward, that it is scarce, that we live on only one temporal plane.”130 The possible range of ways of being-in-time is radically limited if one envisions temporality as singular and linear, as replacing what has come before in its steady forward movement (the kind of synchronous slices of time that Bergson displaces through the notion of duration). Moreover, this notion of time as an unending succession—in which the present unfolds out of the past while supplanting it—can be understood as itself relatively new. As Valerie Rohy observes, “historical alterity is, after all, a recent invention; the conviction that past ages are noncontiguous with modernity is a hallmark of modernity,” and in “Queering History” Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon ask, “Why has it come to pass that we apprehend the past in the mode of difference? How has ‘history’ come to equal ‘alterity’?”131 The positing of the past as on the other side of a great gulf contributes to the sense of the present as something of an integrated whole against which to juxtapose historical events or dynamics (our understandings now versus theirs then), and doing so replaces the coexistence of divergent experiences of time with the difference between the contemporary moment and that which it supposedly has surpassed (such as the antinomy of the modern versus the traditional). The idea of a singular, linear unfolding in which the present supersedes the past might be thought of as a form of “compulsory heterotemporality” in which the understanding of time “mimes the heteronormative demand for proper sexual sequencing,” replaying conceptions of proper individual life sequence at the level of time itself.132 Such a vision of history can be seen at play in the imagining of certain national events, like the Civil War, as moments of transition in which the country breaks away from a degraded past (slavery in the case of the Civil War), as opposed to tracing the regularities of settler violence in which the past appears less as a space of alterity than in a relation of continuity with the present (discussed in chapter 2). In this sense, processes of settler temporal recognition and inclusion might be understood as themselves largely enacted through forms of compulsory heterotemporality that depend on treating the straightness of time (and the ongoing transcendence of the past) as given. If historicism gains legitimacy through its implicit alignment with straightness, deviations from that experience of time can appear as queer. Temporal orientations that do not fit dominant Euramerican frames of reference can be interpellated as abnormal fixations on the past, translated as aberrant tendencies toward anachronism (as opposed to being seen as alternative ways of being-intime). Within Euramerican discourses, the Indian becomes the paradigmatic figure for these kinds of nostalgic inclinations. Discussing the emergence of protocols of bourgeois grieving in the nineteenth-century United States, Luciano observes, “The life-world of the Indian, exterior to the new nation’s modes of ordering, could only be incorporated into its historical timeline through its construction as permanently anterior,” later adding, “The progressive substitution of Indian melancholia, the ultimately fatal embrace of the past, by white melancholy, the reflective look backward that enabled one to continue moving forward, thus bespoke, to whites, their own more sophisticated comprehension of the ‘true’ nature of time’s passage.”133 The Indian serves as a symbol of backward relations to time, of insurmountable melancholic investments in the past in contrast to the putative straightness of time’s passage. The supposed anteriority of Native lifeworlds provides a model of perverse fixity, and, thus, Indigenous experiences of time seem as if they are a deviant way of remaining caught in the past. From this perspective Indigenous duration can be only the carrying forward of what properly should be past, an inversion of “real” time or “natural” time which implicitly is that of Euramerican historicism. Conversely, taking queer insights into account can enrich the meaning of historical density when approaching forms of everyday Native perception, storying, and processes of becoming. Rather than being seen as either a function of straight time (heterotemporal transmission) or simply a deviation from dominant settler linearity, storying can be treated as oriented by its own trajectories, giving rise to fields of possibility that cannot be measured within or through settler frames of reference. Conceptualizing time as not only plural but sensuous, as an expression of affective orientations, directs attention toward the need to consider how quotidian forms and feelings of continuity emerge as part of, in Cordova’s terms, the work of “maintaining stability” amid ongoing processes of transformation and change.134 Shared material conditions can engender forms of perception in common, providing a frame of reference through which individuals reckon with their joint environment. However, such an understanding of perceptual tradition can rely too much on the regularity of those shared circumstances and the group’s long-term containment within a fairly circumscribed area. If they were ever applicable to Native peoples, those kinds of consistency do not necessarily characterize a good deal of Indigenous experience in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century, given dispossessions, dislocations, privatizations, programs of detribalization, urbanization, and various other mobilities (chosen and coerced). Story offers a means of understanding how collective histories can be immanent within everyday interaction and perception, generating kinds of continuity and connections across time that do not necessarily require immediate contiguity of experience (either geographic or generational). As Miranda suggests, having “an identity and community” is possible even in the absence of a legally recognized land base and amid other forms of fragmentation, and part of what enables the sustaining of peoplehood in conditions of dispersion or diaspora is the felt presence of shared (hi)stories amid the circumstances of ordinary life, stories that intimately animate and orient ongoing collective practices of becoming (of re-creation, reinvention, and resurgence).135

#### Heteronormativity in today’s society can be directly traced back to settler colonialism

**Morgensen 11** (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 31-53)//JSL

Modern sexuality arises in settler societies as a function of the biopolitics of settler colonialism. In the United States, the sexual colonization of Native peoples produced modern sexuality as "settler sexuality": a white and national heteronormativity formed by regulating native sexuality and gender while appearing to supplant them with the sexual modernity of settlers. Queer modernities in a settler society are produced in contextual relationship to the settler colonial conditions of modern sexuality. White settlers promulgating colonial heteropatriarchy queered native peoples and all racialized subject populations for elimination and regulation by the biopolitics of settler colonialism. Achille Mbembe has adapted Giorgio Agamben's account of biopower to colonial situations by explaining colonial rule as "necropolitics," or a positioning of the space-time of the colony in a state of exception to Western imperial rule.1 Mbembe invites revisiting the racialization and sexualization of colonial situations, including in white settler societies in the Americas that formed multiracial societies from the transatlantic slave trade, colonized indentured labor, and genocidal control of Indigenous peoples under European settlement. However, to pursue such an account, scholars must explain how the colony comes to be located in a state of exception in context of white-supremacist settler colonialism and the logic of Indigenous elimination. Mbembe's account limited its analysis to modern regimes of colonial biopolitics that arose in the nineteenth-century European franchise colonization of Africa and Asia. As a practice that is not past but continues today, the biopolitics of settler colonialism requires specific study.2 This chapter names necessary elements to such an account, narrowed to explain the settler colonial necropolitics that queered native peoples in the Americas by targeting modes of embodiment, desire, and kinship that Native queer and Two-Spirit people reclaim as their and their peoples' histories. I argue that the biopolitics of settler colonialism produces settler sexuality as the context traversed by non-Native and Native people formulating queer modernities. The queering of native peoples defined not only settler sexuality, broadly, but also the definition of queer subjects among white settlers: as a primitive, racialized sexual margin akin to what white settlers attempted to conquer among natives. when queer white settlers reversed such discourses—notably by laying claim to the colonial object berdache3—they argued their inclusion in settler society by traversing normative paths to settler citizenship, which incorporate and transcend ties to native roots to achieve national belonging. non-native queer modernities form by gathering a multiracial, transnational constituency as a diversity that exists in a non-native relationship to disappearing indigeneity. Yet, narrating native disappearance distinguishes non-native queer modernities from the survival of native queer people, who negotiate settler sexuality by recalling knowledges and practices queered by colonial hetero-patriarchy. native people defined unique identities, including two-Spirit, as modern, decolonizing native critiques of settler colonialism and its structuring of non-native queer projects. this chapter grounds my interpretation of non-native and native queer modernities within a genealogy of white-supremacist settler colonialism as the condition of sexual modernity and its contestation in a settler society.

#### Settler colonialism is inextricably linked to the creation of heteropatriarchal norms in the US

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In this light, native queer and Two-Spirit activisms can be seen to engage, and contest, the settler colonial terms of modern sexuality in ways that remain distinct from the normative affirmation of those terms in non-native queer modernities. This occurs in their discrepant engagement with the biopolitics of settler colonialism that defines modern sexuality in the United States as a "contact zone." Following Mary Louise Pratt, this term invokes Europeans and Indigenous peoples in colonial situations producing conflictual yet creative exchanges, in which "conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict" generate "the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters."44 Theorizing modern sexuality as a contact zone has several implications. First, recognizing that settler colonialism has not ended, "contact" is recognizable not only in the past or in local spaces but as pervasive throughout settler society and all that transpires within it. Indeed, modern sexuality is the contact zone, with all its manifestations meaningfully contextualized by a relationality of "natives" to "settlers" on colonized land. Just as all modern sexual subjects and practices in the United States arose amid settler colonization and narratives of native disappearance, native people articulated modern sexuality as a colonial project while countering it with distinctive Indigenous knowledges and modes of resistance. Second, modern sexuality acts as a contact zone independently of encounters among non-native and native people. For non-natives, sexual modernity produces them as subjects of contact because this modernity presumes native disappearance, by citing native sexual pasts to inspire in non-natives a sexual future. For native people, in turn, sexual modernity incites contact by presenting itself as the modernity of settlers. Even native people who embrace it do not erase its historical ties to colonization, while those who critique it disturb its conflation of coloniality with modernity and create alternative spaces for defining native modernities, including native queer and Two-Spirit activisms. Thus, and third, while the image of a contact zone suggests that colonization is its context, settler formations in fact are being displaced by decolonizing native claims on modernity. While they are interdependent with non-native queer cultures and politics, native queer modernities do not derive from them. Rather, they creatively articulate modern sexuality as settler sexuality by reimagining Indigenous knowledges of personhood and community that never ceased to trouble the supposed universality of settler claims. This book traces the cultural and political effects of this discrepancy in native queer claims on modernity as a counterpoint to the ubiquitous, but not all-powerful, effects of settler sexual culture.

#### The biopolitical imposition of settler sexuality forms the backdown of modern-day heteropatriarchy

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In the Americas and, specifically, the United States, **the biopolitics of settler colonialism was constituted by the imposition of colonial heteropatriarchy and the hegemony of settler sexuality**, which sought both the elimination of Indigenous sexuality and its incorporation into settler sexual modernity. theorists of sexuality who address biopower and colonization are indebted to Ann Stoler's efforts to locate Foucauldian accounts of modern sexuality within colonial studies.8 Although Foucault omitted colonialism from his work on sexuality, Stoler demonstrated how the histories he traced in Europe explain those of imperial metropoles and colonial societies producing modern sexuality and "race" as biopower.9 Stoler displaced more common readings of Foucault's history of sexuality in queer theory, which tended to frame European societies and their normative whiteness as roots of modern sexuality, and to pay secondary or no attention to race or colonialism. In particular, early queer accounts of Foucault's history of modern sexuality did not emphasize his reading of it as a mode of bio-politics, by which he described modern regimes that produce subjects of life by deploying state racism to define populations for regulation. Stoler argued that linking theories of biopolitics and colonialism shifts trajectories of queer theory that would interpret Foucault's history of sexuality as "a history of western desire."10 In light of colonial histories, Europe is Western only to the extent that it is metropolitan—a center of colonial empires —which means that neither Europe nor western cultural legacies will be understood without first studying their formation in relationship to both settler and franchise colonial societies. Stoler and other scholars in colonial studies examined how racial and national formations of sexuality produced the biopolitics of colonial regimes.11 As Stoler notes, a focus on modes of reproduction has accounted poorly for nonheteronormative sexualities and genders, and still requires critically queer readings. Yet work in colonial strudies shows —in concert with Foucault's work, but against limits he put on it—that modern sexuality may have arisen first in colonial societies, including settler colonial societies, if not in their relationship to European imperial states. On this basis, Stoler explains the sexual and racial regimes of metropolitan and colonial societies as based on a colonial "education of desire." Stoler here marks how colonial power deployed a sovereign power over death that nevertheless became complementary with a modern and disciplinary education of desire that produced normative subjects of life in relation to subject populations. She presents colonial biopolitics as what Foucault called a "society of normalization" —"a society where the norm of discipline and the norm of regularization intersect" — and shows that it formed subjects of life and populations marked for deadly regulation by educating them in their interdependent locations within colonial regimes.12

#### Settler colonialism is at the core of the heteropatriarchy, and critiques of such heteronormativity that fail to first comprehend that role recreate settler colonialism – only a prior breakdown of the politics of the settler can resolve either impact

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This book examines how **settler colonial power relations among native and non-native people define the status "queer**." It argues that modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics have developed among natives and non-natives in linked, yet distinct, ways. The imposition of colonial heteropatriarchy relegates native people and all non-native people of color to queered statuses as racialized populations amid colonial efforts to eliminate native nationality and settle native lands. Modern sexuality comes into existence when the heteropatriarchal advancement of white settlers appears to vanquish sexual primitivity, which white settlers nevertheless adopt as their own history. When modern sexuality queers white settlers, their effort to reclaim a place within settler society produces white and non-native queer politics for recognition by the state. Yet memories and practices of discrepant sexual cultures among Indigenous peoples and peoples of color persistently trouble the white settler logics of sexual modernity. For instance, native modes of kinship, embodiment, and desire such as those today called "Two-Spirit" produce Native queer modernities that denaturalize settler colonialism. **the comparative studies in this book show settler colonialism as the context in which non-native and native people produce modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics**. A methodological shift in native studies heralded by such scholars as Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Robert warrior theorizes settler colonialism by tracing the "intellectual histories" (Warrior) and methods of Native peoples practicing survival, resistance, and decolonization.2 Scholarship in settler colonial studies must support this turn, as when Patrick Wolfe theorizes settler colonialism as "a structure, not an event" that calls for a sustained denaturalizing critique.3 Andrea Smith calls on Native studies to refuse its "ethnographic entrapment" in the description of Native cultures and instead become an interdisciplinary site for explaining and transforming a world defined by settler colonialism.4 She promotes this shift by invoking queer theory, which displaced the description of sexual minorities in gay/lesbian studies by theorizing heteronormativity as a power relation that conditions all subjects and social life.5 Scholars at the intersections of Native and queer studies have responded to these calls by demonstrating that each field is intrinsic to the other.6 Smith explains that "the heteronormativity of settler colonialism" has subjected Native and non-Native people to settler colonial rule and regimes of modern sexuality. In this context, "queer" statuses accrue to nonheteronormative identities—such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer—**after colonial heteropatriarchy first redefines embodiment, desire, and kinship to eliminate Native culture, control racialized populations, and secure**, in Sherene Razack's term, **a "white settler society**." In this book, queer will refer to statuses produced by the heteropatriarchal power of white supremacist settler colonialism. My analysis joins critics of homo-normativity in arguing that all "queer" statuses are not equivalent.7 Jasbir Puar critiques "homonationalism" as the process whereby whiteness and imperialism create U.S. queer subjects as "regulatory" over peoples queered by U.S. rule.8 I resituate Puar's account to argue that **in a white settler society, queer politics produces a settler homonationalism that will persist unless settler colonialism is challenged directly** as a condition of queer modernities.9 Native and queer studies must regard settler colonialism as a key condition of modern sexuality on stolen land, and use this analysis to explain the power of settler colonialism among Native and non-Native people. This book investigates how settler colonialism produces what I call "non-Native queer modernities," in which modern queers appear definitively not Native—separated from, yet in perpetual (negative) relationship to, the original peoples of the lands where they live. The phrase suggests a settler colonial logic that disappears indigeneity so it can be recalled by modern non-natives as a relationship to native culture and land that might reconcile them to inheriting conquest.10 Thus, "non-native" signifies not a racial or ethnic identity but a location within settler colonialism. non-native queer modernities naturalize settler colonialism when they confront queer differences as racial or diasporic in a manner that sustains native disappearance. If queer subjects align with whiteness or homonationalism, their settler colonial roots may seem clear. But **even multiracial and transnational queer critiques of racism and imperialism can erase native people and naturalize settler colonialism** in ways that indirectly or directly define queer modernity as not native. This book examines "native queer modernities" as projects that formed historically precisely to displace the settler colonial logics that sustain "non-native queer modernities."

#### Theorizations of queerness that don’t centralize settler colonialism recreate queer citizenship and homonationalism

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Modern sexuality arose in the United States as crucial to a colonial society of normalization. The violent sexual regulation of Native peoples became a proving ground for forming settler subjects as agents and beneficiaries of modern sexuality. Their subject positions arose relationally within the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality and call for broad analysis in queer, American, and Native studies. 40 I now ask how colonial histories made settlement a primary condition of the formation of modern queer subjects and politics in the United States. I reexamine scholarship in queer studies that suggests this claim, and I mark how future queer scholarship can center the study of settler colonialism, including as a condition of homonationalism. Settler colonialism is the open secret in most historical work in U.S. sexuality studies and queer studies. Settler colonialism **conditioned every aspect of the history of sexuality in the United States**, but only rarely has it been made a focus of study. My account has suggested a convergence between the sexual colonization of Native peoples and the growth in the United States of techniques of modern sexuality. These proliferated in the decades following the frontier’s “closure,” a time that in fact represented a heyday of state and religious efforts to institute a colonial education of desire, as in the events at the Crow Agency or during the 1879 – 1918 tenure of the Carlisle Indian School. Far from reflecting finality, this period witnessed tense negotiations of active and contested settlement. In such a time, any iteration of modern sexuality that placed Native people in the past knew itself to be a contingent claim that remained open to challenge. Thus scholars must recognize that modern sexuality is not a product of settler colonialism, as if it came into being in the United States after settlement transpired. Modern sexuality arose in the United States as a method to produce settler colonialism, and settler subjects, by facilitating ongoing conquest and naturalizing its effects. The normative function of settlement is to appear inevitable and final. It is naturalized again **whenever sexuality or queer studies scholars inscribe it as an unexamined backdrop to the historical formation of modern U.S. sexual cultures** and politics. Scholars in Native and American studies have theorized settler colonialism as the social processes and narratives that displace Native people while granting settlers belonging to Native land and settler society. With Renée Bergland and James Cox, I examine how this displacement is enabled by settler narratives of Native absence or disappearance.41 Both terms share a quality of invoking the very thing being argued as not present. Stories of Native absence or disappearance thus precisely do not erase Native people but produce particular forms of knowledge about Native people, as already or inevitably gone. Cox argues that tales of Native disappearance should also be read as narratives of settlement. The very absence of Native people in a story is telling us a story about qualities of settler subjects, cultures, and social life. Queer scholarship on race and sexuality has been effective at marking colonial relations and discourses and inviting the study of settlement. Scholars reveal that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sexual sciences and civil institutions distinguished primitive from civilized sexuality in order to define queer margins for sexual normality. Eithne Luibhéid and Roderick Ferguson explain how Asian immigrants and conquered Mexicans after the midnineteenth century, and African Americans during slavery and the Jim Crow society, were produced as racial and sexual populations for national regulation.42 Queers of color in such contexts were targeted for control, but as emblems of entire racial populations to be queered as the primitive margins of national whiteness and its civilizational sexuality.43 In turn, Jennifer Terry and George Chauncey, among others, explain how sexual sciences classified perversions by documenting white subjects as degenerates who had regressed to prior stages of racial evolution. 44 In early activism, white sexual minorities reversed discourse on sexual primitivity in order to embrace it as a nature deserving recognition by modern citizenship. In the United States, Harry Hay organized the Mattachine Society by referencing stories of berdache as the primitive nature of sexual minorities and as a primitive model of acceptance that modern societies could emulate — themes that were sustained in homophile and gay and lesbian civil rights activism.45 Each such moment is illuminated by its relation to settlement. As Luibhéid’s remarkable historical research suggests, the structural locations of non- Native people of color within the biopolitics of modern sexuality in the colonial and imperial United States align with those assigned to Native peoples by sexual colonization.46 Their distinctive encounters with racial and sexual power thus may be examined as interrelated effects of the United States forming as a colonial power through processes of settlement. Yet studying their ties also will mark the many nonidentical locations occupied by non-Natives, including queers of color, in relation to Native people under colonial conditions of settlement. In turn, white U.S. sexual minorities who defended their sexual primitivity **articulated normative practices of settler citizenship**. Philip Deloria and Amy Kaplan have examined settler citizenship as based on the conquest and incorporation of primitivity, so that primitivity becomes a resource to be drawn on when asserting the unique strengths of a settler civilization.47 Modern sexuality discourses also taught white U.S. American men to tap and control their primitive roots, as when G. Stanley Hall’s recapitulation theory of play or youth health movements in the YMCA invited white youth to explore primitive developmental stages so as to become civilized adults with virile sex and sexuality.48 White U.S. sexual minorities thus organized in a political culture that already validated a journey to personhood and citizenship that translated primitive roots into settler modernity. Defending primitive sexual nature, which could include appropriating Native American culture as part of their history, translated their queer marginality into a normative assertion of settler citizenship. Focusing on settlement also marks the way that theories of degeneration assigned to modern queers in the early-twentieth-century United States presumed Native disappearance. As degenerates, modern queers appeared as failed subjects, incapable of representing either white civilization or authentic primitivity. Yet this framing **also naturalized them across racial differences as non-Native**, in that it presumed that authentic Native people had already disappeared from the modern and settled spaces where queer degenerates would be found. If living Native people ever did appear in those spaces, they tended to present as out of place. For instance, Nayan Shah’s compelling history of sexuality and migration cites a California police report from 1918, which criminalized a relationship between a South Asian migrant man and an American Indian youth by narrating it as sexual predation. This regulatory moment occurred amid recent histories of scalp bounties and massacres targeting Native peoples across Northern California, including only two years after the death of Ishi, famed survivor of the Yahi tribe. How might popular narratives of lost Native authenticity have shaped the police description of the youth only by his town of origin (Truckee) and his assimilation into a multiracial underclass? How, still, might tales of sexual primitivity persist, as his framing as the passive object of his racialized partner’s desire suggests (without naming) the logic of berdache? 49 In turn, Siobhan Somerville and Kevin Mumford have shown how popular stories and social practices in the early twentieth century linked homosexuality to miscegenation, including representing it as emblematic of white “slumming” for sexual adventure in African American districts of New York City and Chicago.50 Yet in the Northeast, blackness already connoted historical miscegenation with Indianness. Amy den Ouden has explained how in the wake of normative associations of Native people with blackness in New England, Native communities with black family lines could be marked by white authorities as racially inauthentic, thereby delegitimating their Native identities and land claims. In light of this, by the early twentieth century, how did discourses on sexual perversion tie Indianness and blackness to homosexuality, and how did they interlink? Did the histories of black-Indian communities and of their regulation shape modern racial theories of homosexuality? What would a queer history of homosexuality and miscegenation look like if Indianness — as an identity, or an object of colonial discourse — were crucial to analysis?51 Queer studies **must center settler colonialism** and processes of settlement in order to pursue these directions in scholarship. Settler colonialism appears in the relational of colonial and modern sexual regimes; in narratives of sexuality and gender based on Native absence and disappearance, despite evidence of Native survival and resistance; and in the normative formation of settler sexual subjects, cultures, and politics. I argue that queer **accounts of settler colonialism will be supported by studying the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality**. The frame of colonial biopolitics makes the discursive and institutional relationality of Native and settler subject positions relevant to any account of modern sexuality in the United States. While such accounts have tended to exclude Native people, biopolitics marks erasure as meaningful to narrating settlement, even as that move can be investigated for evidence of the irruption of Native people amid stories of their demise. The frame of colonial biopolitics will also mark how the power relations structuring “Native” and “settler” articulate diverse people, cultures, and politics across differences of race, nation, class, disability, gender, and sexuality that exceed these two terms and their opposition. Yet the normativity of the terms within colonial biopolitics will still inform every U.S. formation of modern sexuality. Studying their relationality can recall that the locations they define for Native people always are exceeded by the discrepant histories and epistemologies of Native people’s interdependent and resistant lives. In turn, the term non-Native can help mark how subjects outside Native communities incompletely fit the term settler — whether excluded from it categorically or asked to pass through or appeal to it — as they negotiate varied non-Native lives in a settler society. Differences among non-Native people of color, or between them and white people, thus will not be erased by marking their shared inheritance of settler colonialism; indeed, doing so will mark those differences, even as their distinctive relationships to settler colonialism and its naturalization become relevant to study.52 In the process, analyzing the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality will focus queer studies on the work of denaturalizing settlement. I mean here not just that settler colonialism will be marked as a condition of all modern sexual power in the United States but also that the meaningfulness of its naturalization will become a major area of study. We need many more, and more detailed accounts of the subjects, institutions, and power relations that form whenever settler colonialism is naturalized within modern queer projects in the United States. My argument invites scholars to return to **homonationalism and explain it as one crucial effect of the settler histories of modern sexuality** in the United States. We will see that if non-Native queers become sexual subjects of life, **they will do so by joining a colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality that functions to produce modern queers as settler subjects in relation to Native peoples**. Normatively white and national queer politics will arise here by naturalizing settler colonialism, notably when appeals to the settler state fail to trouble its colonial relation to Native peoples and its enforcement of a settler society.53 To invoke Puar, the settler formation of U.S. queer projects will make them “queer as regulatory” over Native peoples, whose social lives will appear distant in time and space despite the continued existence of collective and allied Native activisms for decolonization and calls to non-Natives to join. Homonationalism will arise here, where the historical and contemporary activity of settler colonialism conditions queer modernities in the United States.